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In the period of  transition which followed the collapse of  the USSR, the states 
of  that region were forced to make many political and economic adjustments. 
A crucial part of  the process was the restructuring of  relations among these 
formerly fraternal republics and as they became in 1991, independent states. 
F  or most states structuring relations with Russia became a priority since it is 
the largest and most dominant regional actor. Such relations are shaped by a 
number of  factors including historical development, economic legacies and 
geopolitical concerns. 
These issues have impacted upon the evolving relationship between Russia and 
its Slav neighbours, Ukraine and Belarus.  Drawing on a common background 
in terms of  historical  political, economic and cultural development, Russia's 
relations with these states developed to the point where they were formalized in 
a Russian Belarusian Community (1996) and a Russian Ukrainian Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation (1997). The impetus for Russia to renegotiate its 
relations with the states on its western borders was strengthened by the 
proposed eastward expansion of  NATO. Belarus and Ukraine however 
benefited from this. Belarus was guaranteed cheap supplies of  Russian natural 
resources, vital for its economy,  even if this came at the cost of ceding a 
degree of  sovereignty. Ukraine, still excluded from European political and 
economic organizations was recognized by Russia as independent state and 
significant regional influence. Russia secured a buffer zone on its western 
borders. 
Russia's relations with Ukraine and Belarus are now qualitatively different. 
Ukraine has emerged as a potential  allYarn:I.~en future rival to Russia while 
Belarus  has opted to become a Russian ciienfstate with, it appears, the 
ultimate goal of  union with Russia. Acknowledgements 
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When the USSR collapsed  in 1991, the submerged nations which had been contained or 
suppressed by communism  emerged as nation states. The legitimacy of  claims to nation state 
status was undisputed in several instances, notably Russia, the former centre of  the Tsarist and 
Soviet empires and the three Baltic states of  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, whose forcible 
incorporation into the USSR in 1940 had since been acknowledged and condemned by all, even 
Russia.  Some nations, chiefly Ukraine, had a  history of  movements striving for striving for 
national autonomy and even independence but had experienced  these only briefly in the past, if . 
at all. Others however had weaker claims to legitimacy, borne of  their artificial construction 
within the so called federation that was the USSR. Amongst these are included the Central Asian 
states and Belarus, the third of  the Slavic states of  the European part of  the USSR.  I 
The three states examined in this thesis fit into each of  these categories. Russia, with a largely 
incontestable right to statehood; Ukraine with a strong sense of  national destiny but only limited 
experience of statehood, and Belarus, with an under-developed sense of  national identity  and 
consciousness. The issue of  legitimacy and strong historical and sociopolitical foundations for 
independence was to be of  great importance in the consolidation of  nation statehood in the post 
independence period. 
For  these new states, independence meant a restructuring programme - abandoning the centrally 
controlled political and economic systems of  the Soviet era and replacing them with a pluralist 
democracy and free market economy. Some have progressed more rapidly than others and this is 
due to a number of  factors. The success of  Russia is attributed to the favourable infrastructure 
created by the Soviet regime as well as its plentiful resources. For the Baltic states, their 
experience of  independence in the interior period had a strong impact on their post-Soviet 
adaptation, as well as favourable infrastructures.  However these factors alone do not guarantee 
success. Both Ukraine and Belarus boast comparatively well developed infrastructures and 
sufficient resources yet have been less successful in their economic restructuring. This is partially 
explained by a strong predilection for Soviet style politics and economics,  most evident  in 
Belarus but also acting as a restraint on more radical reform in Ukraine. The involvement of 
western financial and political institutions (e.g. The International Monetary Fund and the 
Council of  Europe) as well as Western governments (e.g. the British Government's 'Know How 
Fund')  in the restructuring process led academics, politicians and the Western media to focus 
primarily on internal political and economic developments once key international issues such as 
nuclear weapons had been resolved. By and large this reflected a Russo-centric approach 
recognising that Russia was the dominant state in the region of  the former Soviet Union (FSU). 
1 My use of  Slavic rather than Slavonic conforms to conventions in the Social Sciences even 
though Slavonic is technically the more accurate adjectival form. In the initial post-Soviet years, much of  the literature consisted of 'familiarisation' monographs, 
reflecting the need for material on these new states, of  which little was previously available. 
These often consisted of  a potted history of  the state and a description of and comment on their 
'transition'·2  Generally changes in the external relations of  the new state were dealt with only 
selectively, and tended to focus on Russia) There were some exceptions - Taras Kuzio 
recognized the importance of  Ukraine as a second regional power early on with the publication of 
his Ukrainian Security Policy (1995).4 
Relations among the former republics themselves was a neglected area of  study. The collapse of 
the USSR meant that these new states now had to relate to each other as regional neighbours and 
since Russia was the dominant state in the area, this meant  in the first instance, working out 
their relationship with it. Monographs charting the historical relationship and the evolution of 
the post-Soviet relationship were slow to appear. Karen Dawisha's and Bruce Parrott's Russia 
and the New States of  Eurasia (1994) was one of  the earliest.s 
The uniqueness of  the problems and issues generated by the emergence of  the Soviet successor 
states was not adequately met by the emerging literature of 'Transitology' and Post 
Communist Studies'.6  The latter approach addressed how the transition was undertaken 
internally, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives but  overlooked its impact on with 
neighbouring states.7  Transitology endeavoured to provide models of similar transitions to 
measure and compare the experience of  the newly independent states (NIS), but while 
comparisons with other transitions from authoritarianism, e.g. Latin America and Chile, had 
some utility  for examining internal developments, they had little value for understanding 
2 See for example Bremmer, I., & Taras, R, (eds)  Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor 
States Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1993  and New States New Politics: Building the Post Soviet 
Nations  Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1997 
3 Petro, N.N., &  Rubinstein, AZ., Russian Foreign Policy  - From Empire to Nation State 
New York: Longman 1997 
4 Kuzio, T.,  Ukrainian Security Policy  Washington:Praeger  1995 
5  Dawisha, K., &  Parrott, B.,  Russia and the New States o/Eurasia Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1994,  was one of the earliest. 
6 see for example: Mandelbaum, M., Post Communism - Four Perspectives  New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations 1996;  Khazanov,  A, M.,  After the USSR - Nationalism and 
Politics in the Commonwealth o/Independent States Wisconsin: University of  Wisconsin 
Press 1995; Colton T. l,  &  Legvold, T. l  After the Soviet Union From Empire to Nations 
New York: W.W. Norton & Co 1992;  Holmes, L., Post Communism - An Introduction 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1997 
7 One critic of  this was Mette Skak who argued Post Communism should abandon the 
preoccupation with the domestic dynamics of  transition and  focus on foreign and security 
policy.  Skak, M., From Empire to Anarchy: Post Communism, Foreign Policy and 
International relations  London: Hurst & Co  1996 pI 
:2 relations among the NIS. 
Given the vastness of  the area of  the FSU and the diversity of  transitional experiences there, a 
comparative methodology was found to most useful for this research. However a comparative 
study investigating how the ex-republics restructured relations with Russia and each other 
could only  produce a very general analysis. It seemed necessary therefore to identify  a suitable 
sub-region as a case study. In this instance the sub-region of  the Slavic states of  Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus was identified as a suitable unit of  analysis.  This approach facilitated intra and inter 
sub-regional comparison after which a whole regional could be studied. This is envisaged as the 
basis of  post doctoral research. 
At this critical  juncture in the history of  the region the comparative method facilitated a 
reevaluation of  the concepts and theories applied to Soviet and Post Soviet Studies.8  Analyses of 
nation states and state building could be undertaken on a comparative basis not only amongst 
post communist nations but with other nations at  similar stages of  development.  In the long 
term the comparative approach offered opportunities for trans-regional comparison. For 
example a comparison between Russia's  relationships with the  former Soviet republics and that 
of  the USA and the countries of  Latin America would be useful for understanding relationships 
between regional hegemonies and peripheral nations. 
I selected the Slavic sub-region as a comparative unit because of a) similarities in their historical 
background and their political, economic, social and cultural development,  and  b) differences in 
their national development since independence. These factors have affected the types of 
relationships which have evolved since 1991. 
Commonality  between these states derives from their  linguistic and cultural affinity and a 
common history as tribes descended from the ancient kingdom of  Kievan Rus' and the provinces 
of  Tsari  st Russia (though this is frequently disputed, particularly by Ukrainian nationalists). 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were the three key areas of  the former Tsarist empire which formed 
the USSR in 1922, and it was these states which left  it in 1991, to form the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS).  They all played a key role within the USSR: Slavs formed the majority 
of  the CPSU membership and took up key positions in other republics which was  important for 
reinforcing the  communist system throughout the region.  In Soviet times all three republics 
made important contributions to sustaining the union: Ukraine and Russia economically, and 
Belarus strategically. They were the key republics of  European part of  the USSR  and the most 
industrialized. On the eve of  independence  they were thought to be the republics most capable of 
effecting successful market reform (apart from the Baltic states). They had suffered greatly 
during World War Two, doubly from the scorched earth policies of  the Soviet administration 
8 Chandler, A., The Interaction of  Post Sovietology and Comparative Politics - Seizing the 
Moment Communist and Post Communist Studies  Vol 27 No 1 p 3-17 1994 
3 fleeing from the Nazi advance and the Nazi withdrawal as the Red army pushed the Germans 
back. Since 1991 all three states were courted by the West, initially  because of  the nuclear 
weapons which the West wanted to demilitarize (successfully); Russia because of  its status as 
regional power, its military capability and potential economic strength and Ukraine, with a 
population  of  52 million making it the  second largest nation in the region with good economic 
potential and a possible bulwark against Russian expansionism. However  in spite of  a range  of 
similarities and common experiences, since 1991 the Slavic states have developed in different 
ways and this is evident in the different type of  relationship which Russia has formed with 
Ukraine and Belarus. 
The main aim of  this research was to investigate and analyse how these relationships evolved in 
the post-Soviet period and explain why they varied. Since Russia is the dominant power in the 
region, the research focused on its relations with  the two other Slavic states. It traces the 
evolution of  the relationship from 1991 until 1997, when a historic point was reached with the 
eventual signing of  the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of  Friendship and Cooperation (June 1997) 
and the Agreement to pursue greater union with Belarus (May 1997).  Although Russia remains 
the dominant partner, by the end of the research period (1997) the Slavic Triangle had become 
inverted, with Ukraine emerging as a credible partner for Russia, and potentially a serious rival, 
while Belarus's  position was greatly weakened,  rendering it vulnerable to influence from either 
or both of  its Slavic neighbours. 
The Slavic Triangle (1991)  The Slavic Triangle (1997) 
Russia  Russia  Ukraine 
Ukraine  Belarus  Belarus This then is a comparative study using a qualitative research methodology and favouring a cross 
disciplinary approach. I began my research in  autumn 1993 at a time when new approaches to 
Post-Soviet Studies were being debated.9  The collapse of  the USSR was seen as presenting a 
unique opportunity to break away from the more narrowly focused approaches of 'area studies' 
and apply the methodologies of  other related disciplines, e.g. Comparative Economics, 
Comparative History and Comparative Politics. With a background in History and Politics and 
having completed my M.Phil dissertation on 'Russian Foreign Policy in Transition 1991-
1992',10  this doctoral thesis was an opportunity to apply the comparative methodology on a 
cross republic basis. The research was supported by a number of  field trips to the FSU  between 
1992 and 1998. 11  During these research trips I interviewed political advisors, academics and 
members of  local government. On several occasions I visited the Russian Duma and spoke with 
Dr Alexei Kuzmin, special advisor to Gregori Yavlinsky ofYabloko.  My main research activity 
however was library and archival based, collecting and analysing materials relating to my main 
area of interests and included statistical evidence, newspaper commentaries, texts of  treaties and 
research monographs. I have endeavoured where possible to refer to original sources in Russian 
and Ukrainian. On a few occasions sources could only be found in translation and for these the 
Current Digest of  the Post-Soviet Press was consulted. Tracing original sources for television and 
radio interviews and commentaries was particularly difficult and for these the Summary of World 
Broadcasts (SWB)  and the Open Media Research Institute's Daily Digest were helpful. 
An approach which is comparative historically, politically  and economically  contributes greatly 
to understanding the changes underway in the FSU and provides a framework  for analysing the 
restructuring of  relations between Russia and its neighbouring republics.  Historical comparisons 
and analogies offer guidelines by which to understand processes of  change in the FSU. In 
particular, two related historical processes are of  value (i) Collapse ofEmpire12  and  (ii) 
Decolonization. 
Collapse of  empire is a rare historical phenomenon.  The collapse of  the Soviet empire was 
made more unique because it represented the collapse of  the ideology upon which the empire had 
existed and expanded and also because of  the scale and speed with which the Soviet collapse 
occurred. Because of  this, comparing the Soviet experience with the post imperial experience of 
other states has some but only limited value.  The most recent examples - the withdrawal of  the 
9 Fleron, F.J., and Hoffman, E.P., Post Communist Studies and  Political Science  Boulder, 
Colorado:WestviewPress 1993; Subtelny, 0., 'American Sovietology's Great Blunder' 
Nationalities Papers Vol 22 No 1 Spring 1994; 
10 McMahon, M.A., The Foreign Policy a/Transition  M.Phil. Dissertation  University of 
Glasgow 1992 (Unpublished) 
11  see appendix one for full list of  research trips 
12 Skak defines the transition from communism as a special type of transition or 'Imperial 
Transition'  Skak 1996 p18 
5 British from India and the French from Algeria - can help us understand better the issues of 
imperial elites and ethnic minorities.  However these were very different types of  empires from 
the Soviet empire.  The imperial lands of  the USSR were those regions geographically contiguous 
to it.  For the imperial powers of  the twentieth century, their imperial colonies were far from the 
metropolis, separated by land and sea. 
While there are a number of  historical precedents for the collapse of empire, a comparison with 
the Austro-Hungarian  empire helps us to understand some of  the factors leading to the collapse 
of  a multinational empire as well as the nature and structure of  the political entities which 
supplant the empire. It also shows how post imperial states can organize their external  relations 
to reduce though still sustain the interdependence which had been a feature of  imperial relations. 
The collapse of  the Austro Hungarian empire as a consequence of  the First World War offers 
many comparisons. Like the FSU, the Austro Hungarian empire was multinational, made up of 
ethnically and economically diverse regions. 13 
When empires collapse, new states or 'pseudo' states emerge.  These are often nation states of 
dominant ethnic groups whose statehood had been repressed or retarded within the empire. When 
new states emerge, their survival depends upon their viability. Congruent with this is a strong 
sense of  national identity and legitimate right to statehood though of equal importance is 
economic viability  so they are not wholly dependent on other states.  However, while new and 
viable states can emerge, a consequence of  the collapse of  empire is the creation of weak states -
politically and economically, formed around one or many  ethnic groups. These could be called 
ethno nations. A useful analogy here are the new states which emerged in Central and Eastern 
Europe after World War One. 
Since the relationship between centre and periphery in the Soviet era was often defined in 
colonial  terms  and is increasingly interpreted as such by a growing number of  former Soviet 
republics, examining the process of  change in the FSU in this context is useful for  understanding 
the political and economic actions of  these newly independent states and specifically how they 
redefine and restructure  their relationships with the centre. This entails looking at how post 
imperial states consolidate  statehood and examining how they guarantee their viability. In an 
increasingly interdependent world, it is almost impossible for any state to maintain an autarkic 
existence. Political, economic and military cooperation with other states is essential.  So another 
consequence of the collapse of  empire is the development of  a new network of  partners, allies 
and even unions, usually, though not always and not necessarily for the mutual benefit of 
participating states. With the collapse of  empire a dual process of  deconstruction and 
reconstruction is begun. 
A continuity thesis has some value when applied in the political context, examining continuity 
13 Taylor, A.J.P., The Habsburg ivlonarchy 1809-1918  London:Penguin 1948  Ch  18 
6 or discontinuity  in policy formulation amongst a number of  political actors and specifically the 
formulation of Russia's policies towards Ukraine in comparison to its policies towards Belarus. 
During the process of  imperial collapse and national reconstruction some degree of  continuity is 
inevitable in policy, practice and personne1. Examining this process, identifying changes and 
explaining why other areas remain unaltered are some of  the tasks of  the researcher. Reference 
to and comparison with similar processes can be helpful at this stage. 
A comparative analysis of  the processes of  nation building  and the institutionalisation of 
statehood  also provides useful insights into the perceptions of  nationhood amongst newly 
independent nations and of  their position regionally and internationally. This approach also 
facilitates an examination  of  the  restructuring of external relations, by which these new states 
can construct the means to co-exist  and co-operate in a new political environment. 
Economic reforms resulting in a shift from centrally planned to market type economies  have 
been undertaken by most of  the former Soviet Republics. By examining the nature of  these 
reforms, their pace and intensity and their success or potential success, I was able to ascertain 
the structure of  new  economic relations among the ex-republics in the post-Soviet phase, 
identifying those factors which determined the economic relationship.  Beyond this however 
there was an opportunity for a wider comparative analysis at a supra regional level. Specifically, 
the similarities and differences between Europe in 1945 and the area of  the FSU in 1991 provided 
a mechanism for understanding how the countries of  the FSU could attain economic viability 
individually and jointly. 
Contextual Framework 
The contextual framework for the research was established by framing a number of  key research 
questions: 
• What were the outcomes of  imperial collapse for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus? 
• What specific issues and problems arose from the emergence of  these states as a result of 
the above process? 
• How did they organize their external relations and what factors determined and shaped 
these? 
• Was some form of  reintegration or reunion inevitable amongst these states? 
In chapter two the historical relationship between the three Slavic states of  the FSU is examined, 
identifying the legacies which have impacted on their relations since independence. The process 
of imperial disintegration in the late 1980s and the interaction of  these republics at this time is 
examined in chapter three. Russia and Ukraine took the lead in this process and it was largely as a 
result of  their actions that the USSR was dissolved in  1991. Its successor, the Commonwealth of 
7 Independent States (CIS) was viewed in differing ways by the ex-republics. A lack of consensus on 
its role and function, mainly from Russia and Ukraine, rendered the CIS  largely  ineffective and 
resulted in relations between the new states being organized at a bilateral level. The reasons for 
this and its consequences are considered in chapter four.  One of  the main reasons for the 
creation of  the CIS was the maintenance of  a common economic space. There were however 
other geopolitical factors which shaped Russia's support for a regional organization. These 
factors and Russia's means of  protecting them are examined in chapter five.  Russia's prioritising 
of  its regional interests meant focusing on its relations with Ukraine and Belarus. The evolution 
of  this relationship, the imperatives driving it, and the agreements reached with both states are 
examined in chapter six.  Chapter seven evaluates the nature of  the Russian-Ukrainian and 
Russian-Belarusian relationship six years after independence. It shows how the balance has shifted 
among the republics so that Ukraine has emerged as an influential regional actor and potential 
rival to Russia while Belarus has retreated backward to the statist policies of  the Soviet era, 
criticised by and isolated from the international community. 
8 Chapter 2  Russia's Relations with Ukraine and Belarus in  Historical Context 
Russia's relations with Ukraine and Belarus in the post-Soviet era have been defined 
by their relationship in the past.  This is more than simply a bond derived from their 
common Slavic past, though this is of  course an important component of  their current 
relationship. Historic ties can provide a raison d'etre for sustaining or reviving 
relations but alone are not sufficient to explain the nature of  the relationships which 
exist today. These are determined by the needs of states which are now independent 
and which must find a way to exist in a manner which is advantageous for them. 
In the years immediately following the collapse of  the USSR Russia was often cast in 
the role of  a regional hegemon pursuing an neo-imperialist policy which threatened the 
existence of  the newly independent states of  the region. This image was often 
promoted by nationalists in the more independent minded states such as the Baltic 
States and  Ukraine, and was frequently reproduced in the Western media.  Certainly, 
Russia's actions in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Chechnya) did little to dispel such an 
impression. But the degree to which Russia could have been viewed as a real threat to 
new states of  the region can be tested by examining its actions in recent years. Inter 
republican conflict, widely predicted in the early post-Soviet years, has been largely 
avoided. Where conflict has occurred it is usually linked to internal ethnic and tribal 
disagreements. No where has Russia sought to  suppress or take over a neighbouring 
state. Belarus offers a prime example of  Russia declining such an opportunity. The 
emergence of  a new type of  'Slavic Union' was also forecast.  Certainly the links which 
existed between the Slavic  states  of  Russia, Ukraine and Belarus made some sort of 
alliance possible, even in certain instances desirable, but it did not make it inevitable. 
The contrasting nature of  Russia's relations with Ukraine and Belarus reflects the past 
development of  these states. While Russia's relations with Ukraine vary in form and 
content from its relations with Belarus, Russia has nevertheless achieved a high degree 
of interaction and cooperation with both of  these states, in the pursuit of its own 
goals and interests. 
Russia's actions in the years following  the collapse of  the USSR suggest that it is 
guided by a policy of  real politik which has enabled the state to emerge as the 
9 dominant regional power, safeguarding its regional interests and managing its 
relationships with its regional neighbours. Such a strategy is shaped by the legacies of 
the Tsarist and Soviet eras and specifically by economic links which bind these states 
closely together. 
As the Soviet regime collapsed in the late 1980s a process of  reclaiming, reconstructing 
or creating a national past or history began in almost all of  the republics of  the Soviet 
Union including Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The fragility of  independence made 
demonstrative statements  of statehood urgent and most states quickly adopted the 
outward symbols of  national independence: national anthems, currencies, and flags -
all of  which had a part in reinforcing in popular consciousness the newly attained 
independence and imprinting it on the national psyche. 14  They also used their 
national history to legitimise statehood,  reinforce national identity and underpin 
national independence. 15  This had contrasting outcomes for Ukraine and Belarus.  In 
Ukraine the recovery of  the national history was used, initially by nationalists but 
very soon by the state administration to demonstrate a  history of  nationalist 
aspirations which was used to reinforce modem Ukrainian statehood, presenting 
independence as Ukraine's historical destiny, which had been subverted and 
suppressed by the Tsarist and then the Soviet Empires.  In contrast the recovery of 
Belarusian history showed a close alignment with Russia, with a lesser degree of 
differentiation, and greater assimilation and economic dependence. 
In the communist era this fostered a sense of  conservatism among the leaders of Soviet 
Belorussia, particularly in the Gorbachev era when, in the non Slavic republics, the 
policies of  Glasnost and Perestroika  encouraged greater autonomy, sovereignty and 
ultimately independence. Since the historical and particularly the economic 
development of  the Belarusian nation had been so closely linked to Russia, the leaders 
of  independent Belarus continued to view the nation's future development as 
inevitably and inextricably linked to Russia. 
14 Havrylyshyn, 0., & Williamson, l,  From Soviet Disunion to Eastern Economic 
Community?  Policy Analyses in International Economics, Institute for International 
Economics  October 1993  No 3 
15 This was relatively short lived in the Belarusian case. By 1994 the electorate had 
voted to restore the  old Soviet symbols 
10 The Belarusian case is an example of  how Soviet nationality policy fostered a 'national 
ethos' in the USSR. Belarus in its modem (ie. post-Soviet) fonn was very much a 
'creation' of  this nationality policy, as well as the regional economic and development 
plans of  the Soviet centre. Indeed, all three Slavic republics in their present form and 
within their current territorial borders can be described as artificial constructs. For 
example, Russia, in it present fonn as the Russian Federation,  has not previously 
existed. It is not and has never been a 'nation-state', existing either as an Empire 
(Tsarist, then Soviet) and since 1991 as a federation. Within Russia this has been the 
source of  a crisis of  identity, generating discussions on 'What is Russia?' and 
resurrecting old debates on whether Russia is a European, Eurasian, or Asian state. 16 
For Ukraine, independence reinforced rather than undermined a  concept of  Ukrainian 
statehood but brought additional problems of  territorial boundaries and demarcations. 
Ukraine acquired its modem fonn only after World War Two, a process completed by 
the transfer of  Crimea in 1954. Parts of  Ukraine were historically the lands of  other 
states including Poland, Hungary, Romania and especially Russia.  Unlike the other 
two Slavic states, Belarus never actually existed as a 'nation' which helps explain its 
weak national identity and absence of  a concept of  national destiny. 
In all three cases then the artificial constructs of  Soviet federal and national policies 
which gave these states their modem fonn could also potentially undermine their 
legitimacy since either the territorial demarcations of  the state can be challenged 
(Russia and Ukraine) or a concept of  nation statehood to buttress independence is 
weak or lacking (Belarus). 
This is an important legacy of Soviet Federal Policy. This policy envisaged though 
rarely tolerated independence within the confines of  a federal body, reflecting elements 
of regime continuity between the Tsarist and Soviet administrations. The Bolshevik 
Revolution did not mark a great dichotomy in policies towards the regions of  the 
Tsarist Empire. Under the Soviet regime they were granted nominal autonomy as 
Union Republics and policies towards them were codified in a nationalities policy. In 
reality, traditional attitudes to these regions remained, reflecting greater continuity 
16 Arbatov,  A.G., 'Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives' International Security Vol 18 
N02 Autumn 1993 p5-43; Alexandrova, 0., 'Divergent Russian Foreign Policy 
Concepts' Aussenpolitik  No IV  1993 
II between the Tsarist and Soviet regimes than the latter cared to admit. 
Tsarist and Soviet attitudes towards Ukraine and Belarus were shaped by the Russian 
interpretation of  the development of  the Eastern Slavic states, sharing a common 
history during the period of Kievan Rus' from 9th to the 14th centuries and 
specifically the period between 911-1054  when almost all east Slavic tribes were 
united to form  Rus' people.I7 
In Tsarist times this concept of  Slavic kinship helped sustain Russian domination of 
these areas and suppress any expressions of  Ukrainian or Belorussian nationalism 
which were beginning to appear in the 1880s and 1890s. While the Kievan Rus' state 
existed, Belarus was known as  Belaia  Rus' but the Tsars reduced to simply the 
North Western Territory.  A decree of 1840 prohibited the use of  the term 'Belorussia' 
altogether.Is  The possible existence of  a Ukrainian nation was not acknowledged and 
the Ukrainian lands of  the Empire were subsumed under the label Malorossi  (Little 
Russia) and the Ukrainian people were known as rus'kii, rusins'kii or maloros'kii.I9 
Tsarist policy aimed to prevent the growth of  national movements and the danger of 
calls for independence. Control was consolidated overtly through the gubernial system 
and less directly through a rigorous policy of  russification.2o Both Ukraine and 
Belarus experienced russification through the influx of  Russian administrators and 
workers. Ethnic Russians had resided in Ukraine since 1654 (the Pereiaslav 
Agreement), though these were usually soldiers in garrisons or nobles undertaking 
administrative duties. Ukraine's industrial boom of  the late 19th century attracted 
17 Lubomyr, RW., Mykhailo Hrushevsky : Ukrainian - Russian Confrontation in 
Historiography  Toronto:CruS 1988  p5 
18 Abetsedarskaia, E.,  et al [storiia Belarusi  Minsk:Ekoperspektiva 1997  p 130-135; 
Shiriaev, E.E., Belarus': Be/aia Rus',  Chernaia Rus' i Litva v Kartakh  Navuka i 
Tekhnika: Minsk 1991; Lubachko, 1.  S.  Belorussia under Soviet Rule 1917-57 
Lexington:University of  Kentucky Press  1972 pl-5; Zaprudnik, 1., Belarus at a 
Crossroads in History Boulder, Colorado:Westview 1993 p46; 
F  or the purposes of  this research the term Belorussia is used specifically for the 
Soviet era 1917-1991 and Belarus for the Tsarist and post-Soviet periods. 
19 Lubomyr 1988  p16 
20 Abetsedarskaia 1997 p 134 
12 many Russians to the area. In the Donbas and Kryvyi Rih the demand for experienced 
workers, stagnation in Russian industry and higher wages in Ukraine's mines and 
factories (often 50% more than in Russia) brought an influx. of  Russian workers.21 
Convinced that theirs was a superior culture, these Russians seldom learned Ukrainian 
and had little respect for or interest in Ukrainian customs or traditions.22 Where they 
predominated in large numbers, such as Southern Ukraine and the Donbas region in 
particular, these areas became heavily russified.  The effective continuation of 
russification in the Soviet era through the out migration of  Russian workers and  party 
members was to be another important legacy which impacted upon Ukraine and 
Belarus after independence. 
In the case of  Ukraine, Russia traced its claim to legitimate rule back to the Pereiaslav 
Agreement of 1654.23  For Russia, Pereiaslav marked the beginning of  a natural 
process of reunification with  Ukraine. In Ukraine, the agreement was interpreted 
differently: through the Pereiaslav Agreement, Ukraine became a protectorate of  the 
Tsar,24 resulting in what  Ivan L.Rudnytsky  describes as the 'submersion' of Ukraine 
into the Russian state.25  After 1654 the Russian  domination of  Ukraine began, with 
the defeat ofMazepa, the Cossack leader at Poltava in 1709 and the liquidation of 
Cossack institutions later in the 18th century.26 
Ukraine's subordination became more rigorous in 1783 with the imposition of  the 
Russian administrative system  and the introduction of serfdom in 1788. The Valuev 
Ukaz (July 1863) and the Ems Decree (May 1876) signified a determined Russian 
21  ibid 
22 Subtelny, 0., Ukraine - A  History  Toronto: University of Toronto Press  1992 
p 274 
23  Zaborovskii, L., 'Pereiaslavskaia Rada i Moskovskie Soglasheniia 1654 Goda: 
Problemi Issledovaniia' in Rossia -Ukraina :lstoriia Vzaimootnoshenii  Moscow 
Iazyki Russkoi Kul'tury  1997 p39-49 
24  Rudnytsky,Ivan., Essays in Modern Ukrainian History  Edmonton:CIUS 1987 
p80 
25  Rudnytsky  1987  p78; Magocsi, P.R., A History of  Ukraine Toronto: University 
of  Toronto Press 1996 p24 ff 
26  Morrison, John. 'Pereyaslav  and After: the Russian - Ukrainian  relationship'  In 
International Affairs  Vol 69 No 4 October 1993  p679 
13 effort to weaken Ukrainian national identity, culture and language)7 This repression 
was in part prompted by the emergence of  a Ukrainian intelligentsia who fostered a 
developing sense of national consciousness and the recreation of  a national history in 
the 19th century. The articulation of  this national consciousness and calls for 
Ukrainian self determination in the works of  the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko 
provoked reaction from the Tsarist regime. Ukrainian patriots were persecuted and 
murdered~ the Ukrainian  Orthodox church was russified and the Ukrainian  Catholic 
church  liquidated, and the use of  the Ukrainian language in public was prohibited,28 
While national consciousness was comparatively less developed in Belarus than in 
Ukraine, demands for national freedom and equality, which grew in the later decades 
of  the nineteenth century were similarly suppressed and accompanied by intensive 
russification,29 Russian became the language of  administration, education and law 
while the Belarusian language continued to be used as the language of  everyday, 
informal communication.  A Russian educated class emerged though the common 
(Belarusian) people, who were mainly peasants or artisans, maintained local customs 
and beliefs and the oral tradition in literature.3o To accompany rigorous censorship, 
Russian historical scholarship became involved in proving the Russian character of  the 
North Western Province. This occasionally worked to the contrary. Ivan Hryharovic 
working under the patronage of  the Russian estate owner Nikolai. P. Rumiantsev 
published the 'Belorusskii arkhiv drevnikh gramot' (A Belarusian Archive of Ancient 
Charters) in 1824.3 1  F or a brief period this appeared to presage the rediscovery of  a 
Belarusian History, until the suppression of  the Polish Revolt in 1863 led to the 
repression of such studies. Literary activities, frequently the catalyst for nationalist 
27 In 1863 the Minister of  the Interior,  P.A. Valuev  issued a decree forbidding the 
publication of  books in Ukrainian, other than belleslettres and folklore  and 
commented that 'there never has been a distinct Little Russian language, and there 
never will be one'. Hosking, G., Russia: People and Empire 1552-1917 London: 
Harper Collins 1997 p378-379; Magocsci, 1996 p372-373 
28 Chirovsky, Fr,  N. L.  'Methods of Muscovite - Russian Imperialism' The Ukrainian 
Quarterly  Vol XUII Nos 1-2 1987  P 31 
29 Abetsedarskaia  1997 p130-135;  Lubachko 1972  p6 
30 Guthier, S.L. 'The Belorussians: National Identification and Assimilation, 1897-
1970  Soviet Studies VolXXIX Nol Jan 1997 p37-61 
31  Saunders, D., 'Nikolai Petrovich Rumiantsev and the Russian Discovery of  Belarus' 
Occasional Papers in Belarusian Studies No 1 1995 p58 
14 movements largely died out in Belarus after this, though they were to reemerge in the 
1880s. By the 1890s a revolutionary movement had developed and clubs were formed 
in Moscow, St Petersburg and other cities,  for  the study of  Belarus. The Belarusian 
Revolutionary Hramada, founded in 1902 went further in its demands, seeking 
territorial autonomy for Belarus with a popular assembly in Vilius and the 
nationalization of  the lands of  the nobles. 
The  political concessions forced on the Tsar by the revolution in 1905 enabled a 
stronger national movement to emerge. The Belarusian press was legalized and 
Belarusian literature grew in volume. As  N.P.Vakar observed, the years between 1906 
and 1917 marked the formative years of  Belarus  ian political nationalism, when the 
national goal was defined in terms of  general cultural and political policies and a 
personnel capable of  assuming the national leadership was being educated.32 
When compared to Ukrainian nationalism, the growth of  a distinct Belarusian identity 
may have been retarded, but by the beginning of  the 20th century there were clear 
signs that it was beginning to emerge. In both cases the dual effects of  russification and 
suppression of  nationalist movements fostered a degree of  reactive ethnicity amongst 
literary and political elites who perpetuated the belief  in and demands for autonomy 
and/or self government. 
The lands which made up Ukraine and Belarus had important functions for the 
Tsarist and Soviet regimes.  Ukraine was as an important economic region and Belarus 
was  strategically important. In fulfilling these functions, nationalists, primarily in 
Ukraine but also in Belarus, argued that these areas were being exploited by the 
centre.33 
The regional development policies of  both regimes show the extent to which these 
areas were controlled so as to serve the needs of  the metropolis. Sector specific 
development was encouraged in Ukraine, designed to supplement Russia's industrial 
needs, while Belarus remained economically underdeveloped since its importance lay 
32  Vakar, N., Belorussia  - The Making of  a Nation  Cambridge, Mass:Harvard 
University Press 1956 p91 
33  Gomovoi, Osin 'Nash Otnoshenie k Russkomy Narodu' p11-25; Dziuba, 1., 
Intematsionalizm iii Rusifikatsiia?  p 126-142  Natsional'nyi  Vopros v S"SSR  1975 
15 more  in its geostrategic position. 
As intensive industrialization began in selected regions of  the Tsarist empire in the 
second half of  the 19th century, Ukraine's agricultural economy was developed to 
serve the needs of  a growing number of  industrial towns and cites and to provide 
crops for export.  The Steppe region, with its open land and easy access to Black Sea 
ports was one of several regions associated with food production, which were to 
become centres of  commercial wheat and bread production. The emancipation of Serfs 
(1861) provided  an abundant work force with greater mobility as the railway network 
developed. Within Ukraine, the Steppe region expanded its food production more 
rapidly than the rest of  the Empire and Ukraine's  economic importance within the 
Empire grew.  By the early 20th century as much as 90% of  the Empire's main export, 
wheat, came from Ukraine.  Ukraine supplied 43% of  the world's barley crop, 20% of 
its wheat and 10% of its com. Its primary crop, beets, grown on the right bank of  the 
River Dniper was the main source of  sugar for the Empire.  Tobacco grown on the left 
bank was another important cash crop, accounting for 50% of  total imperial 
production. 
Railway expansion in the late 19th century had two important consequences for 
Ukraine. First, it linked Ukraine with Moscow, the centre of  imperial markets and the 
Ukrainian economy became more integrated into the imperial system. Food and raw 
materials from Ukraine moved northward in exchange for an unprecedented flow of 
Russian finished products to the South. 
Secondly, the expanding railway network generated an urgent need for coal  and iron, 
and Ukraine was able to supply these in large quantities from the Donets basin and 
Kryvyi Rih. In the 1880s and 1890s these became the fastest growing regions in the 
Empire. Between 1870 and 1900, coal production in the Donets basin increased by 
1000%, with the region producing almost 70% of  the Empire's coal. 
Iron ore production in Kryvyi Rih led to the growth of  the metallurgical industry in 
the region.  Ukraine's economic development in the 19th century was selective, both 
regionally and sectorally. It supplied much ofthe Empire's raw materials for industrial 
use  within the Empire and for export, but the production of  finished goods in Ukraine 
16 remained underdeveloped and it continued to rely on Russia for these. Thus in 1913 
Ukraine produced 70% of  the Empire's extractive industry but had only 15% of  its 
capacity to produce finished goods. The economic relationship which existed was 
based on the exchange of  Ukrainian raw materials for Russian finished  goOds.34 
This phase in Ukraine's history can be interpreted in two ways.  Firstly, although 
evidence shows that this area was economically exploited by the centre, there were 
some positive benefits for the Ukrainian lands from the centre's selective regional 
economic policies. Belarus exemplifies the alternative - a region which remained 
economically underdeveloped until the middle of  the 20th century. The second 
interpretation uses the evidence of  exploitation to argue that self government was the 
only viable option for Ukraine,  a view quickly adopted by many Ukrainian 
nationalists. The findings of a number of  economists and historians on this issue are 
considered below. 
Martin C.Spechler used a comparative approach in considering the benefits of  the 
imperial association. He presented an alternative view of  Empire in which they have 
often served useful economic functions during the early phases of  economic 
development. He demonstrated the potential advantages of  a territorial unit like 
Ukraine, existing within a hegemonic Empire during early, modem economic growth. 
Effective economic integration, he argued, required a dominant political power to 
enforce the rules of  the game. The imperial hegemon would also defend legitimate 
commercial interests at home and abroad, compensate losers for the consequences of 
efficient reallocations, build intra regional infrastructure  and serve as a lender of  last 
resort for temporary financial crisis. 
Spechler appreciated the negative way the relationship with the hegemon tended to be 
viewed in the post colonial state, observing that 
34  Subtelny 1992 p264 p265,267, p268 
17 Normally, the national histories of  countries constituent of  the Habsburg, 
British, Spanish, Turkish, Chinese or Russian Empires have been sharply 
critical of  imperial policies as self serving and exploitative. Such a stance is a 
national response to frequent imperial attempts to subvert, coopt or suppress 
national cultures)5 
He provided examples of  other scholars who challenged the nationalistic 
interpretations of  their own economic past such as Ivan Berend,the Hungarian 
economic historian, who pointed out the benefits to Hungary and Bohemia-Moravia 
oftheir inclusion in the protected Austro-Hungarian market. The Finnish historian, 
Riita Hjerppe suggested that Finland benefited greatly from free access to Russian 
markets during the late 19th century. 
Spechler accepted that on some occasions an imperial power exploited a colonial area 
irrationally, meanly and short sightedly, but he argued, on many occasions a self 
confident imperial power with political and military priorities did promote the long 
term economic development of  subordinate national areas for imperial warfare.36 
Applying this view to Ukraine, Spechler found that it did benefit from inclusion in the 
Empire in economic terms. The development of  the railway network from the 1880s 
facilitated a deconcentration of  industrial activity away from the Moscow and St 
Petersburg regions, some of  which was developed in Ukraine. Ukraine's share in 
factory manufacturing output increased steadily from 9.4% of  the European part of 
the Empire in 1854 to l3.8% in 1887,21% in 1900 and levelling off in 1908 at 22%. 
By 1897 Ukraine's manufacturing share exceeded its share of  the imperial population. 
Its manufacturing  productivity was high - a gross output per worker 2-4 times the 
imperial average. Nominal incomes were also high while prices of  basic foodstuffs and 
primitive housing were relatively low.  Railroad building contributed enormously to 
the development of  Ukraine due to the natural limitations of  water and land transport 
for grain, coal, and iron ore.  Cheap transport established  the superiority of Ukraine's 
35 Spechler, M.e. 'The Development of  the Ukrainian Economy  1857-1917:The 
Imperial View'  in Koropecky I.S Ukrainian Economic History - Interpretative Essays 
Harvard 1991  p265. 
36 Spechler 1991 p165&266 
l8 pig iron over the Urals, where water nows, labour supplies and fuel were unreliable. 
The Russian Empire also provided a unified legal environment, social overheads 
capital  and free access to Ukrainian goods such as sugar, wool and grain. Spechler 
concluded that until the 20th century, Ukraine's intellectuals apparently appreciated 
the boost the Russian Empire gave to their economic development.37 
The positive benefits of  Ukrainian economic development within the imperial system 
is supported by Orest Subeltny who argued that the growth of  transportation and the 
quantum leap in the transfer of  goods and materials between north and south 
integrated the Russian and Ukrainian economies and led to the creation of  a larger, 
more productive and more efficient economic unit, a vast all Russian market from 
which both lands benefited. He concluded that 
With the crucial contribution it made to the economy of  the Empire, 
little wonder Ukraine was regarded as an indispensable and inseparable 
part of  it.38 
As Ukraine's economy developed it began to contribute more to the empire's economy 
than it gained from it.  One measurement of  this is the differential between state 
budget receipts over state budget payments. The Ukrainian economist, Igor 
Koropecky conducted intensive research on the budgetary relationship between 
Ukraine and Tsarist Russia and found that Ukraine consistently paid substantially 
more to the state budget than it received from it. On average, Ukraine's share of 
Tsarist Russia's budget receipts was about 20% and of payments, about 13%.39 
Koropecky found that that regardless of  the development rate of  the Ukraine's 
economy, the Tsarist government taxed Ukraine more than it spent there through the 
state budget.  He sought to ascertain whether this was an indication of  discriminatory 
policies against Ukraine by examining who the primary beneficiaries were. Using a 
study made in 1897 by Iasnopol, Koropecky showed that the principal beneficiary 
37 Spechler 1991 p272-275; Russia.n sponsored industrial development in Ukraine led 
to considerable progress. In the decade between 1865 and 1875 the number of plants 
increased 2.4 times, the number of workers by 20,000 people and output by 120%; 
between 1875 and 1895 the number of  plants increased 6 times, the number of 
workers by 90,000 and out put by 155% (Spechler) 
38  Subtelny 1992 p265,p268 
39 Koropecky, LS. 'One Hundred Years of  Moscow - Ukraine Economic Relations' in 
Harvard Ukrainian Studies  Vol V part 4 1981  P 470 
19 was the St Petersburg province, where the state capital was located. The bulk of 
budget expenditures there went for activities associated with the administration of  the 
entire empire as well as for interest payments on the state's domestic and foreign 
loans, incurred in part for the construction of  the railroad network throughout the 
country. Thus all the provinces were the indirect beneficiaries of  the state 
expenditures in St Petersburg. Direct beneficiaries were the border provinces, 
primarily those situated in the northwest of  the country, which were inhabited by 
Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Poles.  Non Russians also inhabited other 
border provinces; for example various Caucasian nationalities lived in the 
Transcaucasus and various Moslem nationalities lived in Central Asia. The direct 
losers, he found,  were for the most part the interior provinces of  the country, 
inhabited predominantly by ethnic Russians as well as by Ukrainians and numerous 
smaller nationalities. 
An account by the Tsar's finance minister, Sergei Witte,  showed that ethnic Russians 
were not favoured by the budgetary policy as the tax burden was most severe in the 
15 Central Black Soil and Central Industrial provinces of  the Empire's European part. 
For example, in 1896 budget receipts exceeded expenditures there by 3.50 roubles per 
capita. These provinces were also among the poorest. Only one of  them was inhabited 
by Ukrainians and one by Belarusians, while the others represented the heart of  ethnic 
Russia.4o 
Koropecky also considered the view that Ukraine was discriminated against in favour 
of  Russia proper. He noted that the economy of  the Tsarist Empire was based on 
market forces. Economic decisions were made by private entrepreneurs in response to 
the profit motive, so if  a region offered good opportunities  for making profits, 
businessmen, domestic  or foreign, would exploit the situation and the region would 
experience economic growth. The government could facilitate or obstruct these 
decisions to a degree, for example, by granting or refusing to grant corporation 
charters, subsidies, production orders. The most important aid for a region's 
development was construction of  necessary infrastructure, primarily railroads.  Only 
on rare occasions did the government invest directly in productive facilities. 
Koropecky was able to show that while Ukraine did experience a significant degree of 
40 Koropecky 1981 p480- 2 
20 exploitation by the centre, it was not to the benefit of Russians, who experienced 
similar, if  not greater exploitation. He also agreed with Spechler that Ukraine made 
some gains within the imperial system and in particular the movement towards 
industrial development over a wider geographical area. This trend resulted mainly from 
the relative decline of  the Central Industrial Region around Moscow and of  the St 
Petersburg-Baltic region in the country's total output. The principal beneficiaries of 
this development were Ukraine and to a lesser extent, the Transcaucasus and other 
border provinces of  the Empire. Thus in spite of  the budgetary losses, Ukraine 
experienced above average growth of  its industry.41 Ukraine's share in the total 
investment ofthe Empire's industry was favourable - an estimated 36% in 1913 and 
26% in 1917, leading to the remarkable growth of Ukraine's industry. Between 1854 
and 1908, Ukraine's share in the total industrial output of  the Empire increased from 
7.1% to 18.4% and from 9.4% to 22.0% in the Empire's European part. 
Koropecky  found geopolitical factors more helpful in explaining the Tsarist regime's 
policies towards Ukraine. During the 19th century  the government was engaged in the 
conquest of  successively remoter territories in the east and the south east which were 
of  economic or strategic importance for Russia (e. g.  regions bordering on China or the 
natural resources of  the Asiatic region). The integration of  these territories into the 
imperial system resulted in a prioritizing of  government economic policies, 
concentrating on those areas and regions of  most importance for the regime, and 
leading to bias against the already developed economies of  European Russia. Hence 
the further  development of  the Ukrainian economy  was not emphasized but kept at a 
tolerable level and relegated to being a resource base for the development of  the new 
economically or strategically important regions.42 
The initial preference for the industrial development of  the northern regions of  the 
empire and reliance on the southern regions for agricultural supplies and subsequently 
the concentration on the border regions to the east and south,  is used by some to 
argue Ukraine existed primarily as a colony of  Russia, heavily exploited financially 
41  Koropecky 1981  p476 
42 Koropecky 1981 p484-489 
21 and economically to the utmost.43  Ukraine existed, it is contended, as a supplier of 
raw materials which were refined and manufactured  elsewhere in Russia. Hence while 
Ukraine contributed most of  the Empire's sugar, its refining took place elsewhere. 
The Soviet economist, Konstantin Kononenko, argued that as industrialization became 
more extensive in the second half of  the 19th century, Ukraine's economic position 
within the empire changed but, he argued, it retained a different fonn of  colonial 
status. He believed that with industrialization Ukraine ceased to be an industrially 
cultural and primitive land - an annex to the motherland from which she derived raw 
materials to supply her industrial output. He suggested that the Russian and foreign 
investments which facilitated Ukraine's industrial growth were frequently undertaken 
in a discriminatory way to force her economy in a specific direction. Hence a heavy 
outflow of industrial investment earnings from Ukraine in the fonn of  dividends and 
interests was channelled to Russia and other foreign countries and their investors 
instead of  being reinvested to further Ukraine's economic growth.44 
Kononenko presented several examples of  what he considered to be discriminatory 
policies against Ukraine. He argued that in spite of industrial development, Ukraine 
remained a  source of  food and raw materials for the imperial market and was often 
forced against her real interest to accept three quarters of her imports from the empire. 
Ukrainian exports, consisting mainly of  agricultural products were frequently directed 
through the Baltic ports while Ukrainian  ports were often neglected and the Ukrainian 
commercial fleet kept small and confined to coastal trading. 
Ukraine's imperial  contribution was not matched by its own gains from the imperial 
system. While contributing 20% of  the imperial Gross National Product (GNP), only 
5% of  this was returned to Ukraine for its own domestic purposes and needs. 
Ukraine also made significant contributions to the imperial tax system, the  revenue of 
which was largely used for the development of  other imperial regions.45  Kononenko 
43 Chirovsky, N. L. Fr., An Introduction to  Ukrainian History Vol 3 New York 1986 
p9 
44 Chirovsky 1986 p124; K. Kononenko Ukraine and Russia - A History o/the 
Economic Relations between Ukraine and Russia 1654-1917 Wisconsin 1958 
45 Chirovsky 1986  p125; Ukraine's effective subsidizdation of under developed 
regions continued under the Soviet regime. 
22 concluded that such a situation severely contradicted the economic interests of  the 
national community and could only exist under circumstances in which these interests 
are subject to some other interests, whenever, in other words, 'an economy is merely 
an adjunct of another dominant system'.46 
Nicholas Chirovsky was similarly convinced that Russia pursued discriminatory 
policies with regard to Ukraine, arguing that 
There is no doubt that without discriminatory Russian economic policies 
such as tariffs, differential shipping charges and subsidies for Russian 
plants, Ukraine's industrial  capacity could have developed much more 
effectively.  47 
Chirovsky described a specific example of  discrimination aimed at the Ukrainian  sugar 
industry, where St Petersburg continuously increased its oppressive excise tax on 
sugar,  eventually becoming some 40% of  the selling price and substantially reducing 
domestic demand and consumption. He argued that  Russia protected its own sugar 
production by favourable  railroad rates for shipment and tariff policy manipulations. 
Russia also permitted foreign produced sugar to enter the Empire at favourable terms 
which were detrimental to Ukraine's sugar interest. 48 
For Ivan Rudnytsky, defining Ukraine's position within the Empire as colonial, was 
not a well chosen term. He suggested that Tsarist Russia possessed genuine colonies 
such as Transcaucasia and Turkestan but Ukraine would not be counted among them. 
Rather, the administration looked on Ukraine as belonging to the core of  the 'home 
provinces'.  However Rudnytsky recognized that the economic policies of  the imperial 
government were mostly adverse to Ukraine's interests. Ukraine carried an excessive 
load of  taxation, since the revenues collected in Ukraine did not return to the area but 
were sent to other parts of  the Empire. The construction of  railway lines, which was 
dominated by strategic considerations as well as the existing system of  freight rates 
and customs duties, failed to take into account Ukrainian needs.49 
46 Chirovsky 1986 p145 
47 Chirovsky 1986 p14 
48 Chirovsky 1986 p163 &  164 
49 Rudnytsky 1987 
23 Most economists and historians agree that Ukraine did experience some degree of 
exploitation by the centre, but differ in their assessment of  the extent to which it 
benefited from imperial economic policies. It  is reasonable to conclude however, that 
these policies accelerated Ukraine's modernization. Modernization is the usual result 
of  economic development and industrialisation. Urbanization and the accompanying 
growth in dwellings, commercial institutions, centres for social interaction, schools and 
public amenities all contribute to the modernization of  society. Intrinsically linked to 
this is the dissemination of ideas which becomes more extensive and rapid with 
education, wider literacy, the growth ofthe newspaper industry and greater mobility. 
Politicization and class consciousness are byproducts of  this but national awareness / 
consciousness is also an outcome.  This could be the result of  better education and 
access to wider reading material or it could be reactive - a defence against the 
homogenization of  peoples which often took place in industrial centres. In either case 
nationalist movements were growing stronger throughout Europe in the 19th century 
and their development is clearly linked to industrialization and modernization. 
Industrial centres throughout the Russian empire and not just Ukraine, experienced 
such developments in the late 19th century and early years of  the 20th century. In 
Ukraine, it did not create a nationalist movement. This already existed amongst an 
intellectual minority, but it helped diffuse ideas about Ukrainian nationhood, language 
and culture to a greater number of  people, though at no time did it become a mass 
movement.  Some nationalists later extended their thinking to include Ukrainian 
statehood and independence. To strengthen their case they looked back over centuries 
to uncover a history of  suppression and exploitation which began with the Pereiaslav 
Agreement and which found its most recent manifestations in the policies of  the 
Tsarist regime. 
Unlike Ukraine, Belarus was slow to benefit from the wave of  industrialization which 
swept through the Russian Empire in the second half of  the 19th century . Its 
economic base remained predominantly agrarian, and it was one of  the least developed 
areas of  European Russia.  In Ukraine, a perceived history of  exploitation was used to 
strengthen nationalists' demands for autonomy and independence.  Such a perception 
was lacking in Belarus, with Belarusians generally acknowledging that the republic had 
gained enormously from Soviet economic policies. In Tsarist times Belarus remained 
2-1-economically underdeveloped and this continued in the early part of  the Soviet period. 
Only after World War Two and the utter devastation of  the territory did the 
modernization of  Belarus begin in any real sense. Its retarded economic development 
and rapid modernization in the post war years had a number of  consequences, the 
impact of  which became apparent when the republic became independent in 1991. 
A region of  vast estates before the First World War, the state, church and landlords 
owned 54% of  Belorussian lands.5o Industrial development came late and grew 
slowly, largely because there was no regional capital and only a very small urban 
population.51  Prior to 1917, Belarus' contribution to the imperial  economy was 
insignificant - in 1913 heavy industry in Belarus produced only 0.88% ofthe 
industrial production of  Russia, while the population of  the region made up 3.6% of 
Russia's total population. For much of  the Tsarist period Belarus concentrated on the 
production oflinen and linen products, grain, vodka, spirit, wool and so on, trading 
these with the neighbouring regions of  Russia and Ukraine. 52 
Belarus'  importance to Tsarist Russia was geopolitical rather than economic. Lying at 
the heart of  Russian Empire, the North Western Territory had in the past been the 
transit route for attacking armies approaching Moscow. The area acted as an 
important buffer zone for Russia and its economic development would have rendered 
it even more vulnerable.  Nevertheless limited and small scale,  industrial development 
began in Belarus from the 18th century,  prior to its incorporation into Russia as a 
result of  the three partitions of  Poland (1772, 1793 and 1795).  Such industrial 
activity usually took place on private estates and local industry frequently consisted 
of  small distilleries. Belarus' economy was largely agricultural and exports consisted 
of  timber (much of  the area was covered in dense forest), flax and honey. It imported 
grain, salt, finished products, wine and fur. Russia's strategy  of  using the regions as 
suppliers of  raw material which were then processed in Russia, was also applied in 
here. Timber from this area was floated down to the Baltic and Black Sea ports, while 
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25 only 13% of  the annual cut went to the country's own mills.53 Belarus benefited from 
the expansion of  the imperial transport network in late 19th century and retained its 
importance as a transit route for Russian goods going West as well as for Russian 
imports. The network of  railroads and waterways facilitated the 
importation of  goods from other areas to the Belarusian market. Local industry also 
became more specialized in processing agricultural and forest products.54 
In the decade before the Russian revolution there is some evidence of  the development 
of  the Belarusian economy. This included the growth of  an urban proletariat, although 
this development was small in comparison to the rest of  the empire. In Belarus the 
urban proletariat  comprised 0.5% ofthe population compared to 1.43% of  the 
population of  European Russia. By 1917 Belarus' urban proletariat represented 3.5% 
of  the total number in the empire. Industries remained small scale - before the 
revolution there were 10,000 industrial enterprises employing together fewer than 
70,000 workers. However the number of  industries in this area had increased, 
particularly  enterprises in the food, chemical, minerals,  ceramics and animal 
products' industries, as well as the textiles, wood, paper and metallurgy industries.55 
Nevertheless Belarus' economic development was uneven and limited in comparison 
to Ukraine.  Industrialization in a restricted form had only begun as the Tsarist era 
was coming to an end and it was to be the middle of  the 20th century before 
modernization and its accompanying socio-economic developments were to have a real 
impact on  Belarus. 
Ukraine and Belarus retained their relative positions of importance under the Soviet 
regime. To legitimize its own position the regime sought to  expose the colonial, 
exploitative nature of  the previous Tsarist regime. In a speech in Switzerland in 1914, 
Lenin observed 
It [Ukraine] has become for Russia what Ireland  was for England: 
exploited in the extreme and  receiving nothing in return.56 
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26 In 1928, the Ukrainian communist economist, Mykhailo Volobuev described how 
Ukraine was not an Asian type of  colony - under developed industrially with its 
resources carried off  by an exploitative empire, but more of  a European type of 
colony  - an industrially well developed area which was not so much deprived of  its 
resources as of  its capital and potential profits. Volobuev showed how the mechanism 
used to achieve this was the fixing of imperial prices so that costs of  Russian finished 
goods would be exceedingly high, while the prices of  Ukrainian raw materials remained 
low.  Hence Russian manufacturers made greater profits than Ukrainian producers of 
coal and iron. The Ukrainian economy was deprived of  potential  benefits and made to 
serve the interests of  the Russian core ofthe Empire.57 
Theoretically economic disparities amongst the regions of  the former Tsarist Empire 
would be ended with the Soviet promise of  equality among regions and the creation of 
a new favourable economic environment where all nations would contribute and 
benefit equally.  A nationalities policy would extend this equality to all forms of  social 
and political life in the new Union of  Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The intention 
was  to overcome one of  the legacies of  the industrialization drive of  the later 19th 
century which had resulted in extreme regional  disparities in economic 
development.  5  8 
In reality, the USSR retained many of  the peculiarly Russian features of  the Tsarist 
regime. Most notable was the regional/republican implementation of  the policies of  the 
centre by Russians already resident or transferred to the area by the government. 
Under the Tsarist regime, Russians had already played a significant role in assisting 
regional industrialization. In the early stages, Ukrainians and Belarusians had rarely 
participated in this. In the Soviet era they were incorporated more into the republic's 
industries but Russians continued to predominate at the higher, managerial levels. For 
example, among the most experienced workers in the heavy industry of Southern 
Ukraine, indigenous workers made up only 25% of  the coal miners and 30% of  the 
metallurgical workers, with Russians constituting the majority in these occupations. 
Amongst  Ukraine's intelligentsia, Ukrainians made up only 16% oflawyers, 25% of 
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27 teachers and less than 10% of writers and artists. In 1917, only 11 % of  students at 
Kiev University were of  Ukrainian origin. In Ukraine's main cities and towns, 
Russians predominated - in the early 20th century, less than a third of  all urban 
dwellers were Ukrainian, with Russians and Jews making up the remaining two thirds. 
In Kiev in 1874, those who considered Ukrainian to be their native language made up 
60% of the capital's population. By 1897 this had fallen to  22%  and fell again in 
1917 to 16%.59 
It was a similar story for Belarus. The 1897 census recorded  that 92% of  the 
Belarusian population  depended on agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing for their 
livelihood.6o The limited and small scale industries which existed tended to be owned 
and managed by Russians. 
In the immediate post revolutionary period the Bolsheviks appeared willing to redress 
this imbalance with a seemingly liberal nationalities policy. In Ukraine this entailed co-
opting Ukrainian supporters into prominent positions in the government, issuing 
instructions to party functionaries  to use the Ukrainian language whenever possible, 
and to show respect for Ukrainian culture. At the 12th Communist Party Congress 
(1923) these policies were formalized in  a new policy ofKorenizatsiia, or 
indigenization, calling for a concerted effort to recruit more non Russians into the 
party and state apparatus, for Soviet officials to learn and use local languages and for 
state support for the cultural and social development of  the various nationalities. 
Encouraged by such policies more Ukrainians joined the Communist Party but 
although they gained a majority as newcomers, they were largely concentrated in the 
lower levels of  both government and party. In the 1920s Ukrainian  representation in 
the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee was no more than 25%.61 
The policy of  Korenizatsiia  also achieved some success within the Belorussian 
Communist Party (BCP) in the 1920s. In 1922 the party consisted of6,157 members 
and candidates, of  whom 72% were Russian. By 1925 membership had increased to 
7,691 members and 4,972 candidates, with Belarusians making up 45%. In 1928, there 
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28 were 31,713 party members and candidates, with Belarusians fonning the majority 
(54.3%), followed by Jews (23.7%), Russians (14%) and others (8%).62 
With Moscow's encouragement, Belorussian leaders began to build up cultural and 
educational  institutions in the republic. For example, the  aim of  the Institute of 
Belorussian Culture set up in 1921, was the perfection of  the Belorussian literary 
language which had been out of  use since the end of  the 17th century.63  The Institute 
also began the study ofBelorussian history and culture, laying a foundation for the 
development ofBelorussian nationalism.64 In July 1924, the second session of  the 
Central Executive Committee of  Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, (BSSR)  drew 
up a plan  of  practical measures for implementing the national policy, stipulating that 
all administrative, cultural and educational establishments should use Belorussian in 
their offices as the official language of  the republic.65 The development of  a 
Belorussian education system was also supported. Before the revolution, no 
institution of  higher learning had existed in Belorussia. In 1921, the Belorussian State 
university was founded.66  By 1928 Belorussia had four institutions of  higher 
learning and by 1931 these had increased to 32. 
Given the early successes of  the korenizatsiia programme and efforts to indigenize the 
local (ie. republican) party, it  could be argued that Ukrainians and Belarusians gained 
more in the first two decades of  Bolshevik rule than had been possible under the long 
period of  Russia and Tsarist domination. Under the Tsars, Ukrainian and Belorussian 
language, culture and national identity had been suppressed,  while the early Soviet 
regime made efforts to foster or restore these and consolidate these regions within 
territorial boundaries on a federal basis, with each possessing their own administrative 
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29 centre and apparatus.67 
The early policies of  the Bolsheviks were however largely tactical - necessary 
concessions in order to retain power, and  sharply and quickly revoked under Stalin, 
when growing nationalism in these republics threatened to veer out of  Moscow's 
control. Indeed Stalin's purges which followed far exceeded the repressive excesses of 
the Tsarist regime. 
This highlights once more the degree of  continuity which existed between the Tsarist 
and Soviet regimes. John  S. Reshetar, for example, argues that the revolution did not 
bring about a reordering in the relationship with Russia but in the Ukrainian case, 
restored the status quo ante. For this to occur, Reshetar suggests, a total restructuring 
of  the relationship would have required Russian abandonment of imperial claims and a 
willingness to relinquish hegemony. It  would have meant giving up political centralism 
and the implied invidious distinction between greater and lesser people. 68 
Elements of  continuity are also apparent in the economic relationship between the 
centre and Ukraine and Belorussia. With economic planning and the first Five Year 
Plan (FYP) in 1928, it seemed that the economic prioritizing which had characterized 
the Tsarist regime's regional economic policies would also be a feature of  Soviet 
economic planning. In the first FYP Ukraine received over 20% of  the total investment 
and of  the 1,500 new industrial plants built in the USSR, 400 were located there. 
There after however in the second and third FYP, Ukraine received a 
disproportionately smaller amount of investment. Of  the 4,500 plants to be built in 
the 2nd FYP (1932-37), 1000 were located there. Three thousand new plants were to 
built in the third  FYP, of  which 600 were to be located in Ukraine. The basis for this, 
the government argued, was that in the event of war Ukraine's industrial centres would 
be too vulnerable to attack and it was preferable to concentrate on the development of 
industrial centres in the Urals.  The traditional economic relationship  between the 
centre and Ukraine thus prevailed, with Ukraine the supplier of  raw materials and 
Russia the producer of  finished goods. This drew Ukrainian economists to complain in 
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30 1932 that the colonial relationship between Russia and Ukraine that had existed in 
Tsarist days had not altered appreciably.69 
The continuation of  seemingly exploitative economic policies and the growing 
centralization of  the late 1920s suggested that the centre was reverting to previous 
policies of  regional subordination. The severity of  the forced collectivization and the 
rigorous purging of  Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples in the 1930s appeared to 
confirm this. The drive towards collectivization and industrialization in Belorussia and 
Ukraine was accompanied by  a vigorous policy of  centralization and the ending of 
cultural autonomy. Between 1929 and 1934 widespread purges were carried out in 
Belorussia, affecting government and educational establishments so that the national 
and cultural leadership was completely destroyed. The efforts of  the Institute of 
Belorussian Culture to restore the national language was obstructed by  a decree from 
the Belorussian Council of  People's Commissars in 1933 making grammatical changes 
to the national language and bringing it closer to the Russian language.7o The purges 
within the Belorussian Communist Party and within the repUblican administration 
reduced significantly the representation by Belarusians, particularly at the All Union 
level, where from 1933, Belorussia was never adequately represented in the Central 
Committee or the Supreme Soviet. Of  the 1,227 delegates to the All Union Party 
Congress in January 1934, 19 (1.6%) were from Belorussia, though these were mostly 
Russians. In a third purge from 1936-38, about 90% of  Belorussian writers and poets 
were arrested, many of  whom were shot or tortured to death in prison. Top officials 
in the Belorussian state apparatus and military were also affected by the purge.71 
In Ukraine, collectivization was undertaken with particular severity.  By March 1930 
about 3.2 million peasant households had been forcibly driven to join the collective 
farms. Ten years later, almost all of  Ukraine's peasants belonged to the republic's 
28,000 collective farms.72 The forceful and violent policy of  grain procurement; the 
elimination by death or deportation of  the Kulak class of  peasants; the loss of  almost 
one third of  the grain yield during the harvest in 1931; a drought affecting Southern 
69 Subtelny 1992  pp405-407 
70 Lubachko  p80 & pl13 
71  Lubachko 1972  p116 & pl23 
72  Subtelny 1992  p 411 
31 Ukraine in 1931; the contraction by one fifth of  the total area sown in Ukraine by 
1932,  all contributed to a famine in 1932 and 1933 in which between 3 and 6 million 
of  the  Ukrainian population perished. 
Debate on the causes of  the Ukrainian famine became possible only in the later years 
of  Gorbachev's rule and intensified as Ukraine sought national sovereignty in 1990. 
Western and emigre historians were in little doubt that the chief cause was the severe 
grain procurement policy. Robert Conquest and Bohdan Krawchenko point out that 
the 1932 harvest was only 12% below the 1926-32 average  - meaning that there was 
food available, but this was confiscated by the state. Indeed, in 1932, Stalin increased 
Ukraine's grain procurement quotas by 44%.73 
In recent Western interpretations of  the Ukrainian famine, it is suggested that the 
famine was Stalin's way of  weakening  Ukrainian nationalism as well as  destroying 
the independent peasantry as a potential class enemy  to the regime. 74  This was 
certainly an aim of  the purges in Ukraine and elsewhere, with Stalin's declaration in 
1933, that local nationalism was the main threat to Soviet Unity. In the late 1930s the 
limited local self government which the Ukrainians and other non Russian nationalities 
had enjoyed  was ended.  Members of  the Ukrainian Communist Party  and 
government elite  were not exempt from arrest and execution. Stalin reasserted control 
over Ukraine through his personal emissaries including  Pavel Postyshev and Nikita 
Khrushchev and the thousands of Russian party functionaries who had come to 
Ukraine  in the 1930s to reinforce the collectivization drive. By the late 1930s much of 
the top party and government leadership in Ukraine was Russian. 75 
The Nazi invasion of  the USSR in June 1941 was to have grave consequences for 
Ukraine and Belorussia.With the front line running through their territory these 
republics suffered doubly from the destruction and devastation wrought by both the 
Red Army and the Nazis. The evacuation of these areas by the Soviet regime as the 
Nazi advanced encouraged the growth of nationalism, sponsored in the first instance 
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32 by  partisans.76  During the Second World War, the inability of  the centre to control 
the republics as the Gennans advanced enabled local nationalism to flourish once 
more.  Since the 19th century Ukrainian and Belorussian nationalism had surfaced 
when more liberal polices were applied or when regime weakness made local 
concessions necessary. In the aftennath of  the war, the Soviet central authorities had 
to act quickly and decisively to quell these nationalist tendencies. This was made more 
difficult by the immediate pre and post war incorporation of Ukrainian and 
Belorussian lands which had existed outside the Soviet Union since 1918.  Soviet 
efforts to absorb these territories was often met with local resistance. Opposition to 
Soviet policies and in particular to collectivization generated strong anti communist 
feeling. 
In Belorussia the impact of  the war had been great. During their three years of 
occupation the Nazis had destroyed and burned 209 towns and 9,200 villages.17  Over 
80% of  the  capital Minsk had been destroyed and more than 3 million people were 
left homeless, often with no means of subsistence. Industry was largely destroyed and 
in 1945 was only about 20% of  the size it had been in 1941. Agriculture was 
particularly affected  with damage caused to the land and the loss of  livestock. 78 
Belarus had lost more than half of its national wealth. Its material losses were so great 
were that national reconstruction was far beyond its own means.79  Consequently 
Belarus' post war reconstruction was centrally directed and resourced with massive 
inputs of money, technical equipment, machinery and personnel. This reflected an 
important  change in the centre's policy towards Belarus. Previously Moscow had 
been reluctant to locate and develop heavy industry in Belarus,  largely, it was argued, 
because Belarus neighboured on capitalist Western Europe and any industry in 
Belarus could be destroyed in time of  war.  After the war the USSR had secured its 
buffer zone in Eastern Europe and with the communist states of  Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland as its neighbours this threat receded.  Belarus was able to 
develop heavy industry with railroad, locomotive, tractor and automobile plants in 
76 Abetsedarskaia 1997 p257-269; Poda, N.V., & Akimov, F, 1., Istoriia Ukraini XX 
Stolittia  Kiev: Globus 1997  pl40 -159 
77  Marples, D., Be/arus - A Denationalized Nation  Amsterdam:Harwood 1999 
p16 
78 Abetsedarskaia 1997 p268 
79 Lubachko 1972 p165 &  166 
33 Minsk, Vitebsk, Gomel and other cities.8o  The long term implications of  this 
externally directed reconstruction became apparent when Belarus acquired 
independence in 1991. 
Ukraine also suffered wartime devastation. With Germany's advance imminent, the 
Red Army sought to reduce any possible gains by a scorched earth policy. All 
economic enterprises which might be of  use to the Germans were marked for 
destruction. In the Donbas, most of  the mines were flooded.The Dnieper hydro 
electric works and all the blast furnaces in Ukraine were destroyed. A huge evacuation 
of  industry and people was undertaken, moving munitions plants skilled labour and 
important intellectuals - about 1500  plants and 10 million people were  relocated to 
the east of  the Ural mountains.81 
In spite of  this, Ukraine  remained an important acquisition for the Nazis. Eighty five 
percent of  the food supplies which the Nazis obtained from occupied Soviet 
territories came from Ukraine. They used Ukraine not only as a major food supplier 
but also as their main source of  labour for the undermanned industries and farms of 
Germany. The scale of  this became apparent at the end of  the war - of  the 2.8 million 
workers from  Eastern Europe in Germany, 2.3 million were from Ukraine. When the 
Red Army forced the Germans back in 1943, the Germans wrought further 
destruction on Ukraine with their own scorched earth policy. 
Ukraine's losses in the war were staggering, not least in  human terms  - about 5.3 
million people, or 1 in 6 of  the inhabitants of  Ukraine perished. Over 700 cities and 
towns, and 28,000 villages were totally or partially destroyed, leaving close to 10 
million people homeless. More than 16,000 industrial enterprises and 28,000 
collective farms were wholly or partially destroyed.82 
The Soviet central authorities  aimed to restore the Soviet Union to its pre war 
economic capacity and advance beyond this. To achieve this Ukraine's contribution 
would be especially important.  A shortage of industrial workers, government 
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34 bureaucrats and party functionaries in Ukraine and in particular, Western Ukraine, led 
to a dramatic increase in the number of Russians in the republic. In Western Ukraine 
there were practically no Russians before the war but by  1959  Russians made up 5% 
of  the population (330,000). For the whole of  Ukraine there were 4 million  Russians 
in 1939 (12% of  the population) and this increased to 7 million (16% of  the 
population) in 1959. Against the opposition of  the Catholic Church, the peasants and 
the region's youth, Moscow resorted to repression to assert its authority.  Efforts 
were made to build up the membership of  the CPU in the West of  the republic. 
However the increase in membership which resulted (from 7,000 members and 
candidates in 1944 to 88,000 in 1950) was largely due to the new members from the 
east and not from the western regions.83 
Like Belarus, the plan for Ukraine's post war reconstruction was centrally directed 
and resourced. A key aim was to return industrial productivity to its pre war levels. 
The 5th FYP directed 85% of  the republic's investment to heavy industry. Despite 
the fact that many of  the industrial plants shifted beyond the Urals did not return, by 
1950, industrial output in Ukraine was 15% higher than it had been in 1940 and had 
increased by 230%.  However, although Ukrainian industry was in a stronger position 
than before the war, Ukraine's share in  overall Soviet production had fallen, because 
the new industrial centres beyond the Urals and in Siberia  grew at a faster rate. 84 
The industrial development of  the western regions was more successfully achieved. 
Under Polish and Austrian rule, Galicia had been a relatively prosperous agrarian 
region.  The Soviets invested heavily in this newly incorporated area. Old industries 
such as oil production were expanded and a series of  new industries including the 
production of  cars, buses, radios and light machinery were established. New factories 
were built and often outfitted with machines expropriated from the Germans so that 
the enterprises in the region possessed some of the most modem equipment in the 
USSR. By 1951 the industrial production of  the region had jumped to over 230% of 
the 1945 level and accounted for 10% of Ukraine's  industrial production.85 
The post war industrialization of Western Ukraine was in part politically motivated 
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35 and the centre sought to integrate it into the Soviet system  by means of  changing its 
social and demographic structure. The migration of  large numbers of  Russian workers 
and Communist Party activists  to Western Ukraine and Galicia  in particular, was an 
inherent part of  this strategy.  Before the second world war the number of  Russians 
in Western Ukraine was negligible  but by 1959  they had increased to 5.2% of  the 
population there.86 
The reassertion of  political control by the centre manifested itself in renewed purges 
of  the local parties and their leaders. Leaders of  non Russian nationality in Ukraine 
and Belorussia were removed and replaced with Russians. In Belorussia, by the end of 
1948, all the top Belorussian Communists had been purged and replaced by Russians. 
Republican communist officials in party and government organizations were also 
replaced by Russians so that in 1951 of the 33 members of  the Belorussian 
government, 22 were Russian, 9 were Belorussian and the remaining two were Jewish 
and Georgian. 8  7 
The political thaw which followed Stalin's death was accompanied by a less 
centralized approach to the economy and the introduction of  the Sovnarkhoz reform 
(1957)  by which civilian industrial and building enterprises were placed under regional 
economic councils. Each Sovnarkhoz was in general command of  its enterprises and 
each was appointed by and responsible  to the repUblican Council of  Ministers.  88 In 
Ukraine over 10,000 industrial enterprises were put under the control of  Sovnarkhoz 
and by the end of 1957 the Sovnarkhoz supervised 97% of  Ukraine's factories. 89 This 
brief  experiment with regional economic autonomy ended abruptly with Khrushchev's 
ouster  and a similar experiment was not attempted again until Gorbachev's Law on 
the State Enterprise in 1987. 
A more liberal nationalities policy under Khrushchev (First Secretary of  the CPSU, 
1953-64)  encouraged greater local participation  in the communist party.  In Ukraine, 
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36 party membership increased from 777,000 members and candidates in 1952 to 1.3 
million in 1959, of  whom 60% were Ukrainians. Republican interests were better 
represented than before as the number of  Ukrainians among the leadership of  the CPU 
increased and more Ukrainians gained prominence at the All Union level. 90 
Ukraine's altered position within the USSR was due partly to the more liberal polices 
of  the period of  deStalinization. It came also in recognition of  its continued economic 
importance within the union and its new strategic importance with the addition of  the 
Western territories which bordered on Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.91 
After 1953 Ukraine was placed in a new position in the union - 'second among equals' 
and Ukrainians, with the Belarusians became junior partners of  Russia in running the 
USSR.  This was a consequence of  the continuous influx of  Russians to these regions 
which perpetuated a form of  russification with a growing number of  people in Ukraine 
claiming Ukrainian origin but who were Russian in language and culture.92 By the mid 
1960s the three Slavic republics had all attained similar levels of  economic 
development and growth. Ukraine and Belarus had been heavily  russified so that 
within these two republics there was a growing number of  Russian speakers 
(either Russian party or industrial workers, or Ukrainians and Belarusians claiming 
Russia as their first language).93  It  appeared, then, that the Russia, Ukrainian and 
Belarusian peoples were closer to the sliianie (fusion) proposed for all the Soviet 
nationalities than the rest of  the republics. This was emphasized in terms of  the 
common past which the three republics shared.  An upsurge of  Ukrainian nationalism 
in the 1960s led a central regime, dominated by Russians, to stress once again their 
historic bond. The concept of  a shared Ukrainian - Russian identity was revived and 
celebrated. In 1954, on the 300th anniversary of  the  Pereiaslav Treaty, the Central 
Committee of  the CPSU published thirteen theses highlighting the irreversibility of 
the everlasting union of  Ukraine with Russia.94  Large scale celebrations marked the 
375th anniversary  of  the reunification of  Russia and Ukraine in 1979; the 1500th 
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37 anniversary of  the city of  Kiev in 1982; the millennium of  the Christianization of 
Kievan Rus' in 1988.95 
The legacy imparted on Ukraine and Belarus by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes was a 
high level  of  integration within the all union political and economic system  ..  The 
central authorities exerted a high degree of  control over developments - political, 
economic and cultural, in these republics.  This level of  control, effected as it was 
often was by Russian party workers resulted in the presence of  large numbers of 
Russians residing in these republics as shown in the table following. The consequences 
of  this are examined in chapter 5. 
Table 1 
Share of Ethnic Russians in overall population of Ukraine and Belarus 198996 
Republic I 
Ukraine I 
Belarus I 
% Share of  Russians in 
Republican Population 
22.1 
13.4 
The integration of  these republics was especially acute in the economic sphere. 
Economically the three Slavic republics both benefited and suffered from the policies 
of  the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. In the post war period the benefits were evident in 
modern and technologically advanced industries and a relatively high standard of 
living.  Russia, Ukraine and Belarus played a key role in the development of  the all 
union economy making significant contributions to all union production and 
contributing to the  development of  other regions. In 1988, Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus accounted for four fifths of  the total output of  the Union, leaving the other 
republics a combined total of  one fifth.  Table 2  and the pie chart below shows the 
republics' share in the total gross output of  the Union. 97 
95 Magocsi 1996 p 647-648 
96 Dronov,V.P.,  Maksakovskii, B.O., & Rom, B  Ekonomicheskaya i Sotsial'naya 
Geografiaya Moscow 1994 
97 Pokorny, D., Efficiency and Justice in the Industrial World Vol  1 'The Failure of the 
Soviet Experiment' Sharpe 1993 p 142 
38 Table 2 
Republics' share in the total gross output of  the Union (1989) 
Republic 
Share in Gross Output of  USSR by RepubUc 
Russia  58% 
Ukraine  18% 
Central Asia  10% 
Belarus  5% 
Baltic Republics  4% 
Transcaucasia  4% 
Moldova  1% 
I  Share in Gross Output of  USSR by Republic I 
Russia 
•  Ukraine 
o  Central Asia 
Belarus 
•  Baltic Republics 
•  Transcaucasia 
DMoldova 
The disadvantages, for Ukraine and Belarus in particular, were the extent to which 
their economies were structured to serve the needs of  the wider economic community 
made up of  the republics of  the USSR and the other states of  the CMEA, rendering 
them trade and resource dependent. As the tables below indicate, even in the late 
1980s the economies of  Ukraine and Belarus continued to be structured around the 
production, though generally not the processing, of  food supplies and raw materials 
and increasingly the production of  light and consumer goods. In Ukraine's case this 
stemmed back to the development policies of  the Tsarist regime. The imperial 
preference for Ukraine's  agricultural development and the lateness of  its industrial 
development made Ukraine dependent on imports of  industrial goods, the bulk of 
39 which came from Russia. 
It was a similar story for Belarus. After WW2, its economy had to be virtually rebuilt 
from scratch. Before long the metal working and machine building industry, the basis 
of  an agro-industry machinery and an integrated potassium mining and chemical 
fertilizer sector, enabled Belarus  to become one ofthe top agricultural producers in 
the USSR and the capital, Minsk, to become one of  the leading industrial cities of  the 
union.98 Belarus specialized in the production of  tractors, trucks, machine tools, 
precision instruments, computers, synthetic fibres, plastics, petro chemical products, 
mineral fertilizers and various products oflight industry and food industry. Its 
importance within the Union also grew with the development of  military underground 
airfields and rocket bases in the forested areas of  the republic. 99 
Belarus benefited from a steady rise in the investment allocations of  the Union, part of 
the strategy to build up its industrial economy. Taking into account the relative rates 
of  population growth in the republic, there was a marked improvement in the relative 
position of  Belarus. 100  Many industries were located in Belarus because of  the need 
for large quantities  of  clear water for production, cooling and waste disposa1. 1  0 1 
Belarus' rich and skilled labour resources also made it an attractive location for labour 
intensive industries such as electronics, instrument making, heavy machinery 
construction, textiles and clothing. 1  02  Soon it was to become a highly industrialized 
republic and the most militarized of  all the former Soviet republics. The  economy was 
largely geared towards heavy industry: machine building, metal working and  machine 
tool construction, which accounted for 60% of  Belarus' total industrial output and 
military goods, to the disadvantage of  consumer oriented goods. 1  03 The industries 
which were reconstructed or the new ones set up benefited from the latest and more 
98 Urban, M.,  & Zaprudnik, J 'Belarus :A Long Road to Nationhood' in Bremmer & 
Taras 1993 p99 
99  ibid 
100 Schroeder, G.E. in  Denber, R  (ed) The Soviet Nationality Reader: The 
Disintegration in Context  Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 1992  p269 
101  Dreifelds, 1., 'Belarus and the Baltics' in Koropecky 1981: 1 p 341 
102  Dreifelds op cit p 345 
103 Business International September 1992 No 142 III -11; Marples, D.R. Belarus: 
'The Illusion of  Stability' post-SOViet Afjairs 1993 Vol 9 Part 3 pp253-277 
-1-0 advanced machinery and technology so that the republic was very quickly producing 
high quality goods for internal use and export to other republics and members of  the 
CMEA trading bloc. Belarusians themselves benefited from higher than average 
standards of  living with  housing complexes springing up in the new industrial cites. 
This reached its high point in the 1960s and 1970s but even well into the 1980s 
Belarusians were continuing to experience higher than average standards of  living while 
shortages and queues characterized life in many of  the other Soviet cites.  Table 3 
following shows  Belarus' contribution to all union production in 1989. 
Table 3 
Belarus - % share of  all union production 1989104 
Product  %Share in All Union Production 
Synthetic Fibres  28.9 
Flax  26.7 
Equipment for livestock 
raising & fodder  I  23 
18.3  Mineral Fertilizer 
Potatoes  I  14.8 
Electric motors  I  13.5 
TV Sets  11.1 
Radios  10.3 
Defence Industry  5 
Similar to Ukraine, the post war industries located in Belarus were also resource, and 
particularly energy intensive, making the republic almost wholly reliant on Russian oil 
and gas supplies. The collapse of  the regional trading market which accompanied the 
fall of  the USSR dealt Belarus a double blow. Production in light industry contracted 
as Belarus' trading partners fell into economic difficulties and Belarus itself was 
unable to afford the payments for oil and gas that Russia was now demanding. 
Belarus' crash may have come later than most of  the other republics but its effects 
104  International Monetary Fund  (IMF) Report  Belarus' Washington DC, April 
1992; Kaufmann & Hardt 1993 p 785 
-ll from 1992 onwards were widely felt amongst the populace. 105  A significant 
proportion of  the Belarusian population were those who had participated in the post 
war reconstruction as young people and who were now in their sixties and seventies, 
or the children of  this generation who could recall a childhood and adolescence of order 
and plenty. Nostalgia for this golden age helps explain the actions of  the Belarusian 
electorate with its support for the populist president Alexandr L ukashenka and his 
old style policies. 106 
The backbone of  Ukraine's economy: heavy industry, heavy machine building and the 
military sector, was formed on the strength of  its rich resources  of  coal, iron ore, 
various non ferrous ores, natural gas and other mineral deposits. This republic 
specialized in the output of  various extractive and heavy industrial branches such as 
coal, iron ore mining, ferrous metallurgy, production of  raw materials for the chemical 
industry, some construction material, metal intensive machine building, wood 
processing, paper, and light industries.107 So great was Ukraine's all union 
contribution in these areas, it was been described as 
The foundry, the smith works, the coal and metal base of  industrialization 
within the USSR in general and in other republics in particular. 108 
105 Its rapid economic development made Belarus one of  highest ranking republics in 
terms of GNP by the 1980s. In 1990, it accounted for 5% ofthe GNP of  the USSR. 
Business International  September 1992 No142 XIII-6-2 
106 Z. Gitelman shows how modernization can strengthen ethnicity amongst some 
peoples and weaken it amongst others. For Belarus a key element of  its modernization 
was its industrialization. Gitelman argues that industrialization can lead to the 
introduction of  occupations which are ethnically neutral and non distinctive. But, he 
argues, industrialization and the associated urbanization can also heighten the sense of 
identity and can result in both the erosion as well as the preservation and promotion 
of  ethnic allegiances.  Gitelman, Z., 'Development and Ethnicity in the Soviet Union' 
in Motyl, A.J., The Post-Soviet Nations - Perspectives on the Demise a/the USSR 
New York: Columbia University Press 1992 
107  ibid p292 
108  Gordijew &  Koropecky in Koropecky 1981: 1 p 295 
..+2 While heavy industry was extensively developed, the consumer goods sector and the 
service sector  expanded more gradually and slowly. Ukraine was also resource 
dependent on Russia and the other republics:  100% of  its cotton, most of its ferrous 
metals, 93% of its timber, 70% of  the wool  processed and used and 80% of  other 
natural fibres, were all imported. 109  Table 4 following shows the share of  Ukrainian 
products in the all union economy. 
Product  % Share in all Union Production 
Sugar beet  54.2 
Iron ore  45.5 
Sunflower seeds 
I 
44.2 
Electric Engines  35.8 
Steel 
I 
34.2 
Agricultural machinery  27.9 
Vegetables  I  26.2 
I 
F  orge/}2ress machinery  I  25.3 
I  Coal 
I 
24.3 
Grain  24.3 
Milk  22.7 
Meat  I  22.4 
Electric energy 
:  17.2 
Defence Industry  15  I 
I 
Natural gas  I  3.9 
No where was Ukraine's resource dependence greater than in its reliance on Russia for 
energy supplies. The structural bias in the Ukrainian economy towards heavy 
industry  generated a dependence on energy resources which could not be satisfied by 
limited  domestic supplies.  Shortfalls were met by imports of large amounts of  crude 
oil from Russia. Self sufficiency in coal enabled it to export coal to Russia, Belarus and 
the Baltic states, and coal and electricity to member countries of  the CMEA. 
109 Business International September 1992 No 142 XIII-6 
110  International Monetary Fund  (IMF) Report  Ukraine Washington DC, April 
1992  pl-69; Kaufmann & Hardt 1993 p 785 
·B Ukraine's high levels of  agricultural productivity made it an important supplier of food 
for the USSR. In 1989 Ukraine produced one fifth of  the USSR's meat and dairy 
output; one quarter of  total grain, potatoes and vegetable production and one half of 
the overall sugar production. I II 
The economic legacy for Ukraine and Belarus in 1991 was three fold:  a structural bias 
towards heavy industry; a reliance on external  (and cheap) supplies of  energy; a key 
position in the internal trading network of  the FSU. Despite relatively favourable 
circumstances in 1991, these structural legacies caused Ukraine and Belarus many 
difficulties in the process of  economic reform. 
F or both Ukraine and Belarus their economies were heavily integrated into the all 
union economy making them strongly dependent on the exchange of  goods and 
materials which occurred within the Soviet trading network.  This is demonstrated in 
Table 5 below. 
Table 5 
Volume of  Trade (%) by Republic in internal  market and with non  USSR / CMEA partners. For all 
republiCS see Appendix 2.112 
RepUblic  % Trade with USSRICMEA  % Trade with Non USSR /CMEft 
Russia  60.6  39.4 
Ukraine  82.1  17.9 
Belarus  I  86.8  13.2 
Russia,  the largest of the republics and the most well endowed in terms of natural 
resources, had significant economic power in the all union economy. I 13  Abundant  in 
natural and mineral resources (gold, diamond holdings, enormous deposits of all major 
energy resources including oil, natural gas,  coal, phosphorites, potassium salts, iron 
ores,  rare  metals,  copper,  lead,  tin,bauxite,  manganese,  silver,  graphite,  nickel  and 
111  IMF Ukraine April 1992 p1-69 
112  Evstigneev, v.P., & Shishkov, Iu.  V.  Reintegratsiia Postsovetskovo 
Ekonomicheskovo Prostranstva i Opyt Zapadny; Evropy  Moscow 1994: Institut 
Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii  RAN  p39 
113 Russia comprises 51 % of  the FSU, covering 76% of  the land area 
44 uranium)114,  Russia was able to export some of these resources to foreign markets at 
world prices. However most of its  exports  went to the Comecon countries and union 
republics at heavily  subsidized prices.  Though adjustment of these prices to  world 
market  levels  brought  a  short  term  contraction  in trade  with Eastern  Europe  and 
neighbouring republics, Russia's supplies of  natural and mineral resources promised to 
be a continued source of  wealth in the long term. 
Russia was  one  of the  most industrialized of the  republics of the  FSU  and a key 
contributor to the all  union economy, accounting for  60% of the total  GNP  of the 
Union, 60% of its total capital stock, 70% of the  defence industry and 55% of the 
total labour force of the USSR.  Russia's key industries and their share in the overall 
industrial output of  the union are given below. 
Table 6 
Product  % Share in All  Union Production 
Defence Industry  70 
Machine BuildinglMetal W  orkinK  30 
Food Industry  14.5 
Light Industry  13 
Fuels  9 
Chemicals and Petrochemical  8 
Ferrous Metallurgy  6 
Wood, Paper, Wood MakinK  5 
Non Ferrous Metallurgy  5 
Russia was the region's largest energy  producer, accounting for  89.5% of all  Soviet 
crude oil in 1991, 79.3% of Soviet natural gas and 56.1% of Soviet coal. 116  While it 
was the least trade dependent of the republics, the regional market  was important for 
114 Business International  No  141 September 1992 
115  Kaufman, R.F  & Hardt, lP The Former Soviet Union in Transition  Joint 
Economic Committee  Washington 1993  p916 
116 Kaufman &  Hardt 1993 p785 & p916 
45 Russian trade  (see  Table  5  above).  In  1988  Russia imported  135.9  billion roubles 
worth of commodities from the ex-republics and 66.9 billion roubles of goods from 
abroad. Thus more than half of  all Russia's imports came from the area of  the FSU. In 
1988 Russia exported goods worth 102.5 billion roubles, 69.2% of which went to the 
other  republics  and  33.3  billion  roubles  were  exported abroad.  Most  of Russia's 
exports went to the area of  the F SU. 117 
Within  the  regional  market  Russia  played  a  pivotal  role,  both  as  supplier  of 
commodities vital for republican economies and as the destination for products of 
these  economies.  The trade  dependence  on Russia was  demonstrated by  estimates 
which  suggested  that  if Russia  severed  all  economic  relations  with  the  former 
republics,  then  the  economic  output  of the  republics  would  be  curtailed.  It was 
estimated that Ukraine could only produce 15% of its gross output, Belarus only 4%, 
Kazakhstan 27%, and Moldova, Lithuania, Turkmenistan and Estonia would be able 
to produce  practically nothing on their own. 11& It was also estimated that if  Russia 
was to sever all economic relations with the former Soviet republics and the rest of the 
world, it would be able to produce only 65% of its gross output.l 19 
Consequently while Russia was the least trade dependent of the republics, trade with 
the  other  republics  still  played  a  large  part  in  its  economic  productivity.  The 
breakdown in inter republican trade demonstrated the  significance of this.  Russia's 
ferrous metals industry was  affected by shortages in supplies of  metal ores supplied 
largely  by  Kazakhstan.  Shortages of manganese occurred due to the break down in 
supplies from  Ukraine and Georgia. In the first three months of 1991 Kazahkstan and 
Uzbekistan supplied Russia with only 0.5% and 5% respectively of  the total amount 
of  power transformers which they were supposed to deliver. Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
supplied only  16% of  the metal cutting tools ordered and Belarus supplied only 10% 
of  the truck tyres which had been ordered. Ukraine and Kazakhstan also failed to meet 
their contract obligations for supplies of ferrous metals rolled stock. 120 The structure 
117 Smith, A. Russia and the World Economy: Problems of Integration 
London:Routledge 1993 
118  Bradshaw, M  The Economic Effects o/Soviet Dissolution post-Soviet Business 
Forum RIIA 1991  p20 & p24 
119  ibid 
120 Business  International  September 1992 No142 III-3-37 
.+6 of inter republican trade thus  rendered Russia also  susceptible to the breakdown in 
trade  relations.  Russia  remained  however  the  largest  trading  partner  for  all  the 
republics. 121  Ukraine and Belarus were most important trade  partners for Russia. 
Tables 7&8  following show how in the period 1987-90 more than half of  Russia's 
overall trade with the republics of  the Soviet Union, was conducted with  Ukraine and 
Belarus. 122 
Table 7 
Russia's Exports to  Ukraine and Belarus  as percentage of its overall trade with Soviet 
Republics (* Does not include Baltic States) 
Year  1987  I  1988  1989  I  1990 
Soviet Republics *  43.9  I  43.9  43.45  41.03  I 
I 
Ukraine  I  42.03  I  42  42.28  43.32 
Belarus  I 
14.07  I  14.1  14.27  15.65 
Total  56.1  I  56.1  56.55  58.97  I 
Table 8 
Russia's imports from Ukraine and Belarus as percentage of its overall trade with 
Soviet Republics (* Does not include Baltic States) 
Year  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Soviet Repub\ics*  41.03  41  41.37  41.84  I 
I  I  I 
Ukraine  I 
41.98  42  41.63  41.8 
Belarus 
16.99  17  17  16.36 
Total  58.97 
1  59  58.63  58.16 
121 Kaufman & Hardt 1993 p137 
122  adapted from  Mezhgosudarstvennyi Statisticheskii Komitet Sodruzhestva 
Nezavismyx Gosudarstv Sodru:;hestva Ne:;avismyx Go.\ydarstv  v 1996 Gody 
Moscow 1997 
.+7 
I The nature and structure of  the internal market,  developed in the Tsarist era and 
extended in the Soviet era left many burdensome legacies for all of  the former 
republics, forcing them to confront difficulties in supply of  crucial goods and 
commodities at a time of political and economic instability. For Ukraine and Belarus 
these difficulties in supply, and the lack of  alternatives underlined the need for a close 
relationship with Russia. As the tables above show, Russia too, could not completely 
detach itself from its regional neighbours. 
Another important legacy of  the Tsarist and Soviet past was the perception, real or 
imagined,  of  exploitation by the political centre. This was stronger in Ukraine than in 
Belarus. In Ukraine, the belief prevailed amongst the nationalist opposition that the 
republic had been ruthlessly exploited. 123 There, support for greater regional 
economic autonomy  grew in the 1960s, particularly under Petro Shelest (First 
Secretary of  the CPU 1963 -1972). Shelest sought to defend Ukraine's interests within 
the union more rigorously,  demanding more Ukrainian input into Soviet economic 
planning and showing little enthusiasm for the economic development of  Siberia and 
Central Asia which would mean a reduction of  investment in Ukraine. He called for 
more investment into Ukraine's already dilapidated capital base and infrastructure, 
especially in Ukraine's traditional bedrock industries of  mining and metallurgy  .124 
Calls for greater economic autonomy came at a time of  growing political dissent within 
Ukraine, which Bodhan Krawchenko suggests was closely and primarily related to 
socio - economic tensions. This, he argues, was due to the influx of  Russians to 
Ukraine leading to competition for good jobs between the privileged Russian 
newcomers and upwardly mobile Ukrainians, many of  whom joined or supported the 
dissidents' calls for greater Ukrainian self determination. 125 
Shelest's support tor what the centre described as 'economic localism'  led to his 
removal in 1972. His replacement as First Secretary ofthe CPU was V. V. 
Shcherbytsky.  Shcherbytsky sought to end the support for greater autonomy for 
123  Gornovoi  1949 p11-25; Dziuba  p126-142  Natsional'nyi  Vopros v SSSR 
1975 
124 Kuzio, T and Wilson, Ukraine Perestroika to Independence  London:MacMillan 
1992 p45 
125 Subtelny 1992 p510-516 Ukraine and the period of  his leadership was characterized by  repression, economic 
and spiritual stagnation and a determined campaign for the russification of  Ukrainian 
language and culture. Shcherbytsky's support for Ukraine's subordinated position 
within the Union was made possible by the co-opting of  many Russified Ukrainians 
into the republican  party and state leadership.!t is observed that, 
Thanks to Shcherbytsky and his associates, Moscow succeeded in 
cultivating a following of  loyal'L  ittle Russians' who were willing to 
subordinate the republic's interests to those of  the centre'126 
Shcherbytsky remained leader of  Ukraine until 1989 when Gorbachev, no longer able 
to tolerate his obstructionist approach to reform, finally removed him. 
While Ukraine's perceived colonial status within the Soviet system was a topic of 
great debate,  Belarus' position was not subjected to similar rigorous examination and 
discussion. However it is argued the economic policies of  the centre directed at 
Belarus were not optimal for its economic development and growth. For example, 
many Belarusian economists accept that building gigantic tractor and automobile 
plants in Minsk was devoid of  any common sense since all raw materials components 
had to be imported and Belarus only really provided the engineering and labour force. 
Belarus' agriculture technology remained underdeveloped and while the republic 
prided itself on the production of  huge trucks and tractors it was forced to send its 
cattle to meat plants in the neighbouring Baltic countries. Belarus continued to  lose 
hundreds of  tons of  fruit and vegetables each year because it lacked the necessary food 
processing facilities.127 
Ukraine's colonial status in both the Tsarist and Soviet empires continues to be 
debated. Its relevance for this research  project is how it has affected the post-Soviet 
relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Whether or not its colonial status can be 
proved or disproved, the crucial factor was the perception held initially by dissidents 
and nationalists and, in the twilight years of  the Soviet regime, by many Ukrainians, 
that the republic had been exploited. This belief fuelled the opposition movement 
which sprang up, rather belatedly in 1989, in Ukraine. This perception of  exploitation 
126 Kuzio & Wilson  p42 
127  Zaprudnik P1l5 
-1-9 was an important legacy of  the Tsarist and Soviet era which was to have a great 
influence on Russian-Ukrainian relations after 1991. 
Unlike the Ukrainian experience it is much more difficult to make a case for the 
colonial type exploitation of  Belarus. However it is clear that the Belarusian economy 
was structured to serve the needs of  the centre and the all union market. The Soviet 
centre claimed a key role in the economic development of  Belarus, which was outlined 
in various publications.128 It was claimed that under the Tsarist regime Belarus had 
existed merely as a source of  cheap oflabour, a raw material appendage of  the Russian 
empire, a supplier of  timber, hemp, bristle and hides.  By contrast under the Soviet 
system, Belarus became a 'major economic region' of  the USSR. With the help of  all 
the other republics, Belarus became a land of  advanced industry and mechanized 
agriculture.1 29 While Ukraine was able to retain only 68% of  the turnover tax collected 
on its territory in 1989, Belarus retained 71%.130 And though investment allocations 
to Ukraine continued to fall from the 1960s, in Belarus they continued to grow. After 
the destruction of  the Second World War, the whole post-Soviet nation, it was 
claimed, came to Belarus' assistance and the bulk of  the country's resources were 
directed there. 13 1 
Claims about economic exploitation and colonial status which were made about 
Ukraine's position within the USSR are more difficult to substantiate with regard to 
Belarus since the latter's economic development was so closely linked to and 
dependent upon Soviet economic policies. Given the primitive state of  the Belarusian 
economy  in 1917, the Soviet strategy of  assisting the modernization of 
underdeveloped regions did much to aid the economic advancement of  Belarus and 
elevated its status within the Soviet economic hierarchy by the end of  the period. 
The indisputable link between Soviet economic policies and the economic 
development and growth of  the Belarusian economy contributed to the 
128 A good example is Stuk, A., & Sapozhkov,Y., Byelorussia  Novosti  Press 
Agency Publishing House 1982 
129 ibid 
130 Pokorny 1993 p253 
131  Stuk  & Sapozhkov 1982 p14-21 
50 growing conservatism amongst its leadership at a time, when, especially from the mid 
1980s, other republican leaderships were becoming radicalized.  In Ukraine, for 
example, this radicalism was fuelled by the long held belief  that the centre was 
exploiting it and Ukraine's only hope of  a prosperous  economic future was economic 
sovereignty. Because Belarus' economic development and advancement had taken 
place at  a later stage and was dependent upon the support of  central policies, 
resulting in a more integrated position within the USSR,  a sense of  exploitation did 
not prevail to the same extent as in Ukraine. 
This was clearly related to the key role which the Soviet regime had played in the 
creation of  the modem Belarusian economy and Belarus' disproportionate dependence 
on Russia and the other republics which was a by product of  this. While Western 
research in the 1970s and 1980s suggested that the Ukrainian economy may have 
developed more effectively and functioned more efficiently had it not been 
administered by the centre, similar arguments could not have been made regarding 
Belarus. Ukraine's rich soil, minerals, fuel and other raw materials, as well a skilled 
labour force in numbers and of  a quality that made it the 'granary and smith works' of 
the Tsarist empire and the Soviet Union, provided it with the potential for alternative 
patterns of  production and specialization than that developed under the Soviets. 132 
Belarus, on the other hand, was poorly endowed with natural resources and its 
industries would continue to rely on imports of  raw materials and components  from 
other republics and countries, making the prospect of  a viable independent existence 
less likely. 
Conclusion 
In their relations with Ukraine and Belarus, the central authorities (Tsarist and Soviet), 
were guided by the belief  that they had a preordained role to govern these areas. In 
sending ethnic Russians to administer these areas, pursuing wide reaching russifying 
policies and structuring the economies of  Ukraine and Belarus so that they served the 
Russian economy and were inextricably linked to it, Russia, whether in its Tsarist or 
Soviet  guise, was able to perpetuate this role. 
132 Hamilton in  Koropecky 1981: 1  p 297 
51 Within the Tsarist and Soviet empires, Ukraine and Belarus shared a subordinated 
position the major consequence of  which has been their economic dependence on the 
regional market and on Russian energy supplies.  Both states share a common history 
of  repression of  their national identity, language, culture and history, begun under the 
Tsarist regime and continued by the Soviets.  Accompanied by economic policies 
designed to serve the requirements of  the imperial (Russian) market, this dual policy 
of  economic and cultural subordination  guaranteed central control of  these areas, a 
status which was retained under the Soviet regime in spite of  the lip service that the 
latter paid to regional autonomy. 
The experience of  subordination created a form of  reactive ethnicity in Ukraine, where 
the perception of  its exploitation by the centre heightened ethnic consciousness and 
encouraged local nationalism and cultural expression amongst certain groups in 
society. This was not the case in Belarus where a similar sense of  exploitation did not 
exist because Belarus  did not experience any significant economic development prior 
to the Soviet regime  and so its economic position, which was to improve throughout 
the Soviet period, remained dependent upon the centre. 
The legacy for Ukraine and Belarus of  their Tsarist and Soviet past is a dependency 
on trade with the other former republics of  the USSR, and primarily Russia, which is 
the direct result of  the regional specialization policies of  the Soviet regime. Their 
specialization in certain areas of  production and their deficiency in others,  forced 
them to rely on the import of  raw materials, machinery, components, and finished 
products from the other republics. The industries which were developed in these 
republics were also energy intensive. Unable to meet their domestic requirements 
themselves, Ukraine and Belarus relied on energy supplies from Russia. 
This dependency is one of  the critical legacies of  the Tsarist and Soviet eras. While 
Ukraine and Belarus continued to depend on imports from the other former republics, 
the breakdown in trade relations among the republics following the collapse of  the 
USSR reduced these to a minimum, contributing significantly to the economic 
dislocation of  these states. 
52 This  chapter  has  also  identified  and  analysed  other  historical  factors  which  have 
affected Russia's  relations  with  Ukraine  and Belarus  in  the  post-Soviet era.  These 
include: 
• a perception amongst some groups in society (the intelligentsia! nationalists) that 
Ukraine and Belarus had been widely exploited by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes 
and  that  self government!  independence  was  the  best  option  for  them.  This 
perception was stronger in Ukraine then in Belarus. 
• the presence of large numbers of  Russians in Ukraine and Belarus, beginning  in the 
17th  century  and  continuing  until  the  1970s,  representing  the  physical 
embodiment  of the  Soviet  regime  as  party  workers  or  industrial  managers 
consciously or unconsciously implementing the regime's russifying policies. 
• regional economies, structured to serve the needs of  the imperial economy so that 
these  areas  were  heavily  dependent  on  central  monetary  allocations,  external 
energy resource supplies and inter republican trade. 
• the prevailing geopolitical importance of these regions to the centre, particularly 
after the collapse of the USSR in 1991  and the westward shift of  the Baltic States 
which underlined the need to retain a western buffer zone. 
All of  these factors shaped the relationship which Russia developed with Ukraine and 
Belarus  after  1991  and  are  examined  in  detail  in  subsequent  chapters.  The  period 
between the beginning of  Gorbachev's reforms and the collapse of  the USSR marked a 
new and unique phase in inter republican relations and was an important staging post 
in the emergence of the  Soviet republics  as  independent actors.  The impact of this 
period  on  Russia's  relations  with  Ukraine  and  Belarus  is  examined  in  the  next 
chapter. 
53 Chapter 3  Emerging Partners:Relations among the Slavic Republics 1985-91 
In the final years of  the Soviet regime the union republics achieved  an unprecedented  level of  inter 
republican cooperation in pursuit of  a common goal - the displacement of Soviet authority. The 
special relationship which developed among these republics in the late 1980s  merits investigation 
for two main reasons. Firstly, it was an important phase in their development/emergence as nation 
states as they began to identify and pursue 'national  interests' and prioritise friends, allies and 
potential threats. Secondly, the form and extent of  inter republican cooperation, which had not 
occurred before,  acted as an important precedent for their relationships once the USSR had 
collapsed in 1991.  These two factors are examined  in this chapter which analyses them in the 
context of relations among the Slavic republics of  Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Other factors 
affecting  relations between republics after 1991 are also considered. Chief amongst these is the 
continued trade dependence of  all of  the ex-republics which provided a strong argument for 
institutionalising mechanisms for economic co-operation in the short term and possible reintegration 
in the long term. 
Gorbachev's policies of  Glasnost and Perestroika encouraged and facilitated greater republican 
autonomy. A critical feature of  this period was the emergence of  the Russian republic as an actor 
independent of  the central authorities.  This marked a unique phase in Russia's historical 
development. It was unique for two reasons. Firstly, because the existence of  Russia as an entity, 
separate from the central authorities (i.e. the power base in Moscow) was to be a relatively short 
lived phenomena, and secondly because it saw, for possibly the first time in its history, an attempt 
to carve a distinctly Russian presence which  distinguished it from the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. 
Led by Boris Yeltsin, the Russian republic emerged in the late 1980s to position itself in opposition 
to the languishing Soviet regime.  This new Russia was to be a liberal democratic state based on 
market capitalism, in stark contrast to the  Marxist Leninist  USSR. By the time the USSR was 
formally dissolved Russia had evolved into its successor state and elements of  continuity between it 
and previous regimes were already apparent. 
By  1991  Ukraine and Belarus had attained the status of nation state.  This came without what is 
usually a normal and lengthy gestation period. Independence came not from the force of nationalist 
movements  but  was  chiefly  the  result  of the  economic  and  political  collapse  of the  USSR. 
Consequently, as well as a the lack of  preparedness for independence, statehood came to these 
nations in the midst of economic and political turmoil. The legacies of their past meant that Ukraine 
54 and Belarus differed in the maturity of their national consciousness and perceptions of nationhood. 
In the Belarusian case this was shaped by the reality that its status as a political entity was closely 
linked to its position within the USSR, which grew in importance throughout the Soviet period. As 
was shown in chapter 2, its economic development and growth, particularly after the Second World 
War,  was  possible  only  with  the  centre's  support  and  crucially  its  investment  strategy.  As  a 
consequence, Belarus was deeply integrated into the all Union economy, a factor which inhibited the 
emergence of  an active and radical independence movement in the late 1980s. 
In Ukraine in the 1960s the radical nationalism of  the Organization of  Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) 
gave way to a more tempered, but nonetheless direct and critical movement of  dissent, often referred 
to as  the 'shistdesiatnyky' (generation of the sixties).133  A growing number of writers articulated 
criticisms  of the  Soviet  regime  through  underground  publications  - Samizdat  (samvydav  in 
Ukrainian).  Writing  in  1965,  Ivan  Dziuba  criticised the  'denationalisation'  which  had  occurred 
through  russificaton  and  called  for  a  return  to  the  'Leninist Nationalities  policies',  implicitly 
meaning the removal of the Stalinist distortions and a return to  the Ukrainization policies of the 
1920s.134 Around writers such as Dziuba, Ivan Drach, Leonid Pliushch and Viacheslav Chornovil, a 
dissident movement emerged in which a range of views on the future of Ukraine was represented 
including  federation  and  independence  and  a  range  of political  beliefs  held,  including  national 
communism, integral nationalism and  pluralist democracy .135  They sustained their criticisms of  the 
regime throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, largely in the face of opposition from the Communist 
Party of Ukraine and the central authorities. With Glasnost many of  these dissidents emerged at the 
fore front of informal associations and the Popular Front Movement. 136  Many dissidents believed 
that Ukraine's relationship was viewed  by the centre as one of inequality and even exploitation - a 
belief which sustained many in the Ukrainian nationalist and dissident movements throughout the 
Soviet period, and an impression which they used to help  radicalise the Ukrainian populace in the 
late 1980s.137 
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55 Gorbachev's strategy of Glasnost,  Perestroika and Democratization  made  real  the  possibility of 
sovereignty, self determination and even independence for the republics of the USSR.  His strategy, 
designed to  halt  and  reverse  the  decline  of the  USSR,  was  instrumental  in  assisting  the  Soviet 
republics to  attain sovereignty and proceed rapidly to  national independence.  Central to this was 
the reexamination and redefinition of the republics' relationship with the centre.  As  the  economic 
crisis escalated, the republics usurped more economic and political powers for themselves when the 
centre was  no  longer capable of providing a governing role.  By  1990 it was clear that the central 
authorities  could no longer effectively administer the union, let alone reform it.  In anticipation of 
the disintegration of the Union, the republics, led by Russia began to construct a series of bilateral 
treaties amongst themselves, which could form the basis of a new structure when the centre finally 
collapsed.  This experience of co-operation, and the recognition of the necessity  of continued co-
operation was to be  of  great importance in creating a successor organisation to the union. 
Cooperation and interaction amongst the republics  of the  USSR was  an  important  stage  in  the 
transition of  these entities from republics to nation states. A notable feature of  this process was the 
manner in  which the  interaction  between political  and  nationalist activists  took  place  in  a  new 
context, where the traditional animosities and suspicions were set aside in the pursuit of a common 
goal- the displacement ofthe USSR. Amongst the Slavic republics their evolving relationship gave a 
interesting preview of future relations.  Russia, the dominant and largest republic guided a process 
which essentially carried Belarus along but which in contrast saw the gradual maturation of  Ukraine 
to  statehood.  However,  once  the  common  aim  had  been  achieved  traditional  inequalities  and 
suspicions  returned.  The  prospect and soon the reality of independence required a new  level  of 
interaction and the myriad of problems which accompanied the  collapse of the USSR (economic 
dependence,  energy  reliance,  currency  supplies,  stationing  of troops  and  weapons)  meant that 
relations between the Slavic states in the early years of  statehood were fraught with difficulties. 
In  1985,  as  Gorbachev took over as  General Secretary of the CPSU and leader of the USSR,  the 
traditional relationship between the centre and Ukraine and Belarus prevailed and continued in this 
form until  1989.  Like the other 13 Union republics, Ukraine and Belarus still lacked economic and 
political autonomy within the union, responding to and having to  enforce legislation originating at 
the  'centre'.  However, from  1986, and due  in  large part to  Gorbachev's policy of Glasnost, the 
established relationship between the centre and the republics was increasingly undermined, with the 
balance  shifting towards the  more  nationally  minded republics,  especially the Baltic republics of 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. 
56 In the new atmosphere of openness, and in an attempt to prevent the assertion of national identity 
from  developing  into  anything  closer  to  secession  or  independence,  the  centre  reopened  the 
'nationalities question' to debate and passed a new resolution 'On Relations between Nationalities' 
at the 19th All Union CPSU Conference in 1988.138  The resolution acknowledged the existence of 
problems between the nations  which made  up  the  Soviet Union and recognized that inequalities 
existed between these nations. Traditional Soviet style language was used to define these problems 
which were described as  the product  of 'national egoism', 'conceit', 'a dependent mind set' and 
'parochialism'.  The  resolution aimed at the accommodation of 'the interests of all nations  and 
nationalities with the country's common interests and requirements'. 
This  was  to  be  achieved through the  strengthening of the federation  on the  basis  of democratic 
principles, expanding the rights of  Union republics and autonomous formations through the 
demarcation of the jurisdiction of the USSR and the Soviet republics, decentralisation, the transfer 
of a  number  of managerial  functions  to  the  local  level,  the  strengthening  of independence  and 
responsibility  in the spheres of the economy, social and cultural development and environmental 
protection. A central task would be the creation of conditions for the greater independence of the 
regions and the implementation of forms of  co-operation in which each republic would have a stake 
in improving the [mal results of its economic activity, on the basis of its own well being, and of 
augmenting the common wealth and might of  the Soviet state.  The role of the republics in resolving 
the  question  of the  socio  economic  development  of the  regions  would  be  enhanced  and  the 
possibility of  direct ties amongst the republics was raised. 139 
The  resolution  also  stated  that the  economic  and  social  changes  should  be  accompanied  by  a 
'spiritual' programme, based on the cultural distinctiveness of  nations and nationalism, and thus the 
resolution  supported the  umestricted development and equal use  by  all  Soviet citizens of their 
native language, while having mastered the Russian language. 140 
The  'new thinking' which had permeated economic and foreign policy was now extended to inter-
republican  relations.  In  1988  the  'centre'  was  prepared  to  cede  a  degree  of autonomy  to  the 
republics and envisaged a significantly reduced role for itself as the coordinating mechanism amongst 
the republics.  The restructuring of the political and economic relationship between the centre and 
the republics was now on the agenda and open to discussion in a freer press. 
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57 In  the  CPSU's  mouth  pIece  Kommunist,  which  under  Gorbachev  functioned  as  a  forum  for 
discussion on  reform, the issue of republican sovereignty was debated. In  October 1988, an article 
by Koropteyeva, Perepelkin and Sikaratov entitled 'From Bureaucratic Centralism to the Economic 
Integration of Sovereign Republics', criticized the 'excessive centralization' of the Soviet regional 
economic policy, which supported regional development with no  regard for  local potential, work 
practices or existing methods for the organization and division of labour. 141  Over centralization had 
meant the  absence  of any  close  connection between the  results  of work done  by  a  republics' 
residents  and the benefits they  received. 142  The authors demonstrated how increases  in  the  teal 
income of workers failed to keep pace with increases in labour productivity.  During the eleventh 
Five Year Plan (FYP) the real income of workers in Belarus rose by  13% and in Ukraine by  14%. 
However  labour productivity  in industry  increased by  21 %  in  Belarus and  15%  in Ukraine;  in 
agriculture it increased by 42% in Belarus and 21 % in Ukraine; in construction the increase was 22% 
in  Belarus  and  15%  in  Ukraine. 143  The  traditional  practice of allocating  higher  investment  and 
subsidies to the less developed regions was also criticized in the article with the acknowledgement 
that 'gratuitous subsidies do  not permanently improve the economies of the republics that receive 
aid'.144 
The  authors  argued that  while  the  rendering  of assistance  by  advanced  republics  to  backward 
republics was inevitable,  the allocations of these resources should be clearly stipulated as  well as 
the deadlines for their repayment. Gratuitous aid, they argued, should only be given in exceptional 
cases such as major natural disasters. 145 
This  critique of Soviet regional economic  policy  represented the development of new and  more 
radical thinking about the economic relationship of the centre with the republics. The authors went 
beyond the idea of republican economic accountability and even economic autonomy and raised the 
prospect of  sovereignty, which according to them would allow the republics: 
141  Kommunist  15 October 1988 p 2ff 
142  ibid p2 
143  ibid  p3 
144 ibid p4 
148  ibid 
58 •  to develop or curtail specific types of industry in the interests of  the local 
population and the local environment; 
• to maintain direct economic ties with other republics and develop joint 
economIC programmes; 
• to obtain loans from the national budget or other republics budgets with 
obligatory deadlines for repayments; 
• to collect taxes from Union and republican enterprises located on their territory 
in amounts determined by the republics themselves, which would make it 
possible to optimize the siting of  industry according to criteria that are not 
established by the ministry; 
• to implement their own social, demographic and cultural policies; 
•  to enter the world economy independently while observing the interests of 
the Soviet Union as a whole. 146 
At the  official  level  the  criticisms  made  by  Koropteyeva,  Perepelkin and  Sikaratov,  and their 
proposals  for  the  restructuring  of the  relationship  between the  centre  and  the  republics  were 
repeated by Gorbachev in a television address  in July  1989  and in the CPSU's party platform the 
same year. 
In this speech Gorbachev spoke of the excesses of the Soviet past, which included indifference to 
national interests; the unresolved state of many social and economic problems in the republics and 
autonomous entities; deformations in the development of the languages and cultures of the Soviet 
people and the exacerbation of the demographic situation.  While the task was to resolve all these 
differences, this could take place only in the context of a renewed federation, since, as Gorbachev 
asserted that  'the fact  remains that all  the  republics and regions  are  linked to  one  another in an 
extremely close way'.147 
Calls for economic autarky and spiritual isolation were, he said, alien to the fundamental interests of 
every people and of society as a whole. He envisaged the 'resolute renewal of federation, with the 
aim of  giving it a second wind through the implementation of  the principles upon which Lenin based 
the Union of  Soviet Republics'  .148 
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59 The  CPSU's  party  platform of 1989  recognized that  the  cause  of many  of the  USSR's  acute 
problems were contradictions in industry and economic development and disregard for their social 
and economic  consequences.  It acknowledged that the  predominance of the  branch  principle  of 
management and related departmentalism had caused extensive damage to the general conditions of 
national groups and the outcome of  this was the disregard for the national conditions and traditions, 
ecological requirements and development of  areas. 149 The nationalities policy and the harmonization 
of relations between nationalities was  presented as one of the party's highest goals and the new 
policy  would  include  expanding the  rights  and  possibilities  of all  forms  and types  of national 
autonomy. 
More clearly defined powers between the centre and the republics were proposed. The union would 
be assigned the powers necessary to establish the foundations of the political system and develop 
it, to provide for the country's defences and security, to conduct foreign policy and to coordinate 
and accomplish general tasks  in the field of the economy,  science and culture, the status  of the 
individual,  the  effective  utilisation  of integration  processes  and  the  organization  of  mutual 
assistance.  The Union would also be assigned the powers necessary  to  ensure the  dynamic and 
steady  development of the  country's national  economic  complex. 150  For the  republics  it  was 
proposed that 'all rights corresponding to the status of  the republics as sovereign socialist states are 
to be transferred to  them'. The economic collorary of this would be economic accountability and 
self  financing for the republics. 151 
The formulation of  a new nationalities policy under Gorbachev was essentially reactive.  Devised  in 
response to the ground swell of nationalist feeling unleashed by Glasnost in republics such as the 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, by the time the policy was drafted, the initial calls of nationalists for 
sovereignty had advanced greatly and demands were now being made by some of the republics for 
complete autonomy. 
The quest for  independence was not a  union wide phenomenon.  In  Ukraine, and particularly  in 
Belarus,  the  prospect of sovereignty  and  independence  did  not  feature  on  the  agendas  of the 
opposition  movements  until  as  late  as  1990.  Prior  to  this,  opposition  to  the  centre,  national 
conscience raising and hopes for greater autonomy  were  articulated by  the intelligentsia of these 
republics whose primary concerns in these years were linguistic, literary and cultural and, after the 
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60 Chernobyl accident, environmental, rather than political and  socio economic concerns. 
However while opposition was  vocalised primarily  by the intelligentsia, this does  not infer the 
absence of political activity amongst ordinary people. The pace of political activity at this level in 
Ukraine and Belarus during the years 1985-1990 did not match the degree of  popular activism in the 
more independent minded republics, such as the Baltic republics. But the growth in the number of 
political organizations in these years indicates a slow but gradual radicalization at the local level  in 
two of the republics which were  most deeply  integrated into the  Soviet political and economic 
system. These are examined below. 
Centre-Periphery Relations  1985-91: The Case of  Ukraine and Belarus 
Ukraine 
Between 1985 and 1990 there was an escalation in the activities of opposition groups in Ukraine 
and the radicalization of their  demands. Chief among these opposition groups were the Ukrainian 
Helsinki Union (UHU), the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring (RUKH)  , the  Taras 
Shevchenko  Ukrainian  Language  Society,  the  Ukrainian  Association  of Independent  Creative 
Intelligentsia,  the  Ukrainian  Culturological  Club  and  the  youth  organizations  of  Hromada 
(Community) and Tovarystvo Leva (the Lion Society).152  The latter concentrated on preserving 
national traditions and cultural monuments and ecological issues. 153 
Many of these groups were led by former dissidents from the shistdesiatnyky. Ivan Drach became 
head ofRUKH; Pavlo Movchan was one ofRUKH's founders and was elected head of  the Ukraine 
Language Association in November 1991. Ivan Dziuba was elected first president of  the Republican 
Association of Ukrainian Studies in 1990. 154  The Ukrainian Culturological Club, founded by three 
former political prisoners and other like minded dissenters, initially acted as a discussion group for 
nationally minded citizens but soon became a channel for Ukrainian national dissent.l55  In 1989 the 
UHU, Rukh, the Taras Shevchenko Language Society, the Union of Independent Ukrainian Young 
People,  and  various  strike  committees  and  associations,  joined  forces  to  form  the  Ukrainian 
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61 Democratic Bloc (UDB) with the declared aim 'to fight for the Ukraine's secession from the USSR, 
private property and unrestricted economic activity' .156 
Two key developments in  1989 encouraged the growth of the Ukrainian nationalist movement the 
'resignation'  of Ukrainian  Communist  party  boss,  V.  Shcherbytsky  and  the  beginning  of talks 
between  the  opposition  movement  and  Ukrainian  communist  party  officials.  Shcherbitsky's 
'resignation'157  as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) in September 1989, 
removed the chief obstacle to Perestroika in Ukraine  and was welcomed by reformers at the centre 
and by Ukrainian opposition groups. Pressure for Shcherbitsky's  resignation had intensified as  it 
became clear that reform in Ukraine was not keeping pace with political change in the other Soviet 
republics. As the range of  formal and informal, official and unofficial groups grew and their activities 
increased, Shcherbitsky had orchestrated a virulent propaganda campaign  against them, describing 
them as  having a 'clearly destructive anti socialist and nationalistic  orientation'  and accusing the 
UHU of extreme political adventurism and open anti Sovietism.l58  Opposition groups responded 
with  open  calls  for  Shcherbitsky's  resignation.  The  combined  pressure  of this,  as  well  as 
opposition to  him within the  Central  Committee of the  CPU,  and the centre's impatience with 
Shcherbitsky's resistance to  reform, forced  his  resignation in September 1989.  His  successor,  V. 
Ivashko, outlined the party's new strategy for  'Renewal' in Ukraine, which would entail working 
out and implementing the  principles for  the  economic independence of Ukraine, ensuring the  all 
round flowering of Ukrainian culture and the satisfaction of  the national cultural requirements of all 
nationalities  living  in Ukraine. 159  The  evident  split  in  the  CPU  over Shcherbitsky's  leadership 
marked  the  beginning  of the  party's  shift  towards  'national  communism'  which  made  it  more 
tolerant of  the potential for autonomy and even independence. 
Shcherbitsky's resignation marked a significant advancement in political change in Ukraine. He had 
been Ukrainian party boss for 17 years (1972-1989)  and was a loyal supporter of  the Union. Four 
years  after  the  launch  of Perestroika  he  still  retained  his  party  post  while  many  of the  other 
appointees of  the Brezhnev era had been retired. Gorbachev's willingness to tolerate Shcherbitsky's 
often contra Perestroika actions, while at the same time encouraging the development of  movements 
in support of  Perestroika, such as RUKH, reflects the conflict in the centre regarding Ukraine  - on 
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62 the one hand the need to generate and sustain support for Perestroika  there,  and on the other the 
need to control developments in the republics.  In this context it is argued Gorbachev's concern at 
developments in Ukraine made him maintain Shcherbitsky in power. 160 
The beginning of a dialogue between officials of the CPU and representatives  of the opposition 
movement in  1989 marked the beginning of a trend which was to grow in  1990, of increased co-
operation between the party and opposition groups. A  meeting in Lvov between the first secretary 
of the city party committee, Volkov and representatives of the UHU including former dissidents 
Bohdan Horyn and Mikhailo Horyn, reached consensus on regional economic accountability and 
formation of the budget - not from  the  top  down but from  the bottom up,  charges  for  natural 
resources  and  the  channelling  of the  profits  of the  enterprises  of the  Union  into  the  area's 
development. 161 
Belarus 
Between 1985  and 1990, popular activism in Belarus moved beyond cultural and literary issues 
(such as the publication in 1988, in Belarusian, of  a reference work on Yanka Kupula, considered to 
be the founder of  Belarusian literature)162 to more political and socioeconomic concerns. In October 
1988  a  samizdat publication  Ratusha  (Town Hall)  from  the Talaka (Mutual  Aid)  organization 
contained sections which discussed Belarus' sovereignty, the economy, democratization, language, 
ecology,  and  culture.163  In  the  same  month  the  Sovremennik  (Contemporary)  Political  Club 
announced the establishment of an  'Organizing Committee for a People's Front' 164.  which was 
formally set up in June 1989.165 
The activities of opposition groups  in Belarus were restricted by  a  centrally orchestrated press 
campaign which presented their activities as  contrary to restructuring and in pursuit of nationalist 
objectives. The proposal for the creation of a Belarusian popular front was described as 'separatist 
in intent'  .1 66  Obstructionist measures by  the authorities continued in 1989.  When the Belarusian 
People's Front for Restructuring (Adradzhenne-Rebirth) held its founding congress in July  1989, 
the Congress was held not in Minsk, where the authorities had refused to make any public building 
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63 available, but  in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius.1 67 When the organizers of the Second Congress of 
Belarusian Informal Youth Groups sought a location for their congress, the Minsk authorities would 
allow them to rent a hall in the city for only one day, in the middle of  a working week  and at a very 
stiff price.  The congress was instead held in Vilnius where the Lithuanian Popular Front (Sajudis) 
made facilities available to them free of  charge. 168 
At the founding congress of Belarus Popular Front (BPF), the delegates discussed a platform of 
political, economic and cultural autonomy  for Belarus, commended mutual co-operation between 
democratic movements in other republics and agreed to send a message of  greetings to Sajudis and to 
the popular fronts of Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia, Georgia, to the Democratic movement in Ukraine 
and to the popular fronts in cities in Russia. 169  The BPF held its first authorized rally in Minsk in 
February 1989, attended by more than 30,000 people. 
At the congress in Vilnius, the chairman of  the BPF, Zyanon Paz'nyak, stressed that the Belarusian 
movement  was  different  from  the  popular  movements  in  other  republics  and  the  national 
consolidation  of the  Belarusian  people  would  come  when  they  had  begun  to  insist  on  their 
democratic rights, whereas in the Baltic republics the high level of national self awareness preceded 
their push for  political  reform.  Paz'nyak's statement  indicates  that even within the  opposition 
movement there was recognition of the weakness of Belarus' national identity when compared to 
other national  groups  in the Union and which helps  explain the  delay  in  the  development of a 
national movement in Belarus and the cautious approach to nation statehood. 
In  summary  then,  between  1985  and  1990  the  activities  of opposition groups  in  Ukraine  and 
Belarus  increased,  their demands  became  more  radical  and  by  1990  opposition  groups  in  both 
republics  were  calling for  political and economic sovereignty  at  the republican level.  In Ukraine, 
sovereignty  was  increasingly  supported by  the  Communist Party  leaders who  were  adapting  to 
changing political situation within the union by promoting their own brand of  national communism. 
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169 Pravda  24125 June 1990 p2 Inter republican Cooperation 1985-91 
The popular fronts which emerged in many  republics in the late 1980s recognized the advantages 
and strength of mutual  interaction.  RUKH  in Ukraine and the BPF  in Belarus cooperated with 
movements in neighbouring states, particularly the Baltic states.  Initially however this interaction 
did  not  include  Russia.  Cooperation  varied  in  form,  from  letters  of support,  the  exchange  of 
delegates and provision of facilities. For example, when Belarusian authorities made it difficult for 
the BPF to meet, the Lithuanian Popular Front made facilities available to them in Vilnius. 170  In 
December 1988 representatives from Estonia travelled to Lvov to take part in an unofficial  human 
rights gathering, but they were turned back by the authorities who were anxious to prevent any co-
operation between Ukrainian and Baltic activists. 171 Concerned to prevent any spill over from the 
Baltic region, restrictions were placed on news reporting from the region and Baltic activists were 
prevented from  meeting their Ukrainian counterparts. 172 Increasingly inter republican cooperation 
amongst popular fronts  became  proactive in challenging the authority of  the centre.  In June 1988 
leading national rights campaigners from Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and the Baltic republics met in 
Lvov and established a 'Coordinating  Committee of  the Patriotic  Movement of  the Peoples of the 
USSR'. The goal of the committee was the complete political and economic decentralisation of the 
USSR and the transformation of  the Soviet Union into a confederation of separate states.173  Seven 
months  later,  in  January  1989,  delegates  from  Ukraine,  Armenia,  Georgia,  the  Baltic  republics, 
Belarus and Crimean Tatars gathered in Vilnius for a  meeting of  the representatives of  non Russian 
National Democratic Movements.  delegates.  They approved two new documents: The 'Freedom 
Charter of  the Enslaved Nations of  the USSR' and  An 'Appeal to the Russian Intelligentsia'.  The 
charter announced the  setting up of a joint committee to unite their efforts to establish free  and 
independent national states. 17 4 
Inter-republican co-operation at this stage took place to  the  exclusion of Russia and members of 
Russian opposition groups were not usually invited to these meetings of representatives of national 
movements.  In  the Perestroika period,  opposition and national  movements  in the  non  Russian 
republics continued to view Russia as  the  'imperial centre'  or'core nation'. It was  only in  1990, 
when the Russian republic, led by Boris Yeltsin,  positioned  itself in direct confrontation with  the 
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65 centre and sought to create for itself an identity distinct from its Soviet one, that co-operation began 
with the other republics on a more equitable basis and sharing common aims. 
The weakening control of the centre over the republics compelled Gorbachev to shift beyond his 
initial willingness to cede greater autonomy to central support for regional economic control and the 
restructuring of relations between the centre and the republics on the basis of a renewed federation. 
This went beyond the aims of  the Ukrainian and Belarusian opposition movements, whose demands 
were largely centred on cultural, literary and environmental concerns. However throughout 1989the 
opposition movements  in these  republics  had become  increasingly  politicized and  in  1990  were 
sufficiently strong and had gained enough support to push the reform agenda  further. 
Decentralization and Disintegration: The Restructuring of  Relations (1990-1991) 
From  1990  until  the  failed  coup  attempt  of August  1991  a  centrally  directed  programme  of 
decentralization was followed, culminating in the drafting of  a new Union Treaty in 1991 which was 
to  preempt  the  complete  disintegration  of the  Union.  This  period  was  characterized  by  the 
shrinking authority of the centre and the usurpation of its powers by the republics as  the central 
authorities could no longer effectively administer the region.  The economic crisis of the preceding 
years had advanced to the point of  economic collapse and with neither the plan nor the market fully 
operational, the republics resorted to autarkic economic measures to protect their economies.  The 
vertical relationship between the centre and the republics was replaced by  a network of horizontal 
links and connections between the republics, which was to prove critical as the framework for co-
operation  once  the  Union  had  finally  collapsed.  The  centrally  directed  programme  of 
decentralization in 1990 and 1991 consisted of  three components: 
• the Law on Economic Relations between Moscow and the Republics; 
• the Shatalin Plan for the transition to a market economy; 
• the new Union Treaty. 
Despite  the  centre's  support  for  these  initiatives,  their  implementation  was  impeded  by  the 
reassertion of conservative forces at the centre and in the republics which sought to  prevent any 
diminution  of the  traditional  powers  of the  centre.  All  three  measures  envisaged  a  significant 
reduction in the powers of the centre with greater political and economic powers being granted to 
the republics on the basis of a renewed federal relationship. 
66 The Law on Economic Relations between Moscow and the Republics 
This law, introduced in 1990 stated that the centre was to retain control of the legislative bases of 
economic activity and the all union market, the organization of  the tax system, overall pricing policy 
and the organization of  a unitary finance and credit system and a single currency. Two late changes 
to the law limited the powers of the republics. Firstly, the independence of enterprises was to be 
guaranteed by  their relations with republican and local organs of power and on a contractual basis 
and secondly, republics were banned from restricting imports and exports and the introduction of 
transit charges without the agreement of  their neighbouring republics. 175 
The Shatalin Plan 
The Shatalin Plan for the transition to the market extended the restructured relationship between the 
centre and the republics with the vision of an economic Union of Sovereign States. 176  Within this 
new union a single economic space (prostranstvo) would maintain the common market but the new 
sovereign  states  would  carry  primary  responsibility  for  the  economic  development  of their 
territories. In Economic relations among  the republics would be conducted on a more equitable and 
mutually  advantageous basis.  The new economic  union would prevent the breakdown of inter 
republican economic relations and strengthen the mechanism of economic integration. 178  It would 
be composed of sovereign states which had voluntarily  entered the Union.  The role of the state 
would  be  confined  to  the  introduction  of macro  economic  policies,  the  formation  of market 
infrastructures  and the  provision of social  security  for  all  citizens.179  The  republics  would be 
granted significantly more economic powers, with exclusive rights for the legislation of  property and 
the use and control of all  national wealth found on their territory. 180  The sovereign states would 
carry basic responsibility for the economic development of the territory  .181  They  would work on 
the basis of general economic policies and jointly undertake legislation which would regulate the 
system of  inter republican relations. 182 
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67 The new economic union envisaged by the Shatalin plan combined both the need for the retention of 
some  form  of mechanism  for  co-operation  amongst the  republics  with the  will  of many  of the 
republics  for  genuine  sovereignty.  However the  growing  assertion of conservative  forces  at  the 
centre, matched by the more active pursuit of independence by  a number of republics ensured that 
the proposals contained in the Shatalin plan were not implemented. 
The  Union Treaty 
As more of the republics edged closer to independence in 1990, Gorbachev sought to prevent the 
wholesale collapse of the union which their secession would bring.  The new Union Treaty which 
was drafted in 1991 aimed at accommodating the will of most of  the republics for sovereignty with 
the need to retain some form of union. Incorporating many elements of  the Shatalin plan, the union 
treaty envisaged a looser federation  in  which  the  republics would have the  right to  independent 
action on all issues of  their development while the centre retained responsibility for defence, foreign 
policy, border security and the coordination of law enforcement. Republics were also  granted the 
right of  secession. 183 Popular support for the reconstituted union was tested in an all 
union referendum in March 1991. 
Table 9184 
Results of All Union Referendum on Preservation of  the Union (Percentage). 
All Union Turnout: 80%; Turnout in Ukraine: 82.2%; Turnout in Belarus:83% 
Referendum Questions  All Union  Russia  Ukraine  Belarus I 
Preservation of  Union  76.4  71.3  70.5  82.7
1 
State Sovereignty  IUK)  80.2 
Independence (Galicia)  88.43 
183 Walker, R., Perestroika: The Impossible Project - Six Years that Shook the  World  Manchester: 
Manchester  UP 1993  pl84 
184  Poda & Akimov 1997 p206;  Abetsedarskaia p294;  Lapidus & Zaslavsky 1992  p14; White, 
S., et al How Russia Votes Chatham NY:Chatham House Publishers 1997 p73-77 
Voters were asked 'Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of 
equal  sovereign republics in which human rights and the freedoms of  all nationalities will be fully 
guaranteed?' In Ukraine a second question asked  'Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of  a 
Union of  Soviet Sovereign States on the basis of  the Declaration of State Sovereignty of  Ukraine?' 
In western Ukraine, the Councils of  the three Galician oblasts (Ivano-Frankovsk, Lvov and 
Ternopol) added a third question 'Do you want Ukraine to become an independent state which 
independently decides its own domestic and foreign policies, and which guarantees equal rights to 
its citizens, regardless oftheir nationality or religious allegiance?' Wilson,  1992, p.61. 
68 Negotiations  on the  new structure advanced  further  after the  referendum  when the  participating 
republics  (excluding the  Baltic  republics,  Georgia,  Moldavia and Annenia,  which  had  refused to 
participate)  agreed  to  the  treaty  on  a  new  union  which  would  grant  them  autonomy  and 
independence within a new confederal structure. 
Reluctance to accept the independence of  the republics and with it the inevitable disintegration of 
the  Union  of Soviet  Socialist  Republics  as  it  was  originally  constituted,  drove  conservative 
opponents of the treaty  to preempt its ratification with the attempted coup against  Gorbachev in 
August  1991.  This  failed  coup attempt hastened rather than prevented the  disintegration of the 
USSR. 
As with the centrally directed nationalities policy, the strategies for restructuring relations between 
the centre and the republics (the Law on Economic Relations between Moscow and the Republics; 
the Shatalin Plan for the transition to a market economy and  the new Union Treaty) were  reactive 
rather than proactive - responding to events at the republican level which were increasingly beyond 
the control of the central authorities. In this context these centrally directed restructuring strategies 
can be seen as part of a wider process operating at several levels within the Soviet Union, reaching 
their climax with the coup in 1991. The other components of  this process include 
• the  growmg  strength  and  electoral  success  of local  (ie.  republican  level)  opposition 
movements; 
• the development of a network of relations amongst the republics, bypassing the  centre and 
taking the form of  quasi state to state relations; 
• the adoption of national communism by republican party elites as a strategy to ensure their 
own political survival; 
• the development of  a political discourse on the desirability, inevitability and survivability  of 
independent statehood. 
These processes interacted throughout 1990 and 1991  and the failure of the coup in August  tested 
and exposed the weakness of the political centre. It became clear that political power now lay with 
the republics where there was a will to embrace the independence which the events of August had 
led to. 
69 Local Activism and Opposition Movements 
In the last year of  the Soviet administration, activism at a local level escalated. This included strikes 
and demonstrations and the official elections to the republican Soviets held in early 1990. These 
semi free and semi democratic elections were the first chance for an increasingly politicized 
electorate to demonstrate their opposition and challenge the Communist Party authorities. The 
results of  these elections showed growing popular support for state sovereignty and greater 
autonomy. 
In Ukraine, a Democratic Bloc (DB), which included RUKH, UHU, the Ukrainian Language 
Society, independent youth groups and other radically minded associations campaigned on a 
platform which called for 
• the political and economic sovereignty of Ukraine; 
• the introduction of  a multi party system, private  ownership and full religious freedom; 
• Ukrainian national rebirth; 
• preparation of  a new constitution of  the Ukrainian republic. 
The election did not result in a sweeping victory for the DB, apart from some anticipated successes, 
particularly  in Lvov where RUKH leaders V.  Chomovil and Mikhailo and Bohdan Horyn:  three 
former  dissidents and political  prisoners won  seats  and were  elected to  the  republican  Supreme 
Soviet.  Of the 442 deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet, 373  were members of the CPU.  The 
disappointing  result  for  the  DB  was  clearly  related  to  the  obstructionist  tactics  employed  by 
Ukraine's central authorities but also indicated that although the Ukrainian electorate was becoming 
more politicized it had not become radicalized. At the local level, where simultaneous elections were 
also held, the DB  had greater success, winning majorities in the 3 Galician oblast councils and in 
many urban areas and effectively breaking the CPU's monopoly of local power.  Significantly both 
elections marked the end of the CPU's monopoly over political life in Ukraine.  185  In the run off 
elections on 18 March 1990, DB candidates were also successful and won 15 out of 21  contested 
seats in Kiev. Overall, candidates from the Democratic Bloc won 17 of Kiev's  22  seats Ukraine's 
Supreme Soviet. 
In Belarus the BPF campaigned on a platform of political and economic pluralism, cultural revival, 
democracy,  freedom  and  sovereignty  for  Belarus.  Using  the  Chemobyl  accident  to  demonstrate 
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70 Belarus'  position within the  Union,  the  BPF  argued that Belarus existed essentially  as  a  seml 
colony.186  Elections to  Belarus'  Supreme Soviet followed a similar pattern to  Ukraine,  with the 
progressive candidates successful in urban areas and party officials winning in rural areas.  A total of 
20 BPF backed deputies were elected to represent Minsk in the Supreme Soviet. 187  As in Ukraine, 
greater electoral success for the BPF was restricted by centrally directed obstructionist measures. 
Despite the limited success of the opposition movements in Ukraine and Belarus, the election of 
some of  their candidates to the republican level legislature had 2 key effects in: 
• motivating and activating further popular support  for the reform platforms  on which the 
opposition candidates had stood; 
• demonstrating to  the republican authorities that their support was  assured only  in  rural 
areas, forcing them to reexamine their own political power and consider co-operation with 
the opposition groups. 
Party elites were forced to reevaluate the basis of  their power  and their growing preference for a 
form of  national communism was stimulated further by a wave of strikes and demonstrations in 
Ukraine and Belarus throughout 1990 and 1991.188  By 1990  groups in both republics were calling 
for political and economic sovereignty at the republican level. In Ukraine, sovereignty was 
increasingly supported by the Communist Party leaders themselves who were readjusting to 
changing political situation within the Union by promoting their own brand of  national communism. 
Increased activity  amongst  popular organizations  and workers,  and the  electoral  success  of the 
186 Stankevich,W., 'BPF announces its electoral programme' RFE/RL Report on the USSR Vol 2 No 2 
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188 Examples of  popular mobilization in Ukraine included: a human chain stretching from Lviv to 
Kiev in January 1990 to mark the 71st anniversary of  the act that had proclaimed the unification of 
the two states which had existed on much of  Ukrainian territory in 1919;  a rally  organized by 
Rukh  in September 1990, in opposition to the proposed Union Treaty; a strike was held in Kiev 
to coincide with the opening  session of  the republican  Supreme Soviet on 1 October 1990. In 
Belarus a general strike held on April 10  1991  was prompted by economic concerns, specifically the 
recent introduction of  price increases of200%. The strikers also made political demands including 
the resignation of  the Soviet president and the Union government; the dissolution  of  the Congress 
of  People's Deputies and new elections to it on a multiparty basis. Blaming the Communist Party 
for the collapse ofthe economy, the strike leaders demanded more autonomy at the republican level, 
declaring on television that 'we will put  our house in order by ourselves'. 
71 opposition movements exerted further pressure on republican leadership. Such pressures prompted 
the republican leaders to adopt a more favourable stance on reform in their own republics, not so 
much because of genuine support for the demands of the workers and political activists, but rather 
in opposition to  the liberalizing and democratizing  initiatives of the centre, which encouraged the 
opposition and threatened to undermine the privileged positions of the traditional republican party 
elites.  In  Ukraine  these  elites  responded  with  support  for  a  form  of national  communism  and 
sovereignty as a means to guarantee their own political survival.  While the party elites in Belarus 
were less supportive  of reform,  by  1991  they had become more tolerant of the republic's reform 
movement 
The switch of Ukraine's leadership to a strategy of national communism for political survival  was 
reflected in the CPU's support for Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty in July 1990, approved by 
majority  of deputies in the Supreme Soviet (355  deputies  for,  4 against and  I abstention).  As 
support for RUKH and its calls for an independent Ukraine grew, the party leadership had began to 
speak about Ukraine's  sovereignty  itself,  calling at the  Central  Committee  plenum  in  February 
1990, for 'a  sovereign Ukraine within the framework of a renewed  Soviet federation'.  In March 
1990 the CPU incorporated its position on sovereignty  in the party's 'Programmatic Principles of 
the Work of  the Communist Party of Ukraine' and in June 1990, adopted a wide ranging resolution 
'On the  State  Sovereignty  of the  Ukrainian  Soviet Socialist Republic'  .189  In  Belarus  the  party 
leadership made no response to the republican Supreme Soviet's declaration of sovereignty, also in 
July 1990, and in failing to condemn it, appeared at least willing to tolerate it. 
Thus while the opposition movements by themselves in Ukraine and more so in Belarus, could not 
force  through  the  overhaul  of the  political  leadership  in  their  republics,  they  were  capable  of 
exerting sufficient  pressure on the republican party leaders so that in Ukraine the latter  responded 
with efforts to  seek accommodation with the  opposition movements, and in Belarus, to  at  least 
tolerate their demands. The declarations of sovereignty by the Supreme Soviets of  both Ukraine and 
Belarus demonstrated that the power of the republican  party leadership was being challenged  by 
the  republics'  parliaments,  within which  deputies  from  the  opposition movements  were  gaining 
influence. 
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72 By the end of  1990, Ukraine and Belarus existed, with the other republics, as sovereign republics, 
no longer subordinated to the political and economic will of  the centre. In reconstituting themselves 
as sovereign entities, the reconceptualization of 'nation'  and  'nationhood'  was  an integral part. 
F  or  Belarus,  always  more  heavily  integrated  into  the  union  economy  than  Ukraine  and  less 
conscious of its historical  development, the concept of the Belarusian nation was slow to flourish 
in the late 1980s.  In contrast, the Ukrainian national movement successfully articulated the concept 
of Ukrainian  nationhood  in  the  late  1980s,  and  with  the  consensus  between  the  republican 
Communist Party leaders and the opposition movement that independence was the most desirable 
option for Ukraine, won growing support amongst the Ukrainian population. In September 1990 
the  Communist Party  leader  in  Ukraine,  Leonid Kravchuk,  revealed  the  thinking  of the  reform 
communists  within  Ukraine's leadership. To be able to talk about full statehood, he said, it was 
necessary to have the political and economic attributes of such a state.  He concluded 'we do  not 
have them but we are on the way to them'.19o 
In reconceptualizing the perception of nationhood in a sovereign context,  Ukraine and Belarus also 
had to  assess their relationship with Russia.  For most of the period 1990-1991 this moved away 
from the traditional perception of  an  unequal relationship  with Russia as the dominant partner and 
Ukraine  and Belarus the  junior partners,  and  shifted to  a  more  equitable  partnership  based on 
mutual recognition of sovereignty and equality of rights. In the period following the failed coup of 
August 1991, the three Slavic republics, as well as the other republics moved quickly from sovereign 
statehood to  independence.  The political and economic realities of independence forced them  to 
reexamine and redefine their concept of 'self  and of 'nation', as  well as their relationships with 
each other and other regional neighbours. 
From Union to Commonwealth - Independence and the Collapse of  the Union 
(August 1990-December 1991) 
Throughout  1990  and  1991,  Ukraine  and Belarus  had  begun to  put  in  place  the  structures  and 
institutions  which  would  support  sovereign  statehood.  In  Ukraine  the  institutionalization  of 
sovereign statehood advanced at such a rate that it was clear that this republic  was  on a path of 
restructuring, the end result of which would be independence.  This included formalizing economic 
sovereignty with plans to create a separate banking system, including a foreign trade bank, a pricing, 
financial  and  customs  union,  the  drafting  of a  state  budget  and  the  introduction  of  a separate 
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73 currency unit. 191  The introduction of consumer cards and coupons in November 1990, to  prevent 
the  export  of consumer  goods  from  Ukraine,  was  a  stage  in  the  process  of disentangling  the 
Ukrainian economy from the all Union economy.192  Pricing policy, which was always  felt to be 
discriminatory under the SCPE, was to be reformed with the introduction in December 1990 of new 
laws on prices, taxation and the budget. The new pricing policy was to preserve fixed rate retail and 
wholesale state prices for most agricultural products but was to be independent of Union pricing 
policy.193  A  property  law,  introduced  in  February  1991,  envisaged  individual,  collective  and 
intellectual forms  of property.  Ukraine was  to  be the  sole  owner of its  land,  natural  resources, 
means of production, financial  resources and part of the Soviet gold reserve. 194 Private ownership 
ofland was introduced in March 1991, to be effective from  April.  195 
Political sovereignty was reinforced with further debate on the nature of  the Ukrainian state. A draft 
constitution  included  proposals  for  direct  presidential  elections,  a  parliamentary  veto  over the 
legislative initiatives of the President and a unicameral legislature. A referendum was prepared for 
September 1990 to decide on a name for the state, its symbols and whether the notion of socialist 
choice was to be enshrined in the constitution.l96 The construction of external relations, not only 
with neighbouring republics but other regional neighbours such as Poland and Hungary, and efforts 
to  attain  membership  of international  organizations  such  as  the  CSCE,  formed  part  of this 
restructuring and reinforcing process. 
The process of  institutionalizing sovereignty in Belarus did not advance at a similar rate and lacked a 
comparable degree of support from the republics's Communist Party  leadership.  Nonetheless in 
1990 Belarusian  was elevated to the status of  state language; 197  the Supreme Soviet voted to create 
the  post  of  president  of the  republic;  an  economic  plan  was  developed  which  included 
decentralization, privatization and support for entrepreneurship, 198 and following the declaration of 
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74 sovereignty in July  1990, a decision was taken to create the republic's own army.1 99 Belarus also 
pursued bilateral relations with a number of  neighbouring republics. 
Establishing Relations with Other Republics 
Ukraine  and Belarus's declarations  of sovereignty  were  followed  by  efforts  to  consolidate  this. 
Establishing relations with other republics and regional neighbours was a crucial part of  this process. 
Throughout 1990 and 1991  Ukraine and Belarus signed a number of agreements with other Soviet 
republics  taking  the  form  of quasi  state  to  state  relations.  Generally  these  agreements  were 
concerned with  economic,  scientific-technical and  cultural  issues.  Belarus concluded  agreements 
with  Moldavia  (July  1990);  Azerbaijan  (August  1990);  Armenia  (September  1990);  Latvia 
(September 1990); Ukraine (October 1990); Russia (December 1990) and Lithuania (June 1991). 
Ukraine  signed similar agreements  with  Kyrgystan (April  1990);  Kazakhstan (February  1990); 
Russia (November  1990);  Turkmenistan (November 1990); Lithuania (December  1990) and with 
regional  neighbours:  Hungary (September 1990) and  Poland ( October 1990).  In December 1990 
Ukraine and Belarus signed a ten year accord recognizing  each other's republic  as  sovereign and 
pledging equal treatment for Belarusians and Ukrainians on each other's territory.2oo 
While the creation of a network of horizontal ties was symbolically important for reinforcing the 
sovereignty of Ukraine and Belarus, bilateral relations at the republican level served more pressing 
economic needs.  As the  all  union economy virtually collapsed in 1990  and  1991,  most republics 
resorted to autarkic economic measures to protect their economies. Bilateral agreements enabled the 
republics to  negotiate reciprocal deliveries of output, raw and other materials as  well as consumer 
goods. The reality of inter-republican dependency as a consequence of  the integrative nature of the 
ePE, prompted the republics' leaders to seek other forms of regional  co-operation to supplement 
bilateral relationships.20 I 
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75 In April  1990,  deputies  from  the  Supreme  Soviets  of Belarus,  Ukraine and Lithuania formed  an 
informal  group to  promote trade links between these  three republics. 202  A  meeting in  Kiev,  in 
May  1990  of leaders  of  popular  front  organizations  in  Estonia,  Latvia,  Ukraine,  Belarus, 
Azerbaijan,  Armenia,  Georgia  and  Uzbekistan  agreed  to  form  a  coalition  called  the  'Union of 
Democratic Forces'.  The  aim of this  Union would be the establishment of an  information and 
advice centre, with the goal of guaranteeing the peaceful secession of the republics from the USSR 
by  negotiation  with  the  Soviet  government  and  the  creation  of structures  to  facilitate  mutual 
cooperation between the republics after the fall ofthe empire.203 
Leaders of the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan met in Moscow in February 
1991  and established a standing group of senior representatives from each republic to over see and 
coordinate the work of enterprises fulfilling  inter republican trade contracts.  The  system would 
supervise trade flows, in particular food and consumer goods.204 
F  or  Ukraine  and  Belarus,  the  most  important  relationship  at  bilateral  level  was  with  Russia. 
Agreements were signed between Russia and Ukraine (November 1990)205  and Russia and Belarus 
(December 1990).206  As  noted in the  previous chapter this importance derived  partly  from  the 
traditional  relationship  which  had  prevailed  between  the  political  centre  and  these  two  Slavic 
republics but was also  determined by  trade dependence on the Russian republic and in  particular 
energy reliance; by  the large numbers of ethnic Russians in these republics and by  the  geographic 
size of Russia. These factors meant that in a restructured configuration, even of a confederal type, 
Russia  would  continue  to  be  the  dominant  member.  However,  while  political  and  economic 
inequality formed the basis of the traditional relationship between Russia, and Ukraine and Belarus 
a new type of relationship between Russia and Ukraine and Belarus prevailed  during the  period 
between late  1990 (when Russia signed bilateral treaties with these two republics) and the failed 
coup attempt in August  1991. This was a relationship formed on a more equitable basis - in which 
Ukraine and Belarus were viewed as  equal partners who would co-operate jointly with Russia to 
displace the  Soviet centre.  This new style relationship was  possible only  after the  emergence of 
Russia as  a sovereign state and the election of Yeltsin as  its president (June  1990 and June  1991 
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76 respectively). In the struggle to usurp more powers from the centre, these bilateral agreements were 
mutually advantageous. 
In the  'Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Russian SFSR and the Ukrainian SSR' 
(November 1990) both  parties agreed to build their future relations on the basis of the June 12th 
1990 declaration on the state sovereignty of  the Russian SFSR and the July 1990 declaration of  the 
state sovereignty of Ukraine.207 Ukraine and Russia recognized each other  as  sovereign states and 
pledged to refrain from actions that might damage the state sovereignty of  the other side, recognizing 
and respecting 'the territorial integrity of  the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR within the borders that 
currently exist within the framework of  the USSR'. Regarding defence and diplomatic relations, both 
parties recognized the need for  'a system of collective security including co-operation  by both 
states in the area of  defence and security'. 
Article eight of the treaty  dealt with more  specific  areas of co-operation:  interaction in foreign 
policy;  co-operation in the  fonnulation  and development of a  common economic  space  and of 
European  and  Eurasian  markets,  as  well  as  in  the  area  of customs  policy;  co-operation  III 
management  of  transportation  and  communications  including  satellite  communications  and 
telecommunications;  co-operation in the  sphere of environmental  protection on their territories, 
including measures to minimize the after-effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe, and participation in 
creating  a  comprehensive  international  system  of environmental  safety;  questions  of migration 
policy and the struggle against organized and international crime.208 
Economic issues were dealt with in Article  11  which stipulated that 'the parties are to conclude 
intergovernmental  agreements  on  reciprocal  deliveries  and  services,  payments,  prices  and  the 
movement of securities, as  well as  a timetable for  shifting to the use of world prices in settling 
mutual accounts'. 209 
The treaty between Russia and Ukraine envisaged a qualitatively new type of relationship between 
these two sovereign republics - a relationship based on equality, friendship and co-operation, and 
far removed from the unequal and unbalanced relationship that had characterized Ukraine's previous 
relations  with  the  'centre'.  The nature  of the  new relationship  was  described  by  Yeltsin  as  a 
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77 relationship  between  two  sovereign  states,  where  good  neighbour  relations  would  develop  in 
accordance with the principle of equality and on the principles of non interference in each other's 
internal affairs.2 10 
The  agreement on bilateral relations between Russia and Belarus was  signed in Moscow by  the 
Chairmen  of the  republican  Supreme  Soviets,  Boris  Yeltsin  and  Nikolai  Dementev.  Both sides 
agreed to develop friendly relations and neighbourliness, mutual cooperation,  and guaranteeing the 
national interests of each state.  In the agreement, Russia and Belarus agreed not to take economic 
measures that could harm each other.  Yeltsin envisaged this agreement as a model for inter-republic 
cooperation, praising the  'horizontal treaty'  between republics  as  a basis for the new  all  union 
treaty.2ll 
In securing co-operation agreements with two of the most important of the republics which made 
up the USSR, Yeltsin  had created a coalition of support with which to force the centre to reduce its 
powers  further  and to  replace  it  with  a  new  political  configuration which corresponded to  the 
demands of Russia and the other republics.  Having signed agreements with Ukraine and Belarus in 
autumn  1990, Yeltsin toldjoumalists in January 1991 that the leaders of  the four largest republics: 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had decided to conclude a comprehensive  quadripartite 
treaty  among themselves without  waiting  for  the  Union Treaty.  According to Yeltsin they  had 
agreed to meet in Minsk in the near future.  The other republics could accede to the treaty later.2I2 
Thus as early  as January 1991  and  almost ten months before the  founding of  the CIS, Yeltsin was 
envisaging the  creation of new political structures, with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
forming the core. 
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Westward leaning in Russian policy  towards the other republics was evident  as early as autumn 
1990 when Yeltsin suggested that the three Slavic republics and Kazakhstan should form the 
nucleus  of cooperation in a new configuration which the other republics would be invited to join. 
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78 Evolution of  Political Discourse on Independence 
In 1990 and 1991  as part of the process of the consolidation of sovereignty,  a discourse began in 
republican level political and academic circles regarding the desirability, inevitability and viability of 
sovereign independent statehood. Envisaging independent statehood within a confederal system, the 
discourse included discussions regarding relations with regional neighbours. 
In  1991  much of the  political discussion amongst the  republics focused  on the  proposed Union 
Treaty. A conference called on the initiative of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet was held in Kiev in 
April and attended by representatives of  the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
The meeting sought to formulate a joint position on the revised draft of  the Union Treaty)  13 
In Russia the restoration of  a specifically Russian national identity centring on the concept of  Slavic 
unity  was promoted. This unity was seen as having contributed to Russia's past greatness. Writing 
in 1990 on 'A New  Russia in a Changing world',  E.  Vol odin lamented the loss of 'our Slav unity' 
and asked 'why we have no concept of the culture and history of the southern and Western Slavs, 
and why  we have forgotten extremely complex spiritual  processes that gave rise to  our greatest 
cultural  treasures?'.  While supporting the  secession of other republics from  the  Union, Volodin 
argued that  Ukraine and Belarus should be excluded from secession because 'separation from them 
would truly be a common national tragedy'.214 
The concept of Slavic unity was promoted further by  Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in September 1990 
when he called for the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the creation of a 'Union of Eastern 
Slavs', which he  said, could possibly be called the 'Pan Russian Union'  (Rossiiskii Soyuz).  With 
regard to Ukraine and Belarus, Solzhenitsyn stressed their commonality: shared historical roots and 
suffering,  and  argued  that  it  would  be  wrong  for  them  to  secede  to  independent  statehood. 
Specifically, regarding Ukraine, he dismissed what he described as a recently invented notion that a 
Ukrainian  people,  with  its  own  language  has  existed  since  as  early  as  the  ninth  century )15 
Solzhenitsyn's essay met with a decidedly  negative reaction in  Ukraine.  A joint declaration was 
signed by  representatives of Ukraine's parliamentary  opposition  (the People's Council) and its 
Russian counterpart, the Democratic Russia  group,  which  advocated the  future  development of 
Russian-Ukrainian relations on the basis of the  concept of Ukraine and Russia as  democratic and 
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79 independent states and entities in intemationallaw.216 
Solzhenitsyn's vision of a  'Pan-Russian Union'  represented traditional thinking on the status of 
Ukraine and Belarus.  Indeed it was seen by  some as the direct continuation of pre-revolutionary 
Russian thought on the Ukrainian question, the definitive characteristic of which was the conviction 
that the 'Ukrainian idea' posed a threat to the integrity of  the Russian nation and culture.217 
The imminent  prospect of some form of independence for the Soviet republics  both required and 
facilitated a reexamination of their concept of nation, national identity and national consciousness. 
In Russia the position of Ukraine and Belarus proved problematic in this process of reconstruction 
of national  identity.  The traditional  perception of Ukraine and Belarus as  inextricably  linked to 
Russia, which resurfaced at this time, conflicted with the reality of  Ukraine and Belarus as sovereign 
states.  How to resolve this conflict became pressing in the months following the coup of August 
1991. 
In Ukraine, and in particular after the all union referendum on the Union Treaty (March 1991) had 
shown strong popular support for the preservation the USSR as a renewed federation (70.5%) but 
which Ukraine would join only  on the basis of its  Declaration of State  Sovereignty of Ukraine 
(80.2%),  the  republican  party  leaders  sought  closer  accommodation  with  the  leaders  of the 
Democratic movement and became advocates of  independence for Ukraine. 
In Belarus in comparison, the party leaders continued to position themselves  in opposition to  the 
Democratic movement, presenting themselves as  defenders of the union,  as  part of the  historic 
triumvirate of  Slavic nations. Party leaders promoted the idea that Belarus, Ukraine and Russia were 
inviolably and historically ordained to be a community whose nations formed the vital  Slavic core 
of  the Soviet state. 
The Belarusian Communist party, co-operating with the leadership of  the Communist Parties 
of  the RSFSR and Ukraine devised a programme called 'Unity", which included the organization of 
pro  Union  rallies,  exchanges  between the  editors  of newspapers  and assemblies  of Communist 
authorities from these Slavic republics. A delegate to a meeting of 'Unity' held in Minsk in March 
1991, Y.  Pakhomov, Secretary of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, argued that 'the three Slavic 
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80 republics, which are at the source of our socialist statehood have a special mission. They carry the 
main responsibilities for the preservation and renovation of  the Union'  ,218 
In the weeks before the March referendum, there was an increase in the activities  of pan Slavic and 
Russian nationalists in Belarus and Ukraine,  often with the participation of  members of  the CPSu. 
In  Minsk,  the  'Sodruzhestvo'  Slavic  Society  issued a  new publication,  Slavyanskie  Vedomosti, 
which in its first  issue contained anti-Western and anti-Israeli  material and referred to  the three 
Slavic nations with their historic labels of 'Great Russians, White Russians and Little Russians'. 
The  publication  was  printed  at  facilities  owned  by  the  Central  Committee  of the  Belarusian 
Communist Party. Another organization 'Belaia Rossiia' (White Russia) distributed 5,000 leaflets in 
Minsk bearing the Tsarist double headed eagle and the message 'Preservation of the Union is  the 
first step towards the rebirth of  the Fatherland',219 
By March 1991  political developments in Ukraine and Belarus were advancing at different rates. In 
Ukraine both the opposition movement and the party leadership viewed independence as the next 
stage in the restructuring of relations with the centre. While the Democratic opposition in Belarus 
shared this view, the Belarusian Party leaders continued to view Belarus as a vital part of  the Union 
and worked to preserve this.  Ukraine's speedy advancement towards independence and Belarus' 
more hesitant moves to reform at this time were related to two factors:  the results of the March 
1991  referendum on the Union treaty and the prospects for economic viability in the post-Soviet 
environment. 
In Belarus the electorate had endorsed the Union Agreement  (the 83% of  electorate who had turned 
out to vote, voted overwhelmingly in favour of it (82.7%). This was well  above the Union average 
of 76.4% and can partly be explained as  the result of the efforts orchestrated by the republican 
authorities which included denial of air time to the opposition, promoting the concept of Slav unity 
and supporting  groups such as Unity, Sodruzhestvo and Belaia Rossiia. 
In contrast in Ukraine,  support for the preservation of the union was below the all union  average 
though still significantly high.  More noteworthy was the 80.2% (ie. all those who had turned out to 
vote)  vote in  favour of the declaration of sovereignty  defining the  status of the  republic  in  any 
future association.  In western Ukraine in the three oblasts of Ivano Frankovsk, Lvov and Ternopol 
only  15% voted in  favour of all of the proposals of the  all  Union referendum:  19.3% voted for 
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81 Ukraine's continued membership of the Union as  a sovereign state and an overwhelming  89.9% 
voted for independence. 
The  referendum  in  Ukraine  showed that a  majority  of its  electorate  supported  its  status  as  a 
sovereign  state,  but  demonstrated  that  in  Western  Ukraine  the  majority  of the  voters  there 
supported  complete  independence  rather  than  state  sovereignty )20  In  Ukraine  therefore  the 
referendum had revealed the wide degree of  support within the republic for state sovereignty and in 
certain parts, independence. 
In contrast, in Belarus, the referendum had confirmed the preference of  the leadership and electorate 
for continued membership of  the union. The  caution expressed by its leaders and people was linked 
to the economic position of Belarus within the union. Because of Soviet industrial and investment 
policies Belarus remained until the late 1980s, a relatively prosperous republic. However Belarus's 
economic development and success was linked to the all union economy  into which it was deeply 
integrated.  As  the  all  union  economy  collapsed  in  1990  and  1991,  the  Belarusian  leadership 
responded in two ways to protect the republican economy:  practical measures such as restrictions 
on exports221  and support  for a renewed political and economic union to replace the Soviet Union. 
The collapse of  the all union economy underlined Belarus' highly integrated position within it.  Price 
increases caused by the introduction of world prices by Russian producers of raw materials, were 
forcing Belarus to become a net importer rather than an exporter.222 For example, Belarus had to 
import all the metal it required for the dozens of industrial giants built to produce equipment which 
was extremely metal intensive.  These included a tractor factory,  two automobile plants, a motor 
bike factory, an engine plant, an automation line plant, the Gomel farm machinery plant  and dozens 
of  machine tool plants. This dependence on imported metal meant that 
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82 Every month millions of  tons of pig iron and steel were first hauled into 
Belarus and then hauled back out in the fonn of  tractors, motor vehicles 
and machine tools - in the process using millions of tons of  coal, petroleum 
and gas, also brought in from outside the republic.223 
As  inter republican trade collapsed, enterprise managers resorted to  barter, trading television sets 
and refrigerators for metal. However sufficient supplies could not be guaranteed, with the result that 
several  thousand  machines  piled  up  in  yards  of tractor  plants,  unable  to  be  shipped  out  to 
customers because of  missing parts.224 
Signing  bilateral agreements with other republics and participation in regional groupings was  the 
second way  in which the Belarusian leadership sought to  protect the republican economy.  For 
example in August 1990, a delegation from  Belarus went to the Estonian capital Tallin to discuss 
proposals  for  the  creation of 'common market'.  Belarus  was  keen  to  develop  closer  economic 
relations with the Baltic  countries for two reasons: 
• the Baltic area was viewed as a gateway, offering the opportunity to gain easier access to the 
European markets; 
• 30% of the industrial manufactures which Belarus received from other republics came from 
the Baltic area. 
Belarus's  dependence  on  Baltic  trade  was  demonstrated  by  the  consequences  of the  economic 
blockade  of Lithuania  following  the  latter's  declaration  of independence,  which  left  many  of 
Belarus's factories idle.225 
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83 Ukraine  also  responded  to  the  collapse  of the  Union  economy  with  protective,  semi-autarkic 
measures.226  Ukraine experienced similar economic difficulties to Belarus including a high budget 
deficit,  shortage of basic  food  stuffs  and  consumer goods,  the  prospects  of power cuts  and  an 
uncertain  mood amongst  the  labour  force.  The  Ukrainian work  force  continued to  experience 
discrimination in pricing (e.g. the price paid for a ton of sugar beets in Belarus was double that paid 
in Ukraine) and in wages (e.g. in 1987 the average wage in Ukraine, with the largest concentration of 
heavy  industry  in  the  USSR  was  considerably  lower  than  in  Belarus,  RSFSR  and  the  Baltic 
States  ).227 
Nationalists in the republics of  the FSU frequently used the arguments of  economic nationalism to 
support demands for political and economic sovereignty and independence. They argued that 
the CPE had retarded the economic development of  their republics and independence would end the 
exploitation by the centre, which was seen as a key feature of the CPE.  Such a perception fuelled 
national movements in the late 1980s and was a powerful mobilizing force as the republics sought to 
renegotiate their relationship with the centre. Thus 'the perception that certain republics assumed a 
disproportionate burden in realizing central resource allocative priorities arguably played a role in 
the union's demise'.228 
The perception of an exploitative, 'colonial type' relationship between the republic and the centre 
had  been particularly  strong among Ukrainian nationalists.  In Belarus  in contrast,  the  economic 
development  of the  republican  economy  had  occurred  only  with  the  support  of the  centre's 
investment strategies, of which Belarus was a key beneficiary. Here the centre tended to be viewed 
not as the exploiter but the progenitor of Belarus' comparative economic success in the post war 
years. 
226  These included a ban on the export of  grain and sunflower seeds from the republic (an attempt 
to halt the selling of  grain at speculative prices);  a ban on the sale of  products of  the agro-industrial 
complex outside the republic, in excess of  the amounts already slated for export. In introducing the 
latter ban, Ukraine's government was responding to Russia's unilateral actions which included 
sharply raising its purchase prices for meat and other strategic agricultural products. I:::vestia 7 Sept 
1990 p2; 21  Sept 1990 p2 
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84 The perception of centrally direct exploitation was not confined only to the non Russian republics. 
The belief that  Russia was subsidizing economic development in the other republics was held by a 
growing number of Russians  in  the  1980s.  Many Russians viewed their neighbours as  economic 
burdens  for  which  Russia  had  sacrificed  its  own  economic  health  for  decades.229  This  was 
articulated by  Yeltsin in  1990, when  addressing the  RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, he 
condemned the 'imperial policy of the  centre' and described  it as 'the cruel exploiter, the miserly 
benefactor')30  With the revival of Russian national consciousness in the mid 1980s, complaints 
were made that the greatest hardships in the course of  Soviet economic development had been borne 
by the Russian republic and that the well being of  Russia had been sacrificed to the progress of  the 
backward regions of  the country.231 
Thus while arguments regarding exploitation had been used to support the independence drives of 
other republics, similar arguments could be made for the Russian Federation. It could also be argued 
that the  Western republics  of the FSU and primarily  Russia,  acted as  donor  republics  for  the 
economic  development  of less  developed  areas  and  specifically  Central  Asia.  This  can  be 
demonstrated  by  examining  two  forms  of income  transfer  between  the  republics  a)  prices  b) 
investment. 
aJ Prices 
Within the CPE the pricing mechanism was distorted and prices played little role in the allocation of 
resources.  The pricing policy of the CPE facilitated the  indirect or implicit subsidization of less 
developed  economies.  Goods  exported  by  less  developed republics  were  overpriced and  goods 
imported into these republics from the more developed republics (Russia, Ukraine and to a lesser 
extent  Belarus)  were  underpriced.  The  less  developed republics  therefore  received  an  indirect 
subsidy.232  In the Soviet CPE, manufactured goods and fuels tended to be overpriced, while raw 
materials and energy were underpriced. Since  Russia and Ukraine were key producers and suppliers 
of raw materials and energy, supplying commodities to less developed republics, at usually lower 
than cost prices, Russia and Ukraine were in effect subsidizing these economies. In 1988, Russia' 
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85 subsidy  to  other  republics  was  estimated  to  be  64  billion  roubles,233  Since  Belarus  produced 
primarily  manufactured goods  and foods,  it benefited from  the  preferential prices  paid for  these 
goods. 
One consequence of this artificial and distorted price system  was to generate the perception of 
exploitation.  Ericson argues  that  'the absence  of real  money  and real  prices  led  to  unbalanced 
exchange; implicit unmeasured subsidization and confiscation necessarily takes place, generating the 
perception of intentional national exploitation' ,234 
A revision of prices, which is a key component of the transition to the market would thus benefit 
those republics which had previously been forced to supply  energy and raw materials  at lower 
prices.  Russia as the main supplier of fuel,  timber,  metal  and food  supplies  would be the  main 
beneficiary.  Ukraine  as  a  supplier of coal,minerals  and food  products  would  also  benefit.  For 
Belarus, however, a switch to market prices would be disadvantageous, since it is  almost wholly 
dependent on imports of  fuel (90%) and raw materials. While the artificial  structure of  administered 
prices  functioned as  a  means of inter republican income redistribution,  some republics benefited 
from  direct subsidies in the  retention of turnover tax collected in these republics.  There is  again 
differentiation between the developed and less  developed regions of the USSR.  In  1989  all the 
Central Asian republics retained all the turnover tax collected there, where as Russia retained only 
85% of  the tax, Belarus retained 71 % and Ukraine 68%.235 
b) Investment 
An examination of investment allocation also reveals a bias in favour of less developed republics, in 
keeping  with  the  Soviet  regime's  regional  economic  policies.  Investment  allocations  also 
demonstrate  a  specific bias  against Ukraine  in  the  Soviet  period.  The imbalance  in investment 
allocation was  redressed in the  late  1980s  when the  centre ceased its  commitment to attaining 
equality  between  regions.  With  the  policies  of Perestroika,  the  investment  allocations  to  less 
developed republics began to decline.  Gorbachev's investment strategy was to modernize existing 
facilities through  renovation rather than building new ones. Consequently, investment allocations to 
the more industrialized European part of the USSR increased from  1986-1990 while those to the 
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86 underdeveloped republics of  Central Asia fel1.236 
Since  the  1980s  investment  was  directed  towards  the  more  resource  rich  republics  (excluding 
Ukraine) with disproportionate flows  to  Russia and above average flows  to  the Baltic republics. 
Throughout Ukraine received a  below average  share of investment per capita. 237  While Russia 
received a disproportionate allocation of investment (consistently above average in investment per 
capita) and Belarus received high levels of investment between 1980-1988, Ukraine continued to 
receive lower than average allocations of investment. Thus for Ukraine, though not for Russia and 
Belarus a case can be made for a bias against the republic in the form of discriminatory investment 
policies. 
Investment allocations which were  relatively small in  comparison to Ukraine's share  in the total 
population and economic potential of  the USSR retarded Ukraine's economic growth in comparison 
to other republics, which benefited from  higher investment allocations.  The Ukrainian  economy 
was  less  able to  utilize  its  labour and natural  resources  more  efficiently, to  introduce  advanced 
technology  and  had  less  opportunity  to  adjust  its  economic  structure  to  new  technological 
requirements.238  One reason for  this below average investment allocation is  that in the post war 
years Ukraine no longer served the USSR's geopolitical goals. Previously Ukraine was an  important 
region bordering on those East-Central European states which had recently come under the Soviet 
sphere of influence. In the 1970s and 1980s the spread of Islamic fundamentalism led to a shift of 
the  USSR's  geopolitical  interests,  south  to  Central  Asia  and  east  to  Siberia.  With  Ukraine's 
importance  to  the  centre  reduced,  it  is  argued,  the  latter  aimed  only  at  keeping  the  Ukrainian 
economy at a tolerable leve1.239 
F  or Ukrainians then, Soviet economic planning had resulted in the retardation of the economy and 
generated the perception that only economic self management could ensure economic recovery and 
well being.  For Russia and Belarus, both had benefited from the investment strategy of the  1980s 
(upgrading existing plants)  so that in comparison with other republics, their economies were better 
able to meet the industrial  changes necessitated by the transition to the market. 
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87 Nationalist  movements  in  many  of the  republics  were  driven  in  part  by  the  perception  of 
exploitation (real or imagined). However the question of economic viability following sovereignty 
and independence was seldom extensively debated and  often taken as a priori. While the economic 
viability of the Russian Federation could not be disputed, for most of the other ex-republics, their 
economic  viability  depended  on  the  maintenance  of inter  republican  links,  upon  which  their 
economies had been structured. In this context, Gertrude Schroeder argues that economic viability 
should  not  be taken  to  mean potential  economic  self sufficiency  (autarky),  based on near  self 
sufficiency  in energy  supplies  and of other natural  resources,  large  populations  and territories. 
Instead she interprets economic viability to mean the capability to exist and develop as a separate 
state in a world of highly  economically  interdependent states. According to this criteria, the most 
promising of  the new states of  the FSU in terms of economic viability, i.e. the states with the best 
economic prospects were seen as the three largest Slavic republics, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.24o 
The economic difficulties and hardship which accompanied the collapse of the union economy in 
1990 and 1991, resurrected the debate regarding Ukraine's exploited status within the union.  The 
Council for  the  Study of Productive Forces in Ukraine (affiliated to  the Ukrainian Academy of 
Sciences) restated its complaints about the injustices done to Ukraine in view of its contribution to 
the Soviet economy. It argued that the dictatorship of the all union ministries led to a situation in 
which  heavy  industry  had been concentrated  in  large  cities  with  negative  social  and  economic 
consequences, while smaller and medium sized towns had experienced a lower rate of  development. 
Centralization, it was argued, reduced the economic rights of Ukraine and lowered the standard of 
living of  its people.241 
With  Ukraine  due  to  switch  to  complete  economIC  sovereignty  in January  1991,  the  debate 
intensified, producing a consensus among both the republican party leadership and the opposition 
that Ukraine's economic and ecological  problems were largely the result of the  'violation of the 
sovereign rights  of the  republic'.  It was  argued  that  the  central  authorities  exploited Ukraine's 
resources in an irrational and careless manner, with little real benefit for Ukrainians. It was claimed 
that 'Ukraine contributed far more than it received from the Union, and only 5% of  the resources of 
Ukraine were under the direct control of the republic'. A meeting of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet 
Committee on Ecology  noted how the  central  ministries  established and  operated factories  and 
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88 enterprises  in  Ukraine  without  taking  into  account  the  impact  on  the  environment  of the  by-
products released.242 
The immediate benefits of economic sovereignty for Ukraine would be limited, given the continued 
trade  dependence  on  other  republics.  It was  argued that Ukraine  would  lose  most  through  the 
revision of prices for  heavy  industrial  products and would sustain a substantial loss through the 
redistribution of the turnover tax, because part of the turnover tax it received in the past would be 
allocated  to  republics  which  supply  the  primary  and  intermediate  products  which  Ukraine's 
factories finished off.243 
As  the  second  largest  economy  in  the  region  next  to  Russia's,  Ukraine  made  significant 
contributions to the all Union economy.  A key contributor to the overall industrial output (17% in 
1990),244 Ukraine,  like Russia had been heavily  industrialized.  Most of Ukraine's industry  was 
concentrated  in the  branches  of heavy  industry,  including  machine  building,  metallurgy,  wood, 
chemicals, fuel and energy, though light industry and food processing played a significant part in the 
republic's economy.  In the ferrous metal sector, it produced half of the steel, rolled ferrous metals 
and steel pipes made in the USSR. It produced half of  the USSR's granulated sugar, one third of its 
vegetables,  one  quarter  of its  butter.  It manufactured  30%  of the  USSR's  chemical  industrial 
equipment,  one  quarter of its  agricultural  machinery  and  almost  one  quarter of other  important 
types of construction equipment. It produced smaller, relative amounts of most consumer goods 
and was second only to the RSFSR in the production of consumer goods.  Consequently in heavy 
industry and in  the food and agricultural industries, Ukraine had a positive balance of trade with 
other republics.245  Because Ukraine consistently received lower investment allocations per capita 
than other republics, much of Ukraine's industry was aging and in need of modernization. In other 
areas  of production  Ukraine  also  made  significant  contributions  to  the  all  union  economy.246 
Ukraine was also endowed with natural resources including coal, iron ore, manganese, sulphur and 
natural gas. 247 
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89 Much  more  dependent  on  trade  than  Russia,  in  1989  16%  of Ukraine's  domestic  output  was 
exported and 18% of  the republic's internal consumption came from imports. 248 Most of Ukraine's 
trade was conducted with the other republics of the Union, accounting for 84% of its exports and 
73% of  its imports. This trade was concentrated on the neighbouring European regions of  the Russia 
and to a lesser extent with Belarus and the Baltic republics. Trade with the Asiatic part of  the 
Russia, Central Asia and Transcaucasia was infrequent.249 
While Ukraine was an important supplier for the all union market, it also depended on it for imports 
of  fuel and energy. Ukraine produced only 58% of  its own primary fuel and energy needs, importing 
the remainder from energy rich republics such as Russia and Turkmenistan. Thus 11% of  Ukraine's 
imports  from  other  republics  were  oil  and  gas.  To  sustain  the  republic's  timber  and  wood 
processing  industry, and light industry, Ukraine imported  100%  of its rubber; 60-80% of its non 
ferrous metals, motor vehicles, chemical fibres, perfumes and cosmetics, 40% of  its timber products, 
medical products  and textiles. It also imported electrical equipment, motors and radio technology. 
250 Ukraine imported 100% of the cotton it required, most non ferrous metals, 93% of its timber, 
70% of its wool and 80% of other natural fibres. 251 
The  restructuring  of Ukraine's  industry  to  make  it  more  efficient  and  less  energy  and  trade 
dependent could only  take  place in the  long term.  In the  interim, resource  and energy  intensive 
enterprises would continue to produce low quality  goods which would be  uncompetitive on the 
world market.  Its dependence on inter-republican trade would also continue. 
The structure of  Ukraine's industry and the nature of its foreign trade  provided additional evidence 
for  nationalists arguing that the centre's policies had been detrimental for the Ukrainian economy. 
They argued that central policies assigned Ukraine the  role of producer of mainly  extractive and 
intermediate goods, creating a lop sided economic structure and unnecessary dependence on other 
republics for finished goods.252  Furthermore the structure of both industry and trade was seen as 
having limited Ukraine's long term economic prospects. The reliance on imports of oil and mineral 
248  ibid p928 
249 Koropecky (1990) p9 
250  ibidp14 
251  Business International September 1992 No 142 XIII-6-2 
252 Schroeder, G.  'Regional Economic Disparities, Gorbachev's Policies and the Disintegration of 
the Soviet Union'  in  Kaufman & Hardt 1993 p121 
90 deposits  put  pressure  on  the  sources  of non  renewable  raw  materials  and  water  supplies. 253 
Consequently  in  spite  of the  many  difficulties  associated  with economic  sovereignty, the  view 
prevailed that the economic future of sovereign Ukraine could only improve under self-government 
and  would  certainly  be  no  worse  than  the  subordinate  economic  function  which  Ukraine  had 
performed within the USSR. 
Belarus' opposition movement did not aspire to full independence, given the continued strength of 
its  Communist  Party  leaders  and  its  economic  position,  even  within  the  disintegrating  CPE. 
Consequently the republic's leaders were ardent supporters of the Union Treaty and the proposed 
Union  of Sovereign  States.  Following  the  coup  attempt  against  the  Soviet  President  and  the 
subsequent collapse of  the centre, Belarus' leaders only reluctantly declared independence. From the 
Ukrainian  perspective  however,  the  coup  attempt  hastened  the  arrival  of independence,  which 
Ukraine had previously aspired to by progressive and gradualist means. 
Independence  came  to  Ukraine  and  Belarus  in  the  context  of a  rapidly  changing  political, 
socioeconomic and geostrategic environment and forced these two republics to address a number of 
pressing issues. These included 
• how to institutionalize, reinforce and defend  their newly attained independence; 
• how to proceed with the introduction of  market reform; 
• how to advance with democratization; 
• how to exist and co-exist regionally as independent states; 
• how to  gain access to  international political and economic organizations and international 
markets. 
Central to  all  these issues  was  the question of Russia's role  in the  post-Soviet environment,  its 
relationship  with  all  of the  newly  independent  states  and  in  particular its  Slavic  neighbours  of 
Ukraine and Belarus. Following the collapse of  the union, Russia's relationship with these republics 
shifted to a new level and the months between the coup attempt  in August 1991 and the creation of 
the CIS  in December saw the disintegration of the short lived partnership between Russia and the 
new sovereign republics of Ukraine and Belarus which had existed since 1990.  At the heart of this 
was  Russia's role  in defeating the  forces  of reaction and thereafter acting as  the  force  for  change 
within the union. 
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91 Russia played a key role in the negotiations for the restructured union and when it became clear that 
Ukraine  would  not  participate,  particularly  after the  referendum  on  independence  in  December 
1991, convened the meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha which created the CIS.  In September 1991, 
leaders of 10 republics (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgystan, 
Takijikistan,  Armenia  and  Turkmenistan)  pledged  support  for  a  new  treaty  for  a  'Union of 
Sovereign  States',  within  which  each  republic  was  to  determine  for  itself the  forms  of its 
participation within the union; the conclusion of an economic union for the purpose of interacting 
within the framework of a single economic space  and for  the  normal functioning  of the national 
economy, the provision of vital services to  the population and the accelerated implementation of 
radical economic reform.254 
In  October  1991,  eight  of the  former  republics  (excluding  Ukraine,  Moldova,  Georgia  and 
Azerbaijan)  signed the  'Treaty on an Economic Community  of Sovereign states'.255  Agreement 
was reached on  the 'Union of Sovereign  States' at Novo-Ogarevo in November. Seven ex-republics 
called for the creation of  a new political union and discussed the possible forms that it could take: 
• a union of  sovereign states, without a state formation of its own; 
• a union with a centralized state power, on a federal or confederal basis; 
• a union which would perform certain state functions but which did not have the status of a 
state or a name. 
Agreement was finally reached on a confederal state, which would perform functions delegated to it 
by the states which were parties to the treaty. The confederation, or USS, would not have its own 
constitution but  would  have  a  bicameral  parliament and a  government,  with  a  Prime  Minister, 
deputy Prime Minister and Ministers of the Union.  The posts of President and Vice President of 
the Union were to be elective.256 
While Russia, Belarus and several of the other former republics supported the proposed political 
and economic union, Ukraine continued to object to its form and refused to sign the agreement.  Its 
refusal  to  participate  was  problematic  but  since  it  constituted  an  important  component  of the 
former union, its absence in  a new union was difficult to conceive. This difficulty  was the basis of 
a joint appeal issued by  Gorbachev, Yeltsin and the Chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, 
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92 Shuskevich, as well  as the heads of seven of republics, calling on Ukraine to take an active part in 
the collective work of the Treaty of the Economic Community. Recognising Ukraine as one of the 
largest  republics of the USSR, their appeal acknowledged that 'its role in the development of the 
country, in everything  of which our peoples can rightfully be proud, is irreplaceable'. The appeal 
declared that 'we cannot imagine the Union without Ukraine'  .257 
Yeltsin acknowledged the difficulty of convening a new union without Ukraine, when on the eve of 
the Ukrainian referendum on independence (3 Dec 1991)  he  said that he could not imagine a union 
without Ukraine and if  Ukraine failed to sign the Union treaty, then Russia would not sign it.258 
Ukraine's referendum confirmed wide popular support for independence (84.2% of the electorate 
turned  out  to  vote,  with  90.32%  voting  for  Ukraine's  independence).259  Such  overwhelming 
support  for  Ukrainian  independence  gave  the  newly  elected President of the  republic,  Leonid 
Kravchuk (elected by  60% of the electorate as President on the same day  as  the referendum) a 
strong mandate to resist pressure to join the proposed political and economic union of the Novo-
Ogarevo process and seek instead a new configuration better suited to Ukraine's aims. Immediately 
following the referendum, Kravchuk announced that Ukraine would not sign the proposed Union 
Treaty.260 
Seven days  after Ukraine's declaration of independence, Ukrainian President Kravchuk, Russian 
President Yeltsin and Chairman of Belarus's Supreme Soviet, Shuskevich, met in Belovezhskaya 
Pushcha and signed a new agreement on the Creation of a 'Commonwealth of Independent States' 
(CIS).  The three Slavic states of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, which had formed the core of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922, had joined together again in 1991  to replace it with a 
new organization. While nine other republics (excluding the Baltic republics) eventually joined the 
CIS, the Slavic core remained its most important element. 
The agreement on the creation of the CIS stressed their Slavic heritage,  referring to  'the historic 
community of  our peoples and the ties that have developed among them' including bilateral treaties, 
as the basis for the new relationship. The founding agreement was accompanied by an agreement to 
coordinate market reforms, recognizing that the preservation and development of  the close economic 
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93 ties amongst the republics was vital to stabilize the situation in the national economy and to create 
the preconditions necessary for economic reviva1.261 
Strategies for maintaining economic co-operation and links amongst the republics had begun almost 
immediately after the failure of the  coup in August.  On August 29 Kravchuk (then Chairman of 
Ukraine's  Supreme  Soviet)  and Russia's Vice President Alexandr Rutskoi  signed an  eight point 
communique pledging co-operation to prevent the 'uncontrolled disintegration  of  the Union State'. 
The agreement envisaged the setting up  of interim structures and invited 'interested states' which 
were subjects of the Soviet Union to join them in the transitional period, regardless of their status. 
Ukraine and Russia agreed to recognize existing borders and exchange ambassadors. The agreement 
also dealt with the issue of military strategic problems, the necessity of the reform of the military 
and the creation of a system of collective security. Both sides also agreed not to adopt unilateral 
decisions on military strategic issues.262 
In October, Ukrainian and Russian officials, led by Ukrainian  Foreign minister Anatoli Zlenko and 
his  Russian  counterpart,  Andrei  Kozyrev  met in  Kiev  for  talks  aimed at working  out common 
approaches to domestic and foreign policy and agreed to work towards the speedy implementation 
of  the Conventional forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). 
Mutual  co-operation  was  pledged  in  gaining  entry  to  international,  economic  and  financial 
organizations. 263 
While  at  the  supranational  level  the  months  between  August  and  December  1991  had  been 
characterized by the attempts to construct a new type of union, at the bilateral level efforts were 
underway to redefine and restructure relations within the new context of post-Soviet  independence. 
Co-operation at this between Ukraine and Russia reflected the new circumstances in which relations 
between these two republics were now being made. It also reflected the change in the nature of the 
relationship between the two as they moved from friendly and co-operative relations between two 
sovereign  republics to the status of  independent states. 
In November  1991  an agreement was  reached between Ukraine  and  Russia on  the  principles of 
trade and co-operation between them.  The agreement anticipated the stabilization of economic co-
operation,  specifying not only  the  principles  of co-operation but  also  the  mechanisms  for  their 
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94 implementation. Both sides pledged to maintain reciprocal deliveries of goods through co-operative 
inter-industry  ties.  To stabilize the  coal  and  metallurgical industries the  agreement called for  the 
conclusion of separate agreements to preserve  existing ties between enterprises in  these  sectors. 
There  was to be a coordinated policy in the sphere of price setting and price regulation. Starting in 
1992 payment for deliveries of  goods (or labour and services) between enterprises and organizations 
was to be made on contract prices and for certain types of products at world prices converted into 
roubles at an agreed upon rate,264 
The change in Russia's attitude to and relations with its Slavic  neighbours became apparent almost 
immediately after the coup. Yeltsin's declaration regarding the reopening ofterritorial issues brought 
protests from  Ukraine and marked the beginning of a new phase in the relationship,  which was 
described  as  'cold  war'. 265  Yeltsin' s  statement  led  to  public  protests  outside  the  Ukrainian 
parliament, with demonstrators bearing placards declaring 'Ukraine without Moscow'. Russian Vice 
President Alexandr Rutskoi and Mayor of St Petersburg, Anatoli Sobchak were dispatched to Kiev 
to prevent the escalation of  a possible dispute,266 
Yeltsin's comments were seen as an indication of  the resurgence of  Russia's  traditional 'Ukrainian 
complex' ,267  Having co-operated to displace the union, Russia and Ukraine began the process of 
renegotiating  these  relations  as  independent  nations.  Russia  was  concerned  that  Ukraine's 
determination to  consolidate  independence  should not interfere  with its  interests:  economic  and 
strategic, as  well as the fate of the many ethnic Russians living there.  Anxious that the enhanced 
role of the Russian Federation in the political and economic life of the area of the FSU should not 
obstruct  Ukrainian  independence,  the  Ukrainian  leadership  was  fearful  that  Russia  would  not 
singularly usurp the status of successor to the USSR both regionally and internationally.268 This 
explains  Ukraine's speedy  efforts  to  reinforce  independence  in  concrete ways,  following  the  24 
August declaration of independence, including its  refusal to adhere to the new treaty on economic 
co-operation; the failure to send a delegation to the opening session of  the USS Supreme Soviet and 
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95 the  unusually  quick  passage  of legislation  to  establish  its  own  military  forces,269  To  further 
consolidate its independence Ukraine  continued to  present itself as  a  'European nation'  and to 
seek recognition and support for this amongst the European nations. F  oHowing Kravchuk's election 
to  the  Presidency,  his  successor  as  Chairman of the  Ukrainian  Supreme  Soviet,  Ivan Plyushch 
declared that 'a European state has appeared on the map, and its name is Ukraine' ,270 
Ukraine's leadership did however recognize that relations with Russia formed a core component  of 
the  external  relations  of the  independent  state.  On  being  sworn  in  as  Ukraine's  president  in 
December 1991,  Leonid Kravchuk acknowledged that 'we have a special interest in good relations 
with all the republics of  the former union and above all with Russia' ,271 
In contrast to Ukraine, the Belarusian response to  independence was  reactive.  With most of the 
other republics declaring independence following the August coup, Belarus followed suit and in the 
months following began to consolidate that independence while actively supporting the movement 
towards  a  restructured  union.  As  in  Ukraine,  Belarus's  first  steps  in  the  consolidation  of 
independence were concerned with security. On 29 August 1991, a decision was taken to defend the 
interests ofBelarusians on their ethnic territory. Unlike Ukraine however, the Belarusian leadership 
did  not  envisage  the  creation  of a  republican  army.272  At  the  extraordinary  session  of the 
Belarusian Supreme Soviet, Belarus' communist Party leader and President of republic's Supreme 
Soviet, Mikala Dementei, was forced to resign for his behaviour during the coup and was replaced 
by  Stanislav  Shushkevich.273  The parliament voted to change the name of the new independent 
state  to  Belarus,  the  Belarusian  language  version  of the  republic's  name,  dropping  the  Soviet 
Socialist terms from the name, and  to restore the traditional 'Red on White' flag. 274 The parliament 
also voted to place border and customs patrols under the jurisdiction of the republic's government. 
All Belarusian conscripts were to serve only in Belarus,275 Belarus also introduced special coupons 
to  partially replace roubles  as  the  first  step in the  introduction of its  own currency.  The special 
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96 coupons were to be paid as a proportion of salaries, beginning in 1992.276 
Alongside these consolidatory measures, the Belarusian leadership also made clear its willingness to 
cooperate  with regional  neighbours.  This  stemmed  from  the  recognition of Belarus'  continued 
economic dependence on these neighbours and primarily Russia and hence the support for a new 
type  of union.  Shushkevich acknowledged this, saying that Belarus would sign the Union Treaty 
at the end of 1991  or early  1992.  He also said that Belarus could not deal with the aftermath of 
Chernobyl or with the current economic crisis on its own. 277  Following the agreement to create a 
new CIS, Shushkevich further underlined Belarus' economic motives in supporting the new union. 
He pointed out that 
It is not based on national or ethnic hallmarks ... We preceded from 
primarily economic considerations. Belarus, Ukraine and Russia border 
on one another and any economic action in one republic is immediately 
reflected in another.278 
While  Belarus'  continued  reliance  on  Russian  raw  materials  and  energy  was  indisputable, 
Shushkevich was anxious that this reliance should not be taken as  a sign of 'dependence' which 
could limit Belarus' independence.  In September 1991 he warned that Belarus constituted a 'nation 
state'  and that it was a big mistake on the part of historians to depict Belarus as dependent upon 
Russia, 'the elder brother'  .279 
In December  1991,  Belarusian Prime Minister, Leonid Kebich articulated another viewpoint on 
Belarusian independence amongst the leadership when he said that 'if Russia and Belarus are to be 
sovereign states, Russia must assume part of Belarus' defence expenditures, since our most likely 
adversary continues to be NATO'  .280 
Kebich's  statement was seen as an indication that Belarus' post  Communist government saw 
Russia as the de facto successor to the former Soviet Union and so Belarus was seeking to  obtain 
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97 'Most Favoured Nation' status in exchange for loyal relations.281  It could however also be taken as 
a sign that the Belarusian leadership was prepared to accept some curbs on its sovereignty in return 
for economic and security guarantees. This  became clear  when the Belarusian government began to 
actively seek economic and monetary union with Russia in 1992 and 1993. 
Between August and December 1991, Russian emerged as the leading force within the area of the 
FSU.  Given its  size  and economic power,  as  well as  its  position as  the traditional  'centre', its 
evolving role as  successor state was inevitable. Russia remained committed to the preservation of 
some form of union and actively worked to  achieve it.  Ukraine and Belarus were viewed as vital 
parts of this.  Their new geopolitical positions as  buffer states between East and West increased 
further their importance to Russia. 
Unlike  Ukraine,  Belarus'  leadership  viewed  close  relations  with  Russia  as  inevitable  and  even 
desirable. This was taken for granted by Russia's leaders. Following the creation of  the CIS, Russian 
Prime  minister,  Yegor  Gaidar  was  asked  whether  Belarus  joined the  Commonwealth  without 
hesitation,  he  replied,  'Belarus  cannot  remain  aloof from  Russia  since  it  is  part  of our  single 
economic space,282 
Belarus  was  one  of the  most  trade  dependent  of the  Soviet  republics.  Specializing  in  the 
intermediate and final stages of  metal and energy consuming processes,  chemicals, machine building 
and  machine  tool  construction  were  its  key  industrial  sectors.  Poorly  endowed  with  natural 
resources, the structure of Belarus's industry meant that the republic relied on raw materials from 
outside the republic. Belarus' energy dependence was even greater than Ukraine's. It produced only 
8%  of the  energy  it  consumed  primarily  oil,  peat  and  small  quantities  of natural  gas.  It was 
dependent on external supplies of energy, importing much of its oil and gas from Russia.  Iron and 
steel was  supplied from  Ukraine; supplies of ferrous  metals came from  Kazakhstan and various 
parts and components came from all over the USSR.  Belarus' key  imports were machinery  and 
equipment (44%), chemicals (12%) Textiles and apparel  (91%).  Its  chief exports  were  machine 
products and transport equipment (36%), other machinery and equipment  (17%), chemicals (13%) 
as well as fertilizers, refrigerators, television sets, watches and furniture.283 
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98 Russia  was  Belarus's  key  trading  partner,  supplying  it  with  64%  of all  its  imports,  primarily 
underpriced energy and raw materials. This close trading relationship with Russia was underlined by 
Russia's reliance on Belarus as  a transit route for  gas pipelines, bringing gas from  Western Siberia 
and the Komi  ASSR to  Eastern Europe  and Lithuania.  The Druzhba oil  pipeline  also  traversed 
Belarus. 
This dependency on external supplies of energy and raw materials meant that Belarus relied on the 
smooth functioning of  the whole Soviet economic system.  The degree of integration in the all uriion 
economy and the level of  Belarus's dependence on imports from other republics was demonstrated 
in the  late  1980s as  inter-republican broke down.  In 1990  the  decline in industrial production in 
Belarus was  directly linked to  shortages of raw materials and components as  supplies from  other 
republics became increasingly sporadic. 
In  1991, industrial production in Belarus declined by  15%  from the previous year.  This slump is 
attributed  to  the  breakdown  in  supplies  due  to  general  shortages,  the  abrogation  of existing 
agreements~ republic level trade restrictions and monopolistic free prices.284 In particular Belarusian 
industry  suffered  from  shortages  of raw  materials  and  semi-finished  products  from  its  key 
suppliers, Russia and Ukraine.285 
Ukraine  and Belarus  shared a common energy  dependency  on Russia,  the  key  supplier of their 
energy requirements. Within the all union economy, Russia was the key producer of oil (90%) and 
natural gas (77%). Ukraine met about one third of its energy requirements with its own supplies of 
coal  from  the Donets basin in Eastern Ukraine  and nuclear energy, but depended on Russia for 
almost 40% of its  energy requirements.  This dependency derived from the structure of its heavy 
industry,  geared towards the  production of iron  and steel,  machine  building,  metal  working  and 
chemical production - all energy intensive industries.286 
The level of energy dependency and the consequences of this for  industrial production within the 
republics  was  shown by  the  declining  supplies  of energy  and  fuel  in  the  1980s  in  the  USSR 
generally  and  Russia specifically,  as  the key  oil  producer.  The  decline  was  due to  a number of 
factors  including:  a  natural  decline  in  the  older oil  fields,  reduced  investments  so  that outdated 
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99 technology  and  equipment  was  not  replaced;  poor  production  methods;  ethnic  conflicts  in  oil 
producing areas and areas producing oil field equipment (Azerbaijan). Gas supplies have declined 
due to a disintegrating infrastructure and political and ethnic unrest.287  Coal output in Ukraine and 
Russia continued to fall and overall production of  coal fell by  11 %  in 1991. Thus reduced supplies 
of  energy contributed to the overall decline in industrial production in the region.288 
The structure of the all union economy and the nature of trade relations between its constituent 
parts imparted a critical legacy for the independent states of  the FSU and for the Slavic republics of 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The Soviet orientation  towards 'energy intensive' and' raw material 
dependent' heavy industry meant that the most industrialized  of the ex-republics (primarily the 
Western republics), and those with better prospects for industrial restructuring towards a market 
economy, would continue to rely on 'external' supplies of energy and raw materials in the short 
term. While the preference of some republics (the Baltic states and Ukraine) would be to reorient 
their economies and trade away from the area of the FSU and towards Western Europe, the short 
term problems associated with the structural legacies of the SCPE and the transition to the market 
economy, would continue to tie most of the republics to the regional market and to Russia as the 
dominant economy in the region. 
F  or  Ukraine,  relations  with  Russia  could  only  take  place  on  a  bilateral  basis  between  two 
independent  states  and not  within  a  reconstituted  union  where  Russia would  be  the  dominant 
player.  Against Ukraine's opposition to a renewed union Russia's leadership recognized that such 
a union could not exist without Ukraine and that a new type of structure needed to be created to 
ensure  Ukraine's  involvement.  Ukraine  finally  agreed  to  the  very  loose,  non  governmental 
framework proposed in the CIS. 
By  the end of 1991  and the collapse of the Soviet Union,  political developments since the coup 
indicated that  in  the  post-Soviet environment,  Russia  would  be pursuing  qualitatively  different 
types  of relationship  with its  two  neighbouring  Slavic  states.  Belarus was  a willing  ally  in  co-
operation, and Ukraine, the reluctant partner,  suspicious of Russia's assertion of influence in the 
area of the FSU.  Ultimately though both states could not disassociate themselves from  their links 
with Russia but would have to find ways of  managing their relations. 
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100 Conclusion 
In  some  of the  former  republics  of the  USSR,  and in  Ukraine  in  particular,  the  belief that  the 
republican  economy  had  suffered  under the  centre's economic  policies  and  the  perception  that 
independence would bring greater economic prosperity mobilized support for national independence 
in 1990  and  1991.  However while economic  self management was  seen as  a vital  component of 
national independence, the legacy of the Soviet CPE meant that the economic independence of the 
former republics was curtailed by their high degree of integration within the all union economy and 
their dependence on inter republican trade.  The link between  economic  and political independence 
for the republics of  the FSU is explicit: 
A declaration of  sovereignty or independence is ultimately meaningless 
without economic power; no drive for self determination can lead 
very far when the government in question is unable to ensure supply 
lines or raise its own revenues.289 
For the ex-republics, continued economic dependence would restrict their political independence. As 
the  global  economy  became  more  interdependent  so  that  most  states  are  no  longer  wholly 
independent  economically,  the  ex-republics  were  renegotiating  their  economic  relations,  both  to 
reduce  the  dependency  and  ensure future  relations  would be  conducted on a mutually  equitable 
basis.  For  most republics, this entailed redefining and restructuring their economic relationships 
with their key trading partners, primarily, but not exclusively Russia. 
Russia's  emerging  status  as  successor  state  to  the  USSR clearly  affected this  relationship.  The 
structure of the all  union economy, the nature of external trade and the structure of the regional 
market  indicated that a  continued  degree  of economic  co-operation  and  even  reintegration  was 
essential  for  the  economies  of the  FSU.  The  prospect of some  form  of economic  reintegration 
received mixed responses amongst the ex-republics. 
Russia, as  the dominant economy in the region favoured reintegration amongst the more advanced 
industrialized nations.  However this process was to be selective with fears that the incorporation 
of the less developed Central Asian economies would act as  a drain on vital resources and would 
return Russia to the position of  subsidizer of  their economies. 
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101 Given the high degree of  its trade dependency and in particular its reliance on trade with Russia, 
Belarus became an active supporter of  economic reunion, even  to the extent of accepting limitations 
on its political sovereignty in pursuit of this.  Ukraine however, though less trade dependent than 
Belarus recognized the necessity for continued co-operation in trade with the other republics, but 
opposed any type of economic union which could act as a precursor to political union.  Since much 
of their  trade  was  conducted with  each other,  the  three  Slavic  republics  would  continue  to  be 
important trading partners for each other. 
Working out the bases for this new relationship formed part of an evolving and rapidly  changing 
process.  Between  1985  and  1991  this  relationship  evolved from  interaction and cooperation to 
displace the  Soviet centre, to  their coexistence (not always  peaceful) as  independent states.  The 
nature of  relations shifted from harmonious accord to the predominance of  self interest.  In the post-
Soviet  environment,  the  difficult task  for  the  ex-republics  would  be  how to  reconcile  political 
independence with the necessary economic co-operation to ensure survival.  Since Russia was at the 
centre  of most  trade  relations,  this  also  meant  renegotiating  the  relationship  with Russia.  This 
restructuring of relations with Russia after the  collapse of the USSR in December 1991  and the 
growing momentum towards renewed co-operation and possible reintegration are  examined in the 
following chapter. 
102 Chapter 4  Independence and Reintegration:The CIS and its impact on the 
relationship between the Slavic nations after 1991 
The long established links between the republics of  the USSR which developed in Tsarist and 
Soviet times, and the newly evolving relationships ofthe proto nation-states which emerged 
in the region in the late 1980s, provided strong incentives for continued cooperation in the 
post-Soviet era, albeit in an altered fonn.  The need for some type of  union was recognized 
by most, though not all of  the ex-republics and in December 1991 the Commonwealth of 
Independent States  (CIS) was fonned for this purpose. By the end of 1997 however the CIS 
still failed to function  effectively as a  regional economic and political  organization despite 
the wealth of  legislation which had been passed to reinforce its role and commentators were 
once again predicting its demise.29o 
During the period analysed by this thesis (1991-1997) three trends became discernible which 
help explain why the CIS failed to evolve as a  functioning successor and alternative to the 
USSR and why it has been superseded by new types of  relations and unions between former 
republics and groups of  states. Firstly, the reintegration of  the fonner republics of  the USSR 
was driven largely by Russia, the largest and most dominant state in the region, for reasons 
which were not only or exclusively economic. Secondly, reaction to and resentment of  a 
Russian dominated union of  any type, coupled by the strong desire to preserve the recently 
attained sovereignty led some republics, and notably Ukraine, to obstruct its functioning at 
crucial stages. Thirdly, the emergence of  a naturally evolving network  of  alliances and 
agreements between neighbouring states and sub-regional groupings, often bypassed Russia 
and further impeded the functioning of  the CIS. 
Central to the success or failure of  the CIS was the relationship between Russia and Ukraine, 
the second largest state in the region. Clearly Ukraine's opposition to any institutionalised 
fonn of union conflicted with Russia's desire to achieve greater control in the region through 
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!O3 the channels of  a regional organization.  Belarus, in contrast, as a republic whose economy 
had flourished because of its highly integrated position within the USSR, now relied on the 
restoration of some type of  union. When this failed it actively pursued economic union with 
Russia at a bilateral level to ensure its survival. Thus the weakness of  the CIS  played an 
important role in the shaping of  the relationship  among the Slavic republics. Had conflicting 
Russian and Ukrainian perceptions of  its purpose and role not resulted in its malfunctioning, 
then Belarus may not have been forced into a union with Russia, which however desirable 
from the Belarusian perspective, nevertheless impinges greatly on its sovereignty. Clearly 
Ukraine has emerged as the victor, seeing down Russian efforts to  institutionalise a new type 
of union among the fonner republics and ultimately emerging as a serious rival  to Russia in 
regional affairs. 
The three trends outlined above are examined in depth in this chapter. The rationale for a 
regional economic organization and the emergence of  the CIS are analysed and the alternative 
fonns of  inter republican cooperation which emerged due to the shortcomings of  the CIS are 
also considered. Factors leading to the reinvigoration of  the CIS in 1994-95 are discussed. 
Despite a change in attitudes to the CIS, largely by Ukraine, the CIS remained an organization 
controlled and driven by Russia. The extent to which it was designed and operated to serve 
Russia's  wider needs and its neglect of  the economic development of  the organization 
between 1995-1997 as pressing geopolitical concerns came on board are also considered. 
Rationale for economic cooperation among the former republics of  the USSR 
In the modem world few states can achieve autarky, and most of  the fonner republics of  the 
USSR were dependent on each other for vital supplies of  food, energy,  raw materials and 
finished products.291  On independence in 1991, none of  the states of  the USSR had any 
prospect of immediate admission to world markets and so needed to preserve their existing 
trading relations. Additionally, they needed to renew the economic relations which had 
broken down as the USSR collapsed and guarantee the restoration of  important supplies. 
The key issue was how to achieve this. 
Relations between states, whether bilaterally or at the supranational level in some fonn of 
union can vary in the degree of  cooperation. At the most basic level this entails cooperation 
on the interstate infrastructures and transit arrangements but generally is concerned with 
291  see tables I & II in Appendix 4 
10.+ issues of  trade, and particularly customs and security issues such as border controls. A more 
advanced level of  cooperation can result in a comon market,  an economic community or even 
the merging of  two or more economies and the pooling of  military resources to provide 
collective security. The degree of  cooperation, especially where there is a relationship of 
inequality between partners, can be marked by the dependence of  one or more of  the co-
partners on the relationship. One consequence of  this  would be the undermining of  national 
sovereignty as the actions of  partner state(s) becomes decisive. Many of  the ex-republics 
experienced the same dilemma which slowed the Maastricht process in Western Europe -
how to reconcile national sovereignty with the need for cooperative relations with other 
states. This dilemma became more acute as the ex-republics adjusted to the realities of 
independence following the initial rush to state sovereignty in 1990 and 1991. 
The CIS was formed in December 1991 partly to sustain the cooperative relationships among 
the republics, built up over many decades and which had begun to disintegrate as 
Gorbachev's economic reforms started to fail.  Since its formation the CIS remained a loose 
organization whose members often proclaimed their desire for deeper cooperation but whose 
resolutions were rarely implemented. The two major integrative agreements of  the CIS: the 
Treaty on Collective Security and the Treaty on Economic Union have not really advanced 
much beyond the planning and ratification stage. On the other hand integration among the 
post-Soviet nations is taking place on a different axis, frequently at the bilateral level as well 
as a form of  horizontal integration with large enterprises in differing states engaging in new 
types of  cooperative relations to ensure deliveries and maintain output and border regions 
seeking revive cooperation. 
In part the weakness of  the CIS derives from the absence of  a clear definition of  what it is, 
leaving it open to differing perceptions of  its role and functions. The CIS  is neither an 
economic union nor a military-security union or an amalgam of  both. That it may evolve in 
the direction of  either of  these, or both, will entail a process of  reintegration amongst the ex-
republics of  the USSR which will take many years. The CIS is simply a 'commonwealth' - a 
loose organization of  independent nations. 
From inception the CIS was a mechanism to prevent the total collapse ofthe area that had 
been the former Soviet Union. It was to act as a medium by which critical issues from the fall 
out ofthe collapse of  the USSR could be dealt with. These included the question of nuclear 
105 and strategic weapons (located not only in Russia but in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan); 
the international debt of  the USSR, and conversely its assets, and trade relations among the 
republics which were already in a state of  breakdown. Thus the CIS would be the channel by 
which the dismantling of  the Soviet Union could take place, leading to its replacement by a 
'commonwealth' of  independent states. 
What is often overlooked is the fact that the CIS was also a mechanism for keeping Ukraine 
in. In the 'deconstruction' period of  the Soviet Union (from the coup in August 1991 to the 
creation of  the CIS in December) Ukraine had refused to join the proposed economic union 
and waited until popular opinion could be tested in a referendum in December. The 
referendum confirmed overwhelming support amongst the Ukrainian population for 
independence (90.2%). From a geopolitical perspective the prospect of  an independent 
Ukraine with a population of  52 million, 11  million of  whom were ethnic Russians, nuclear 
weapons and great (at least in 1991) economic potential, existing outwith a union of  all the 
other republics, resulted in the hastily put together CIS of December 8 1991. A loose 
commonwealth of 'independent' states was the most that independent Ukraine would accept. 
In its early years (late 1991 and 1992), the CIS was perceived as nothing more than a means 
to organize a civilized divorce. In some circles (usually neo communist / restorationist circles) 
it was viewed as a temporary structure 'no more than a transitional form between the former 
union and the new state systems of  its constituent republics'.292 
It was also viewed in maximalist terms as 
a deliberative consultative body designed to co-ordinate the activity of  its 
member states in the most important spheres and to facilitate the determination 
of  common rules of  the game in economics, politics and military, with the aim of 
making national development as effective as possible.293 
It was seen as a 'community of  equals' seeking to  co-ordinate their policies, which are 
conducted above all in their national interests')94 For much of 1992 the minimalist view of 
the CIS prevailed and its function was seen as 'maintaining a state of  incomplete 
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106 disintegration in the post-Soviet space in the transitional period'  ,295 
In its first year the CIS came in for much criticism. Its critics claimed that it never actually 
materialized, that it was a hoax. At the end of 1992, A. Lipsky questioned this, asking what 
exactly did not materialize, 'a great leap from a unitary union into a Eurasian community - an 
Eastern analogue of  the EC and NATO did not come about'. Lipsky stressed however the 
great accomplishment of  the CIS in either averting many dangerous conflicts over the division 
ofthe union's legacy or lessening their intensity.296 Thus the CIS was given credit for acting 
as a 'conduit' which made it easier to maintain economic ties and facilitating the establishing 
of  a network of  bilateral  relations among its members, without which there could be no 
hypothetical integration in the future' .297 
In 1992 the CIS made some progress towards integration in the post-Soviet area. At the CIS 
Heads of State summit in Tashkent in Mayan agreement on Collective Security was signed 
constituting the basis for the formation of  a defensive alliance of  the states interested in one. 
It was signed by  Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
Ukraine and Belarus did not sign, the latter on the basis of  its neutrality.298 
By the end of 1993 the CIS states had advanced in developing institutional structures of  the 
CIS  and the creation an economic union amongst them. The key stages in this 
process are outlined in summary form: 
• January 1993  CIS Heads of  State meeting (Minsk); 10 ofthe participating member 
countries agreed a draft CIS Charter, committing them to recommending the charter to 
their parliaments for ratification. Agreement was also reached on the creation of  an 
interstate bank which was seen as essential for reviving interstate trade and ensuring 
the preservation of  the rouble zone.299 
• April 1993  CIS Heads of  State meeting (Minsk); a statute was initialled, setting up a 
Consultative Coordination Committee (CCC) which would coordinate and prepare 
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107 documents  and decisions in the economic, foreign policy and military realms.30o 
• September 1993  CIS Heads of  Government meeting; 'Treaty on an Economic 
Union' was initialled. The treaty called for the creation of  a single economic space, 
free  movement of  goods and unified customs regimes.301 Ukraine agreed to the 
economic union on the basis of  associate membership. 
• December 1993 CIS Heads of  State meeting (Ashghabat);  agreement was reached on 
the temporary application of  Treaty on the Creation of an Economic Union. 
Most of  the CIS states shared common motives in agreeing to the creation of  an economic 
union. All hoped to benefit from the restoration of  trade links among the republics.  Their 
agreement to create an economic union was also seen as strategic self interest, as their best 
means to secure much needed Russian raw materials and energy resources at preferential 
prices.  General support for the economic union was seen as a reaction to Russia's attempts 
to bring order to its settlements with its commonwealth partners. It  was argued that the 
danger that Russia might drastically cut subsidies to its neighbours' economies and reduce the 
amount of  facilitative credits granted, made these CIS states move toward the speedy 
creation of  an economic union.302 
The decision to create an economic union can also be seen as a reaction to threat of  the 
breakdown of  the area of  the CIS into sub-regional groupings. This became apparent early in 
1993 with the prospect of  a new commonwealth being created among the Central Asian 
states. At a meeting in Tashkent, the leaders of  the Central Asian states and Kazakhstan 
emphasized the possibility of  closer economic interaction amongst the countries of  the region. 
An accord was reached on working out a concrete mechanism for regularly monitoring 
implementation of  interstate and intergovernmental treaties and agreements. 303 In July  1993 
the prospect of  a Slavic Union grew with the meeting of  the Heads of  Government of  the 
three Slavic republics of  the CIS to discuss integration and resulted in the signing of  a joint 
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108 statement  on urgent measures aimed at close integration. Trilateral integration of  their 
economies was envisaged, and though the initial economic union would be created by the 
three Slav republics, membership would be open to all. 
Clearly, the promotion ofa Slavic Union was a reaction to the growing realignment of  the 
Central Asian states away from the CIS and towards stronger regional ties. Thus the idea of  a 
Slavic Union was designed to force the Central Asian states and Kazakhstan to choose what 
path they were going to take.304 Commentators in the Russian press at this time suggested 
that the idea of  a Slavic Union was 'preemptive', designed to speed up the process of 
economic integration and the creation of  an economic union in the area ofthe CIS.305  That 
this may have been the case was confirmed by Ukrainian President L.Kravchuk, who objected 
to the joint statement from the three Prime Ministers of  Russia,  Ukraine and Belarus.306 
The ideas of  a Central Asian Commonwealth and a Slavic Union did not really advance 
beyond the discussion stage, but were nevertheless significant in that they represented the 
main arguments which characterized the debate in late 1992 and 1993 about how the CIS 
should develop,307 
Amongst the leaders and legislatures of  the CIS states there was a common consensus that in 
its actual form the CIS could not function as a means of  maintaining economic and military 
unity among the ex-republics and that the Commonwealth would have to evolve into a more 
formal supranational organization. Various models and routes of  development were discussed 
throughout 1992 to 1994. These are outlined below. 
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109 a) the Eurasian Model (the Nazarbayev model) 
This was most persistently promoted by the Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. A 
Eurasian union, he argued, would fill the vacuum that the CIS clearly had been unable to do 
and would also counteract  what Nazarbayev described as the growing Eurocentrism of  the 
three Slavic republics.308  In June 1993 Nazarbayev invited key Russian economists (S. 
Shatalin, N.Petrakov, L. Abalkin and G.  Yavlinsky - all keen supporters of  maintaining a 
single economic space in the FSU) to Alma Aty to discuss a concept for a new stage in state 
to state relations in the post-Soviet space and the working out of  a broad scale initiative for 
integration. The model for Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union was the European Community.309 
b) Confederation 
The concept of  a confederal structure had many supporters in the CIS and one of  its chief 
proponents in Russia was Sergei Shakhrai (Minister of  Nationality Affairs and Regional 
Policy and leader of  Russia's Party of  Russian Unity and Accord). A confederation would 
facilitate the integration of  sovereign states but without the loss of  their independence. Its 
basis would be a confederative economic community as a single economic space without 
customs borders. The main hallmarks of  a confederative union would be a common market, 
common currency, common banking system with the retention of  national monetary unit, 
coordinated export-import tariff policy, standardization of  the civil and economic laws of  the 
parties of  the agreement.  310 
c) Slavic Union 
The idea of  a union of  the Slavic nations of  which economic union would be a component was 
proposed by various groupings in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. As outlined above the Prime 
Ministers of  the three Slavic republics advanced the concept of  a Slavic Union in 1993 as a 
mechanism to hasten integrative processes within the FSU. But the concept of  a Slavic Union 
has been  supported mainly by neo communists, Russian nationalists and pan Slavists. One 
ofthe chief advocates of  a type of  Slavic Union was Alexandr Solzhenitsyn who called for a 
union of  the three Slavic republics and Kazakhstan.311  Slavic unity was also supported by 
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ttO Russia's centre-right group Civic Accord312  and communists  in Russia  demanded a 'Union 
of  Slavs'. Party leader G. Z  yuganov called for the restoration of  the USSR, the first stage of 
which should be the restoration of  unity between at least four republics including Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Former Russian Vice president, Alexandr Rutskoi was 
been a keen supporter of Slav unity, claiming in April 1995 that if  he were elected Russian 
president he  would reunite Russia, Ukraine and Belarus)l3  Iu. Petrov, one of  the leaders of 
1. Rybkin's bloc also proposed that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan form a new 
confederation of  independent states that could later be joined by countries in the 
Transcaucasus region and Central Asia.314 
d) Central Asian Commonwealth 
The leaders of  the Central Asian supported the idea of  a Central Asian Commonwealth as 
well as  the Kazakh president, Nazarbayev. External influences such as Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan were also keen for this regional model to develop. 
Despite a general lack of  support for Nazarbayev' s model of  a Eurasian Union, many of  the 
main features of  his model were promoted by both Russian and Western economists as the 
best way to restore financial and monetary relations in the region - paramount for economic 
stabilization to take place and for trade relations to be restored.  Nazarbayev advocated  a 
common customs and economic space based on the principles of  free trade. This would 
require a unified currency policy and creation of  a banking union. The model for this, 
Nazarbayev believed was the European Payments Union (EPU) of  the 1950s, which he 
described as not only a technical agreement but a powerful regulator of  the economy, since it 
not only helped to increase production but also to increase its efficiency.3 15 In the FSU the 
critical function of  a payments union CPU) would be to facilitate payments among the 
republics and thus permitting the restoration of trade. 
In the late 1980s the collapse of  all Union structures  exacerbated the deterioration of  inter 
republican trade as supply constraints intensified throughout the FSU. Once the union had 
finally collapsed in 1991 the decline in inter republican trade continued and was made worse 
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!! I by the  conservation of  national resources (via export restrictions in the form of  quotas and 
licences as well as both explicit and implicit export taxes); a loss of  confidence in the rouble; a 
deterioration in the rouble payments mechanism with inter republican trade facing increasing 
uncertainty over the receipt of  trade payments.3 16 
The instability of  the rouble and the absence of  an effective payments mechanism resulted in 
an increase in barter trade among the ex-republics. While at the very least this enabled trade to 
be continued, as a long term mechanism for trade relations it was not viable. Furthermore as 
Russia  and the other republics began to implement market type reforms it was clear that 
barter trade would be  incompatible with the market system.317 
Liberalization of  trade and convertibility of  currency  are two key components of  the 
transition to a market economy.  In the FSU most of  the ex-republics  liberalized their foreign 
trade regimes and though most have introduced their own national currency, these were 
inconvertible. While either full convertibility of  regional currencies or their replacement by a 
single currency was considered essential in the long term, the establishment of  a Payments 
Union (PU) was seen as the next best option. It offered the best means for reversing the 
decline in inter republican trade  in the short term and advancing towards open trading 
arrangements: free trade, common market, monetary union and convertibility in the longer 
term.3 18 
The collapse of  the rouble zone in 1993 made the establishment of  a PU even more urgent. 
The rouble zone, as it existed from 1991-1993 represented a form of  currency union where 
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112 the common currency unit was the old Soviet rouble. Since the Russian Central Bank (RCB), 
as the successor to the Soviet Central Bank continued to control monetary emissions, Russia 
gained a high degree of  influence over money supplies in those republics which still used the 
rouble. It also meant that Russia suffered doubly from the import of  inflation from republics 
which had not yet begun or were only at an early stage of  price liberalization and from the 
uncontrolled credit emissions from the central banks at the republican level. 319 
From mid 1992, in line with its own tough monetary  policies and strategy for financial 
stabilization, Russia began to pursue a more rigid monetary and credit policy  towards the ex-
republics. A presidential decree in July 1992, provided that all settlements with countries of 
the rouble area and those outside it would be made via bilateral clearing. The RCB also 
increased the rediscount rate from 50% to 80%, leading to protests from Kazakhstan, Ukraine 
and Belarus.320 In the winter of 1993 and 1994, the belief that the restoration of  Russia's 
dominant position in the post-Soviet economic space was a less valuable objective than 
financial stabilization in the Russian economy gained influence in government circ1es.321 The 
resulting hard line policy forced out the remaining members of  the rouble zone amidst 
protests that Russia's excessive demands had made continued membership impossible. These 
included demands that the republics should be subservient to the rules of  the RCB, should 
deposit gold and hard currency reserves with it and end the subsidies which the republics had 
been receiving.322 By the end of 1993 most of  the former republics had introduced or stated 
their intention to introduce a national currency, so that only war torn Tajikistan shared a 
common currency with Russia. As a result, payments between the republics were now made 
through bilateral clearing since none of  their currencies were convertible. The lengthy and 
arduous processes associated with bilateral clearing made the switch to multilateral clearing 
essential and a PU was seen as the best means to effect this. 
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113 In promoting a PU as the best means to overcome the payments crisis  in the FSU, the 
experience of  the European Payments Union (EPU, 1951-1958) was drawn heavily upon. 
The F SU shared a number of  common features with the state of  the post war economies of 
Western Europe including, dilapidated capital stock, the need for modernization of  industries 
and the restructuring of industrial sectors from defence to civilian production. Trade among 
the West European nations had been severely affected by the collapse of  world trade, the 
abandonment of  convertibility  and the introduction of  foreign exchange restrictions. Mutual 
trade was hampered by highly discriminatory  trade restrictions and the inability  to pay for 
imports, especially from the USA.323 Thus the EPU was created with the aim of  facilitating 
payment settlements  of union members by providing the additional resources  to pay for 
imports and by creating a multilateral  system of  clearing outstanding imbalances. This 
facilitated the multilateralization of  trade  and the move away from bilateral trading  and 
payments arrangements)24 
Like the EPU, a PU in the FSU would operate for a specific period of  time (eg. for the EPU 
this was for 7 years). This would be because in the long term 
• maintaining a PU would run the risk of delaying the introduction of  convertibility 
and the necessary shift to greater integration with market economies; 
• a PU might encourage the republics to continue to trade passively in the PU area 
rather than moving aggressively to establishing convertibility and finding new markets; 
• the PU might perpetuate a centralized bureaucratic approach  to trade payments)25 
The establishment of  a PU was not seen as an end in itself but as a stage in process of 
integration among the economies of  the FSU. Its three specific functions would be (i) a 
clearing house, making inconvertible currencies convertible vis a vis member countries; (ii) a 
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11-1-mutual credit mechanism; (iii) a forum for policy co-ordination.326 
The CIS states reached this stage of  integration in 1994 when agreement was reached on the 
creation of  both a PU and a Customs Union (CU) at the October meeting of  CIS Heads  of 
State. Agreement was also reached at this meeting on the IEC and the adoption of  a 
memorandum on the main trends in the development and integration of  the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.327 
Reaching this higher stage of  integration reflected a renewed commitment  among the ex-
republics in favour of  greater integration. In 1994 and 1995 integrative processes within the 
CIS intensified. This was in large part associated with the  Russian desire to advance 
integration within the CIS, which it was in a better position to do once its President had 
assumed the chairmanship of  the CIS Heads of  State Council in 1994 and 1995. In January 
1994, one Russian official, G. Karasin, outlined Russia's plans for the CIS in its capacity as 
chair of  the Commonwealth. These included: 
• the future development of  the commonwealth; 
• the  establishment  of  mechanisms for an economic alliance; 
• ensuring the human rights and rights of  minorities throughout the CIS and creating 
mechanisms to guarantee these rights; 
• restoring cultural, scientific and educational ties between the commonwealth countries 
and creating a unified humanitarian space; 
• shaping an effective system of  collective security with emphasis on peace keeping 
functions and developing practical mechanisms of  the CIS to prevent armed conflict; 
• ensuring greater effectiveness of  joint actions of  Commonwealth members in the 
foreign policy sphere in the development of  cooperation between the CIS, UN, CSCE 
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115 and other international organizations.328 
This renewed commitment to greater integration followed from the agreement on the 
temporary application of  the 'Treaty on the Creation of  an Economic Union' which was 
signed by the CIS Heads of  State at the Ashgabat summit in December 1993.The economic 
union would provide for the formation of  a single economic space, the free movement of 
goods and the unification of  customs procedures.329 At the summit, the agreement  'On the 
creation of  an Interstate Eurasian Coal and Metal Association' was ratified and its 
implementation was begun in January 1994.  Commenting on this, S Afonin, Chairman of  the 
Russian Federation Committee on Metallurgy, noted that implementation of  the plan for the 
Eurasian Coal and Steel Association would make it possible to restore the traditional flow of 
goods so as to ensure the solvency of  metallurgical and ore mining enterprises.330 
Throughout 1994 and 1995 a series of  further integrative measures occurred. These included: 
Creation of an Inter Republican Economic Committee (lEC) (September 1994). 
All the CIS countries except Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan agreed to the creation of  the IEC. 
lt would be based in Moscow and would deal with: 
• the management of  installations and sectors which were transnational in nature 
(energy systems, transportation, communications and gas and oil pipelines; 
• analysis ofthe state of  the economy; 
• progress of  economic reforms; 
• development of  joint economic programmes.331 
Programme to form a free trade zone and customs union, approved by Heads of CIS 
Foreign Economic Departments (November 1994). This would be a two stage process with 
the zone of  free trade and the creation of  a unified system of  foreign economic relations being 
established first, followed by the second stage - the formation of  common customs territory, 
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ll6 with national customs border controls remaining in place.332 
Proposals to create an Interstate Currency Committee (March 1995). 
The aim of  the ICC would be to promote multilateral cooperation in the sphere of  currency 
and monetary relations and bringing closer together and upgrading the rules of  currency 
circulation within the CIS framework. The ICC would act as a standing body for a PD.3 3 3 
The renewed drive  towards regional economic integration in 1994 and 1995 reflected a 
changed attitude towards the CIS on the part of  the ex-republics and Russia  and Ukraine in 
particular. For most of  the ex-republics support for greater integration within the CIS was 
related to the worsening economic crisis of  the CIS economies in 1993 and 1994 and the 
potential for collaboration in the CIS to assist economic recovery. Although Russia's attitude 
to the CIS essentially remained  unchanged since its inception, in 1994 and 1995 Russia 
renewed its commitment to the CIS and integration within it. 
Ukraine also adopted a  more amenable approach to the CIS. This had much to do with the 
election ofa more pro-Russian president in July 1994 but was equally determined by the 
absolute collapse of  the Ukrainian economy in 1993-1994.  Belarus retained its commitment 
to the CIS while actively pursuing economic integration with Russia at the bilateral level, 
presenting this as a model for the  integration within the CIS. 
By the end of 1993 the CIS had expanded to include all of  the ex-republics except the Baltic 
states. The 'return to the fold' of  even the most reluctant of  the ex-republics (Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and to an extent, Ukraine)  and generally greater support for integration within the 
region from most of  the republics reflected the crises of independence which had 
characterized the region since 1991. In the case of  Georgia and Azerbaijan, civil war had 
destroyed both the state structures and the economy. Inclusion in the CIS was an attempt to 
gain economic support to rebuild their devastated economies and restore stability. Their 
inclusion  also came under Russian pressure in a type of  quid pro quo arrangement for 
Russian military support. 
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117 F  or most of  the member countries support for deepening CIS integration reflected the 
economic slump that had affected all the economies in the region since 1991.334  In 1994, 
GDP in the CIS dropped by 16%, the volume of  industrial output fell by 23% and gross 
agricultural output by 10%.335 
Support among the ex-republics for integration within the CIS was interpreted by some in 
Russia as a means by which the ex-republics could gain access to Russia's markets, goods and 
credits at more advantageous rates than would be possible if  excluded from a regional 
economic organization.336 This perception  fostered the belief that Russia's own economic 
interests should be put first.337  An article in Segodnya in December 1994 interpreted the 
decision to form an economic union as a reflection of  the choice which  faced the independent 
states. It argued that the independent states could have chosen two methods of salvation, 
undertaking difficult and painful reforms or creeping gently into the the market through the 
use of  Russian resources. Most of  the republics and Belarus in particular, it claimed opted for 
the second route.338 The ex-republics viewed CIS expansion as a means to restore economic 
stability in the region and progress towards market type economies. However it was Russia, 
and Russian support for greater integration which pushed the CIS further in the direction of 
becoming a regional economic organization. 
Several factors affected Russia's attitude to the CIS and its renewed commitment to 
integration. These included 
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338 Segodnya  15 December 1994  p2 • the parliamentary elections of  December 1993 which revealed greater support 
amongst the Russian electorate for nationalist-conservative forces; 
• the share held by the CIS states in Russia's overall volume of  trade (22.8% in 
1996).339 
• the trend among the Central Asian states to greater cooperation amongst themselves 
and the prospect of  the future establishment of  a Central Asian Commonwealth; 
• the proposed expansion of  NATO to include the countries of  Eastern Europe and 
possibly even some of  the ex-republics; 
• the position of  the 25 million Russians living in the other 14 republics ofthe FSU; 
Since the expansion of  NATO and the position of  ethnic Russians in the other republics are 
directly linked to  Russia's national security interests these are discussed separately in 
Chapter five. 
The election results of  Russia's first post-Soviet parliamentary elections (Dec 1993) reflected 
the growing assertiveness of  communist, neo communist and nationalist forces on the political 
agenda. This had become evident by mid 1992 with the switch from radical shock therapy to 
a more gradualist programme of  economic reform and Viktor Chernomyrdin's elevation to the 
premiership - a sign also of  the growing influence of  the industrial lobby. In the foreign policy 
arena in 1992 and 1993, debate had increasingly focused on issues of  national security and 
Russia's  great power status. Reassertion of influence over the regions of  the FSU and the 
defence of  the rights of  ethnic Russians in the other republics had featured significantly in the 
election programmes of  the main political parties. The growing influence of  the Red-Brown 
coalition throughout 1992-1993 and the success of  its representatives in the elections was 
evident in Russia's  policy towards the republics of  the FSU, a policy which was becoming 
both more assertive and more nationalistic and manifest in a  fresh commitment to the 
integration of  the CIS countries. 
Russia's promotion of  further integration within the CIS was made easier by its control of  the 
chair of  the CIS Heads of  State Council in 1994 and 1995, effectively enabling it to control 
the agenda of  the meetings. The growing importance of  the CIS for Russia was also 
demonstrated in the creation of a new'  Ministry of  Cooperation with the Member States of 
the CIS' Its acting chairman, V. Mashchits, outlined Russia's policy to the CIS, saying that 
339 Ekonomika i Zhizn' No 16 April 1997 p27 
119 Russia's CIS policy would have new guidelines - geopolitics would take precedence over 
economic calculations and integration under the Russian aegis, based on resuscitating the 
rouble zone would come to the fore.34o 
Yeltsin stressed the economic importance of  integration within the CIS when addressing the 
Russian Federal Assembly saying, 
Russia is for the strengthening of  the Commonwealth of  Independent States, 
above all through the establishment of  an economic union, a common CIS market 
and the establishment of  a system of  collective security and the strengthening of 
guarantees of  human rights.341 
In its renewed policy towards the CIS, Russia saw its role as both supporter and promoter of 
reform throughout the region, which would bring regional economic stability. Foreign 
Minister, Kozyrev told a meeting of  Russia's Foreign Policy  Council that 
'Russia must continue to be the locomotive of  reform. The stronger the Russian 
state is economically and politically the better things will be for the other CIS 
countries, for the development of  integration processes'.  342 
In 1995 promotion of  integration as a policy became more explicit. Yeltsin told Korotchenya, 
the CIS Executive Secretary, that the RF intended to strengthen the CIS since there was 'no 
alternative to this alliance at this stage'.343 Addressing Russian ambassadors to the CIS 
countries, Kozyrev stressed that the basis of  integration would be the promotion of  economic 
cooperation and the major aim in that direction would be 'the achievement of  the creation of  a 
common market'. Kozyrev also pointed out the other elements of  Russia's CIS policy which 
included, turning the commonwealth into an influential regional organization, ensuring 
security along the perimeter of  the boundaries of  CIS countries with the countries which were 
not members of  the commonwealth, and the fight against terrorism and contraband. While 
economic union underpined the CIS, the CIS was also viewed by Russia as an 'important 
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120 instrument of  maintaining stability in the post-Soviet expanses' and which would contribute 
to the consolidation of  regional and global security'.344 
Russia's renewed CIS policy became even more assertive with a decree from Yeltsin on 14 
September 1995 stating that Russia's goal was the creation of  an 'integrated political and 
economic community of states' .  The decree stated that the CIS was a priority area for Russia 
because of important 'vital interests'  in the areas of  security, economics and the defence of 
Russians living abroad'. The decree called for closer economic ties and underlined the 
importance of  forming a military alliance to create an effective'  collective defence system'.  345 
The evolution of  Russia's new strategy to the CIS showed that Russia's perception of  the 
organization had changed. The CIS was no longer a means to manage a civilised divorce among 
the ex-republics but a way of  reintegrating these independent states. For Russia, the CIS 
would fulfil a number of  functions. It was to act as a mechanism to sustain trade with the CIS 
states, which continued to be important trading partners for Russia. It would also provide 
Russia with a structure through which it could control important pipelines and resources in 
the region.3 46 Finally it would provide Russia with a more legitimate means of  ensuring its 
control over the region. Economic integration would be pivotal but Russia's vision also 
included military and security cooperation which was reflected in growing geopolitical 
concerns. Thus while an economic union was to be the basis of  the renewed CIS, actual union 
among the republics would be much more than this in the longer term. 
Russia's commitment to advancing integration within the CIS was also an attempt to prevent 
the establishment of  alternative regional organizations. As shown earlier the Kazakh 
President, N.Nazarbayev, has been a persistent advocate of  a Eurasian Union. When 
Nazarbayev sought to advance this concept at CIS Heads of  State meetings, it met with little 
support. The failure of  the other CIS members and primarily Russia,to lend support to the 
concept of  a Eurasian Union led Nazarbayev to promote union amongst the Central Asian 
states on the basis of  his model. This resulted in a commitment to advance cooperation among 
the Central Asian states (July 1994). 
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121 In February 1995 Nazarbayev, and the Presidents of  Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan, Karimov 
and Akayev, met to set up what Nezavisimaya Gazeta  described as 'a new regional 
geopolitical bloc'. The three Central Asian presidents agreed to create an Interstate Council, 
consisting of  the three Presidents, a Council of  Prime Ministers, a Council of  Foreign 
Ministers and a Central Asian Bank for Cooperation, with a capital fund of  up to $10 million. 
They agreed to meet again to review a plan for three way integration to the year 2000. 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta suggested that the union of  Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan 
could become a major factor in and of  its self, enabling each of  its members to play new games 
of  political chess with other countries, first of  all Russia. 347 
Russia's goal in promoting further integration amongst all ofthe CIS republics in 1994 -95 
can be seen in part as a reaction to the organization of  three key Central Asian states into a 
regional grouping. While in its initial form,  a Central Asian Union would pose no threat to 
Russia in security terms and certainly not in economic terms, its potential long term 
development concerned Russia. Primarily this was the risk that a Central Asian Union might 
fall under the influence of  other Asian nations anxious to get a foothold in the region, such as 
Iran and Pakistan and the risk of  splitting the regional space of  the FSU and threatening 
Russia's security. Additionally Russia did not want to risk losing control over important oil 
and gas resources to other states. A Central Asian Commonwealth could also pose as an 
alternative form of  organization to the CIS, encouraging the other republics to join or set up 
similar organizations, challenging and undermining Russia's regional influence  and reducing 
the role of  the CIS)48 
Clearly the revival of  the CIS in 1994 and 1995 was determined by the commitment to its 
survival by its key member, Russia. But the future development of  the CIS was also affected 
by the attitude of  the second most important of  the ex-republics, Ukraine, which also began 
to approach the CIS with a new outlook in 1994 and 1995. 
Since 1991 Ukraine had only been a partial supporter of the CIS, viewing its role in very 
narrow terms and opposing any attempts to expand or institutionalize it. However in 1994-
95 Ukraine demonstrated a different, more amenable policy to the CIS, reflecting its altered 
circumstances caused by the devastating crisis of  the economy and the election of  the more 
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122 pro-Russian oriented President, Leonid Kuchma. 
Ukraine's desperate economic situation in 1994 tempered somewhat its opposition to 
integration within the CIS, so that it did not wholly oppose the creation of  an economic union 
and agreed to associate membership of  it. Ukraine's attitude to the CIS was shaped by the 
economic crisis of  the country which accentuated the need to restore past economic links 
particularly since  80-90% of  Ukraine's total requirements for oil and gas, 80% of  raw 
materials for light industry, 70% of  components for the machine building industries of 
Ukraine, came from CIS countries. Ukraine was also one of  the main suppliers of  agricultural 
products, cast iron and steel to CIS markets.349 
In the Ukrainian presidential elections  of  July 1994, attitudes to Russia and the CIS played a 
crucial role. Presidential candidate, Kuchma actively called for closer ties with the former 
republics of  the CIS, especially Russia, and advocated the creation of  a unified economic 
space with all of  the countries of  the CIS.35o In a TV address, Kuchma clarified his vision for 
the CIS, speaking of  the need to create a single economic space with the CIS countries on the 
model of  the EC or the Free Trade area  in America. He also said he would strive for 
Ukraine's fully fledged entry into the economic union (as opposed to the associate 
membership which Kravchuk had agreed to) and said that he would support all states signing 
a currency and customs agreement on equal terms.351 
Kuchma's election promises regarding policies to the CIS were replayed in his inauguration 
speech as President. Stressing the importance of  the CIS, Kuchma also revealed how he 
perceived Ukraine's role in the revived integration of  the CIS - not as an equal like the other 
former republics but as co-leader of  the process with Russia, 
Ukraine can assume the role of one of  the leaders of  the process of  Eurasian 
economic integration and establish civilised, mutually favourable relations 
between interested parties.352 
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123 The renewed policy towards the CIS reflected part of  Ukraine's wider strategy of  ending its 
self  isolation, for which Kuchrna's predecessor, L. Kravchuk was frequently criticized. 
Kravchuk had favoured a restrained approach to the CIS, opting to concentrate instead on 
consolidating Ukraine's national independence and positing it as a new state in Europe. 
Criticizing Kravchuk's policies in this area, Kuchrna said 'Ukraine's self  isolation and its 
voluntary refusal to campaign vigorously for its own interests in the Eurasian space was a 
serious political mistake, which caused great damage  above all to the national economy'.353 
Ukraine's Foreign minister, Hennadi Udovenko also spoke ofthe new approach to Ukraine's 
relations with the CIS, making the policy 'less passive and negative as it once was and 
emphasizing economic cooperation'.354 
The importance of  restoring economic ties within the context of  the CIS was emphasized by 
Kuchrna in his address to the Ukrainian people on independence day. The president spoke of 
the risk of  Ukraine becoming a colonial type economy and identified a key problem to be the 
structural reorganization of  the national economy. Kuchma outlined the extent ofthe 
economic slump: in 1994 the share of  machine building and metal processing within the 
overall volume of  production decreased in comparison with 1990, from 30.5% to 17%. 
Industrial production  declined overall by 40.4% and production in a number of  sectors in the 
machine building industry decreased by 70-80%. In the light industry sector, especially the 
textiles, footwear and knitwear industries, their share in the overall structure of  production 
fell from 10.9% to 4.4%. According to Kuchrna an intensive process of  'forcing the domestic 
industry out of  the domestic market' was taking place'. Citing estimates by economists, 
Kucbma outlined how in 1990 domestic producers accounted for 80% of  the retail trade 
turnover. In 1994, this figure had fallen to less than 50%. The result he said was the deep 
degradation ofthe industrial, scientific and technical potential and high technologies and 
consequently, he argued, the production structure was acquiring the features of  a colonial 
type economy, incapable of  an independent expanded reproduction.355 
The depth  of  Ukraine's economic crisis in 1994-95  necessitated a more favourable attitude 
to the CIS. It was hoped that this would lead not only to the restoration of  trade with the 
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12-1-other republics and crucially Russia, but would also bring loans and credits from the IMF, 
which was keen for the formation of an  economic union in the FSU. 
Belarus experienced similar levels of  industrial decline to Ukraine but unlike the latter did not 
see the restoration of  economic links within the CIS as the way to initiate economic recovery. 
In contrast, Belarus viewed closer links with Russia, on a state to state (bilateral) level, 
resulting in closer economic integration between the two countries, as the best means to 
overcome its economic crisis. Thus the distinction between Belarus' policies toward the CIS 
and Russia were frequently blurred as Belarus increasingly came to view integration with 
Russia at the bilateral level  as a component part of  its membership of  the CIS. Indeed, 
integration at this level was viewed by Belarus as a precedent from which the other  republics 
could take example. 356 
In 1994-95 renewed commitment towards greater integration by most of  the CIS states was 
actively demonstrated in their agreements to pursue deeper integration. Ratification and 
implementation of  the agreements continues to be a lengthy process and the CIS remains an 
organization lacking definition and orientation. Its failure to evolve into the type of 
supranational  union  envisaged by Russia resulted in the development of  a range of 
cooperative and integrative  measures  on a number of  different levels. The main forms 
included sub-regional co-operation (ie. between border regions); cross-republic integration; 
creation of  joint financial! industrial groups and bilateral cooperation. 
Regional cooperation amongst border areas sought to overcome the breakdown in exchange 
(economic, scientific, technical, cultural) between neighbouring regions of  the newly 
independent countries and was an attempt to move beyond the restrictions imposed by state 
to state relations. In Belgorod in January 1994, leaders from the border oblasts of  Russia and 
Ukraine adopted a package of  documents setting out the principles of  economic, scientific and 
technical  cooperation between the ten border oblasts of  Russia and Ukraine. These included 
support for the creation of  a zone of  economic cooperation, for granting their territories 
special status and for instituting direct financial  accounting between enterprises in the border 
oblasts of  Russia and Ukraine.357 A meeting in Novgorod in February 1995  of  regional 
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125 leaders of  the three Slavic states  addressed issues concerning the restoration and organization 
of  economic and cultural relations of  the member states of  the CIS at the regionalleve1.358 A 
similar meeting in Minsk in June 1995 discussed the problems of  speeding up the integration 
processes between these three Slavic republics. 
New forms and ways of  deepening cooperation were  examined at the meeting. N.Medvedev, 
head of  the Russian delegation and Deputy Minister  for Cooperation with Member 
Countries of  the CIS spoke of  the importance of  the  development of  direct ties between 
enterprises, the need to realize common departmental and interdepartmental  programmes and 
the creation of  financial and financial-industrial groups and joint projects. A decision was 
taken to create a Council of  Regional Officials of  Russia, Belarus and Ukraine which would 
act within the framework structures of  the CIS secretariat.359 
With growing support from regional and national leaders, the creation of  cross republic 
financial-industrial groups increased. In September 1994, the first Russia-Ukraine Oil 
company was set up. The company was to comprise several extraction and processing 
enterprises and plants producing oil industry equipment in Russian and Ukraine.36o 
A year later Ukraine's First Deputy Minister of  Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, V. 
Hladush, claimed that preparations for the setting up of 100 Russian-Ukrainian financial-
industrial  groups were completed. He said that Russia and Ukraine had reached general 
agreements on setting up four financial and industrial groups in the chemical industry and 11 
within the framework  of  the Ministry ofIndustry of  Ukraine. A project was also underway 
which would involve  15 Ukrainian enterprises and organizations and more than fifty Russian 
enterprises.361 
In February 1994,the Russian government approved the creation of  a Russian-Ukrainian 
Financial- Industrial Group  'Mezhdunarodnye Aviadvigateli' for their aircraft engine 
manufacturing enterprises. The group would produce engines for  A.N.-70 cargo planes and 
would include financial, credit, insurance and trading companies to encompass some 50 
Ukrainian enterprises)62 
358 Diplomaticheski Vestnik No 2 February 1995 p63 
359 SWB SU/2340 0/427 June 1995 
360 SWB SUW/0348 WDII 2 September 1994 
361 SWB SU12422 D/3 30 September 1995 
362  OMRI Daily Digest No 44 2 March 1995 
126 By the late 1990s cooperation at the bilateral level had progressed so that Ukraine was a 
significant investor in Russia's economy, while Russia's investments in the Ukrainian 
economy were growing. This is illustrated in tables 10 & 11  below:363 
Table 10 
Direct Russian Investment  in Ukraine as percentage of overall  foreign investment in Ukraine 
Investor  I  1995  !  1996  I  1997  1998 
I  I  I 
RF  I  3.95  I  5.57 
I  7.38  7.32  I 
Table 11 
Direct Ukrainian Investment  in Russian Federation as percentage of  overall  Ukrainian 
investment 
Investor  1995 
I 
1996  1997  1998 
Ukraine  20.69  61.93  i  48.8  33.51 
Regional (border) cooperation and joint financial and industrial groups represented an attempt 
to advance integration amongst regions and enterprises of  the CIS countries. However because 
they were at an early stage of  development their real impact and benefit was not to be felt for 
several years. More immediate cooperation came at the bilateral level and provided a channel 
for addressing critical economic and security issues in the post-Soviet space. In 1994-95 
bilateral relations amongst the Slavic republics of  the CIS advanced with the Russian-
Belarusian agreement on Monetary and Customs union and a Treaty on Cooperation between 
Russia and Ukraine. The formalizing of  the relationship between Russia and its Slavic 
neighbours reflected a strategic choice on its part. The ineffectiveness of the CIS accompanied 
a  growing perception in foreign policy that while all of  the former Soviet republics were 
363  Derzhavnii Komitet Statistiki Ukraini Ukra ina u Tsifrakh 1997 Kiev 1998 p9-1 
127 important for Russia, some were more important than others,364  Ukraine and Belarus were 
prioritized as they continued to be Russia's key partners in trade.  This is illustrated in the 
tables following which show the share of  Russia' s  trade  (exports and imports) with Ukraine 
and Belarus as percentage of  overall exports to CIS States over a ten year period 1987-97,365 
Though Russia's trade with these two republics declined between 1990 and 1992,  after 1993 
trade began to grow again. In particular trade with Belarus reached higher than ever levels. The 
growing importance of  Ukraine and Belarus as destinations for Russian exports is shown in 
the growth of  exports. In 1997 together Ukraine and Belarus formed 71.8% of  all Russia's 
exports to CIS states 
364 Noreen, J. H.,  &  Watson, R  'Interrepublican Economic Relations after the Collapse of 
the USSR' Soviet Economy 1992  Vol 8 N02 p 114ff 
365 Mezhgosudarstvennyi Statisticheskii Komitet Sodruzhestva Nezavismyx Gosudarstv 
Sodruzhestva Nezavismyx Gosudarstv  v 1996 gody (!vfoscow  1997) Table 12 
Russia's share of  Trade (EXPORTS) with Ukraine and Belarus as percentage of  overall  exports to CIS States 1987-97 
CIS State  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Ukraine  42.03  42  42.28  43.32  41.99  40.02  53.1  49.67  48.9  47.47  43.69 
Belarus  14.07  14.1  14.27  15.65  14  14.44  15.89  21.62  20.61  32.09  28.11 
Total  56.1  56.1  56.55  58.97  55.99  54.46  68.99  71.29  69.51  79.56  71.8 
Table 13 
Russia's share of  Trade  (IMPORTS) with Ukraine and Belarus as percentage of  overall imports from CIS States 1987-97 
CIS State  1987  1988  1989  1990  1995  1996  1997 
Ukraine  41.98  '  42  4l.63  41.8  48.68  43.1  28.07 
Belarus  16.99  17  17  16.36  12.9  12.39  22.8  ~  20.2  15.36  20.87  33.1 
- 1 
1 
Total  58.97  59  58.63  58.16  48.71  60.38  62.88  64.04  63.97  61.17 Russian - Belarusian Relations 
Throughout 1993, Belarus viewed bilateral cooperation, particularly of  an economic nature, as 
a means  of  halting the country's economic slump and eventually restoring productivity.366 
The basis for this, it was claimed were the traditionally close ties between the Russian and 
Belarusian economies (Belarus imported over 90% of  its energy products from Russia) and so 
it would be logical to realign these republics' economies once more. It  was also becoming clear 
that in Belarus, closer  alignment with the Russian economy was seen as an alternative to 
introducing potentially destabilizing market type reforms. Agreement on monetary union 
came early in January 1994, when Russia and Belarus agreed to merge their monetary 
systems as of  mid January and to make the Russian rouble the only legal tender in both 
republics. The agreement stipulated that there would be coordination of  monetary, credit, 
budget, convertible currency, taxation  and social policies, as well as the creation of  a common 
customs zone with a common system of  prices. In Russia however the proposed monetary 
merger brought criticism that the union would not be to Russia's advantage and would 
increase inflation by at least 10%.367 
The Treaty on the Unification of  Monetary Systems of  Russia and Belarus was signed in 
April 1994. This envisaged a two stage process of  unification. Stage one would begin on May 
1 1994 with the cancelling of  trade customs dues and payments for Russian cargo transit via 
Belarus. Russia's free leasing of  Belarus  ian facilities for strategic forces would also begin then. 
The second stage would entail the direct exchange of  Belarus  ian cash to Russian roubles at the 
one to one exchange rate and would be preceded by a political expression of  the Belarusian 
people's will on unification ofthe Belarusian monetary system with that of  Russia.368 
Despite these initial agreements, actual monetary union between Russia and Belarus was slow 
to evolve, due largely to Russia's reticence. In September 1994 Russian Prime Minister, 
Chernomyrdin announced that Russia would not in the future choose to amalgamate its 
366 Speaking about economic integration with Russia on Belarusian radio, President 
Lukashenka anticipated that once economic integration with Russia was achieved, living 
standards in Belarus would greatly improve. OMRI Daily Digest No 122  23 June 1995 
367 see for example the comments by A. Illarionov, Head of  the Russian Government's 
Study and Planning Group  in  Finansoviye Izvestia January 13-19 1994 pl-2; Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta 13 January 1994 p4 
368 Izvestia April 14 1994 pI; Kommersant Daily April 15 pI 1994 
129 monetary system with that of  Belarus and for monetary union to take place Belarus would 
have to bring its economy up to the Russian leve1.369 
Agreement was however reached on a Customs Union, initially between Russia and Belarus 
but which has since been joined by Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. According to Russian Foreign 
Economic Relations Minister, O. Davydov, one of  the benefits of  customs union with 
Belarus was that it would allow Russia to 'open our borders and control the borders with 
Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania on the basis of  Russian legislation'. 370 Agreement would also 
promote integration and allow Russia and Belarus to trade at domestic rather than world 
prices.371 
In January 1995 agreement was reached by Russia and Belarus on deepening Russian-
Belarusian cooperation.372 Formalization of  bilateral relations between Russia and Belarus 
came in February 1995,when Yeltsin and and the Belarusian President, Alexandr  Lukashenka 
signed three major treaties: 
• Treaty of  Friendship and Cooperation; 
• Treaty on Joint Efforts to Protect the Border of  Belarus; 
• Agreement on a Single Administration for the CU between Russian and Belarus.373 
By May 1995, Belarus and Russia had finalized the first stage of  the CU accord: tariff and 
qualitative restrictions were abolished in mutual trade; there were unified normative acts on 
tariff and non tariff regulations in free trade and unified excise duties on goods. 374  On 26 
May  the two presidents signed an agreement to  remove all customs posts on their common 
border and Yeltsin declared 'there are no borders between Russian and Belarus'  .375 
369 Segodnya 16 September 1994 p5;  SWB SU/2098 N2 12-10-94 
370 SWB SU12145 B/3 3 November 1994 
371 ibid 
372 Diplomaticheski VestnikNo 2 1995 p45 
373 Nezavisimaya Gazeta  23 February 1995 pi 
374 SWB SU/2303 D/4 15 May 1995 
375 SWB SU/2314 N3 27 May 1995 
130 Russia's restraint in its relations with Belarus and its caution in approaching monetary union, 
opting instead for customs union, indicated that a new realism was guiding Russia's policy 
toward this most willing of  partners and to the countries of  the 'near abroad' generally. This 
realism was underpinned by a belief  that it was no longer advantageous for Russia to act as 
'donor' to the ex-republics and relations between them would have to be reconstructed on a 
mutually advantageous basis.3 76 
Russia and Ukraine 
An element of  realism was also evident in Russia's relations with Ukraine. Unlike Belarus, 
negotiating bilateral relations with Ukraine was a lengthy and complicated process dealing 
with critical issues of  economic relations and security matters. Bilateral relations between 
Russia and Ukraine have been shaped by attempts to resolve the outstanding problems of  the 
Black Sea Fleet, the external debt of  the USSR, Ukraine's energy needs and energy debt to 
Russia, Crimea, dual citizenship and  border issues. Still, while cool winds may have blown 
through the Russian-Ukrainian negotiating process from time to time, the negotiations never 
reached the point of  breakdown or open conflict as had been predicted in 1992 and 1993. 
Changed circumstances in 1994-1995  (economic collapse in Ukraine; the election of  a more 
pro Russian oriented President; the growing assertiveness of  Russians in the heavily 
Russified Eastern and Southern parts of  Ukraine and Russia's invasion ofChechnya) altered 
the context of  negotiations significantly, to the point that a bilateral treaty could be signed in 
June 1995.377 
From the Ukrainian perspective, the changed circumstances of 1994-95 gave rise to a less 
hostile and suspicious attitude toward Russia and it was emphasized that the cornerstone of 
Ukraine's foreign policy  was interaction with Russia,  stressing that Russia was Ukraine's 
special strategic partner. 378  On his appointment as new Foreign Minister for Ukraine, 
Hennadi Udovenko signalled that changes would be made to Ukraine's foreign policy course 
376 "Nuzhno Ii Rossii Ob"ediniat'sia s Belorussiei' Kommersant' No 75 March 1996 
377  Diplomaticheski VestnikNo 3 1995 P12; Moskovskiye NovostiNo 39 4-11 June 1995 
p5 
378 SWB SU/1894 0/6 13 January 1994; SU/2053 Oil 21 July 1994; SU/2109 B/8 22 
September 1994 ; SU/1892 011  11  January 1995; 
131 and the normalization of  relations with Russia would remain a high priority.  3  79 
The  bilateral accord of  June 1995 brought agreement on one of  the most contentious 
problems in Russian-Ukrainian relations. According to the agreement, the Black Sea Fleet was 
to serve as the basis for the creation of  Russia's own Black Sea Fleet  and Ukraine's navy. 
Both fleets would have separate bases with Sevastopol the main base of  the Russian fleet. 
Russia was to have 81.7% of  the ships and vessels and Ukraine would get 18.3%.380 
The eventual agreement on the Black Sea Fleet removed the chief  obstacle to Yeltsin's 
repeatedly postponed visit to Kiev at which a comprehensive Treaty of  Friendship and 
Cooperation would be signed. Agreement was also reached in 1995 on the rescheduling of 
Ukraine's debts to Russia. 
In promoting integration, whether at a supra national level via the CIS or bilaterally through 
financial-industrial groups or regional cooperation, the actual economic gains for Russia in the 
short term would be few.  Yet Russia was prepared to reschedule debts and loan repayments, 
make available  facilitative credits and supply energy resources at prices significantly lower 
than the world price to the CIS states. While Russia sought to reduce the level of  this 
exchange, financial transfers to the other republics remained high. 
Nevertheless Russia's hardened stance on the rouble zone in 1993 reflected the aim of 
reducing financial transfers to the CIS states. In 1993 Russia also attempted to charge more 
realistic prices for its exports to the CIS. From 1 January 1993 payments for the products of 
Russia's oil and gas refining enterprises from the ex-republics were to be made at world prices 
in dollars or roubles. 3  81  Russia also sought to end the granting of  facilitative credits. 
Generally these credits had been made without any preliminary conditions and were allocated 
to buyers of  Russian products in the near abroad, meaning that in effect Russian resources 
were being transferred to  citizens and enterprises of  neighbouring states virtually free of 
charge. In 1992 such facilitative credits were estimated to be approximately 8% of  Russia's 
GDP (compared to the USA, where  aid in the form of  credits to other countries did not 
379SWB SU/2089 0/3 1 September 1994; 
380 Diplomaticheski Vestnik No 3 1995 P12;  SWB 2326 S/1  10 June 95 
381 l::vestia 14 January 1993 pi 
132 exceed  1%  of  GOP).382  By comparison  in 1992, free aid granted to the the world's poorest 
countries by the world's most developed countries did not exceed 0.17% of  GOP for the US, 
0.3% for Japan, 0.4% for Germany, Great Britain and Italy and 0.6% for France. The 
excessive credits to the ex-republics resulted a 25% growth in inflation in Russia. Credits 
from Russia made up 45-70% of  the national GOP of  Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan.383 The IMF estimated that  in real terms the actual figure for facilitative credits 
was $17 billion or more than 21 % of  Russia's GDP,384 Table 14  below demonstrate the 
extent of financial transfers from Russia to the ex-republics in the form of  facilitative credits. 
In table 15 the extent of  Russia's financial support for the three republics in which the 
majority of  Russians living ourtside of  Russia reside is shown. 
Table 14 
BE'_~Lfi!!~l:!cjELA  i d  __ JQ ~_~~_Ql~tXQ!l~LStCJj:~~_l!!_~  __ QL R~QJ=LI?Jl~?_  G  D  X 
____  .. ____ ._. __ ..... __ ._ .. __  ~_~.  ___ .  __  13_~~______  _____ ___  J_~  ~J_{  JCJ}}-'_::LLJJyt _________ _ 
Uzbekistan  69.2  :  52.8  ...  - .......  _  - - . __ ._,_._  .. __  .• _ .. __  ... __  J ..  _.  __  • ______  ._  .• _____  • __  . ____ ,.  ____ .. ___  • ___  "'  __  "_' _.,.  ___  . __ .. _ .• ___  . ___  ... _____  . ____  ~  ..... ___  . _  •..• ___  .  __ . __  .  ___  .•••  _____  .••. ____  _ 
Kazakhstan  25  48.8  ----_  ... -- -..  _."- --"- - ... _--- --'-;"'''~'----'-.-------_  .... _- .....  -"  ... ~--- - .. -------.-'- _  ..  __ .  "-. -_.- _  .... -_. --_  ... _---.--- ---.-.--...... ~.----.. --_._. -_  .. _-_._---_._-----
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l.!~r~in_e__  ___ f}L  _____  .. ___  _______  1.9'  __ _______ _ 
Azerbaijan  20.8  n/a 
RFAid tQ  Ukraio_e,  B_eJarl.J~  ~  _KazakhstClI1JI1%_QtRE!PlJ.J?li~s'_GJ)P_ 
. __  ___  1992_L~_~3(JClI1._:-JulyJ  __ _ 
Belarus 
Ukraine  ..  .. 
Kazakhstan 
382 [;;vestia  18 May 1993 pI 
383 Izvestia 16 September 1995 
.. U:9  .  _  $,8._. 
23.71.~_ 
25.1  48.8 
384 Financial and Business News From Moscow No 34 August 20-26 1991 p2 
385 Izvestia September 16 1993 p4 By  mid 1993 Russia was attempting to reduce the degree of  financial transfer to other 
republics. Facilitative credits were halted, energy prices were raised and a national currency 
was introduced. Despite the significant contribution to the economies of  the ex-republics, in 
1995, Russia denied charges that it was underwriting almost half of  the CIS states economies. 
Russian Finance minister, V Panskov claimed that Russian economic and financial aid to other 
CIS countries was very 'insubstantial'. Russia, he claimed had agreements to provide credits 
only to Belarus, Tajikistan and Armenia. These took the form of  credits in uranium fuel for 
Armenia's atomic power stations and raw materials for the light food industries in Belarus 
and Tajikistan.386 In June 1994, Russia had also allocated Belarus credit of 150 billion roubles 
for the first six months of 1994.387 
Russia's hardening stance prevailed in 1994. Addressing the CIS Heads ofGovemment 
Council in Moscow, Chernomyrdin warned that in 1995 Russia would be forced to introduce 
the principle of  advance payment in trade and economic agreements and contracts for the 
supply of  commodities. To resolve the debt problem, there would be financial penalties for 
failure to pay on time (accumulated debts to Russia for energy and fuel stood at 7,500 billion 
roubles).388 
Inspite ofthese measures, Russia continued to supply selected states with Russian exports at 
preferential prices. For example, in April 1994 an agreement between Russia and Belarus 
meant that Belarus would  pay US$50 for 1,000 cu.m of  gas and US$74 for one tonne of  oil-
about 30% less than other CIS republics.389 In the Belarusian case, Russia's generosity was 
linked to its free use of  military bases. 
During 1994 and 1995 it became apparent that Russia's policy towards the CIS was not 
driven wholly by economic imperatives. Russia's benevolence towards the ex-republics was 
linked to the safe guarding of  its perceived national interests in the region. Clearly one such 
interest was that Russia should not be bordered by economically weak nations, politically 
unstable, vulnerable to extremists forces (originating internally or externally)  and threatening 
to undermine security in the region. Assisting economic recovery in the ex-republics through 
386 OMRI Daily Digest No 83  27 April 1995 
387 SWB SU/2012 B/6 2 June 1994 
388 SWB SU!2178 NI 14 December 1994 
389 SWB SU12286 D!4 25 April 1995 
13-l loans, credits and preferential prices was one way of  preventing instability. L inking this fonn 
of  aid to the maintenance military bases in the CIS enabled Russia to further protect its 
national interests. Clearly then Russia's policy toward the CIS was governed by more than 
simply its economic interests  and was shaped by issues of  national security and geopolitical 
concerns.  These aspects of  Russia's policy are considered in chapter six. 
Conclusion 
Since 1991 the CIS has been evolving towards an economic community of  most of  the nations 
of  the fonner Soviet Union. The process of  evolution is slow and frequently difficult, as 
evidenced by the numerous agreements reached by the CIS states, many of  which failed to 
reach the implementation stage. The difficulties associated with it are not unique to the CIS 
and there are several similarities with the problems affecting European integration. 
Integration amongst the CIS states gained a fresh impetus in 1994 and 1995 when two key 
members of  the CIS, Russia and Ukraine, supported the strengthening of  the commonwealth. 
Russia's renewed commitment to the CIS arose from growing concerns about regional 
stability and security, stemming not least from the weakness of  the region's economies, few 
of  which, apart from Russia, had advanced much beyond the initial stages of  market type 
refonns. Strengthening the CIS and reinforcing Russia's role within it would provide a 
mechanism to facilitate economic recovery in the region and guarantee regional security. From 
Ukraine's perspective, its new policy of  supporting the CIS came from the reality of 
economic collapse and the imperative of  cooperation within the CIS to aid economic 
recovery.  The degree of  Belarus' trade dependency made it a supporter of  economic 
integration, whether that was within a wider organization such as the CIS or with Russia 
alone. Clearly however without Russia's and Ukraine's renewed commitment to the CIS in 
1994 and 1995, the CIS is unlikely to have evolved to the stage of  economic union and may 
well have broken down into sub-regional groupings. 
Supranational processes of  integration within the CIS were supplemented by further 
integration at the inter republican / inter enterprise level and this was more successful in 
restoring past links and creating new ones. Through the strengthening of  the CIS, the 
territorial integrity of  the area of  the FSU (excluding the Baltic States) has largely been 
preserved. Thus one of the crucial functions of  the CIS at its inception was fulfilled. This 
occurred in large part due to Russia's support. Russia saw the CIS as the best forum for 
135 protecting its national interests  and controlling the region of  the FSU. It  became dear that its 
long term  interests lay not only in an economic union but full political, economic and military 
union. 
[3G Chapter 5  Geopolitics and Russia's Relations with Ukraine and 
Belarus 
The  preservation of  Russia's economic interests  in the area of  the FSU led to its renewed 
drive for regional economic integration at both the multilateral and bilateral level. The need to 
preserve or restore economic ties among the ex-republics was the initial raison d'etre for the 
CIS and Russian efforts to strengthen it.  But Russia had a number of  other interests and 
concerns in the FSU which influenced its attitudes and policies towards the CIS and its long 
tenn aim oftransfonning it into a full political, military and economic union. 
Geopolitical  interests have shaped Russia's attitude towards the states of  the FSU and 
detennined policy  to the countries of  the Near Abroad.  In an article on <National Interests 
and Geopolitics', Igor Tishin defined geopolitics in two ways. The Russian view he 
suggested, sees geopolitics as 
'"  the political concept, that uses natural-geographical data (configuration and the 
size of  territory and aquatory, climate, material and natural resources, racial and 
ethnical composition of  population) to explain the national interests of  states 
and the coalition interests of  military alliances.390 
He presented the American definition of  geopolitics as 
the application of  military geography at the strategic and global level. Geopolitics 
integrates political, diplomatic, sociological, economic and military considerations 
into an overall strategic approach. Geopolitics is concerned with  relative power 
among  nations and coalitions. It includes consideration of  the foundations of 
national power: population, industry, commerce, financial status, internal stability, 
resources and national will, as well as military forces. The essence of  geopolitics is 
consideration of  the size, shape, location and characteristics of  nations with respect 
to one another  )91 
390 Tishin, 1., <National Interests and Geopolitics: A Primer on <The Basic Provisions of  the 
Military Doctrine of  the Russian Federation' in European Security  Vol 4 No 1 Spring 1995 
pp107-131;  Tishin cites  A.  Sinayskiy 'Geopolitika i natsional'naia bezopasnost' Rossii' 
Voennaya Mysl' No 10  1992 p2 
391 Tishin pI  09, citing  international Military and Defence Encylopedia  (McLean, 
VA:Brassey's 1993 pl0S7. 
l37 The primacy  of  geopolitics in Russia's regional policy represented a shift away from the 
ideologically driven  policies of the past and towards a new realpolitik. It  represented 'the 
return of  geography' and the renewed impact of  location and resources on political 
decisions.392 It was therefore intrinsically linked to issues of  national security and national 
interests. 
Analysing the national interests of  the RF and the military aspects of  national security, 
Tishin identified Russia's main national security objectives as: 
• to preserve the integrity of  Russia as ajoint and sovereign democratic state within its 
existing borders; 
• to create peaceful living conditions for its citizens; 
• to integrate Russia politically and economically  into the world community as a 
democratic power in the future. 
The most important interests in the military realm of  national security, Tishin identified as: 
• to defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
• to promote and preserve the social and political stability  of  society and the vitality of 
the political constitutional regime; 
• to provide free access to vitally important economic zones and lines of 
communication; 
• to support strategic stability and security in neighbouring countries and in the 
world.393 
Strategic stability and security in neighbouring countries, i.e. the countries of  the 'Near 
Abroad' was thus identified as a key national and military interest of  Russia. 
The range of  Russia's geopolitical interests in the area of  the FSU can be broken down into 
economic interests: political interests and security interests. Its economic interests are 
identified as ports, access to raw material, transportation, communication and plants where 
production is not yet duplicated in the RF.  Its political interests encompass cooperation with 
392 Goble, P.  'Russia as a Eurasian Power:Moscow and the post-Soviet Successor States' in 
Lukin & Kissinger 1996 see also Goble,  P 'Russia and its Neighbours  Foreign Policy 1996 
p82 
393 Tishin 1995 p 113 
138 the new states to prevent an explosion of  ethnic violence; protecting its citizens and even co-
ethnics abroad and in coordinating policies on a variety of  regional issues such as the 
environment. Russia's wide range of security interests includes  preventing instability that 
might bring massive refugee flows into Russia or a spill over of  violence into Russia proper; 
denying outside powers access to regions that might be used to threaten Russia itself and 
interests in certain military sites such as the Skrunda radar site in Latvia.394 
Russia's geopolitical interests in FSU have a number of  implications for certain key republics. 
In 1992 Noreen and Watson noted that 
Republics that Russia considers important for economic or military security 
reasons: Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic  republics, or those republics with large 
ethnic Russian minorities or those which control key ports or pipelines 
may be granted somewhat more generous terms or conditions.395 
Using Noreen and Watson's hypothesis and focussing on the three categories identified by 
them (republics with large ethnic minorities; republics important for economic or military 
security reasons; republics which control key ports or pipelines) this chapter examines 
Russia's geopolitical interests in the region and consider how these interests are manifest in 
policy and on the ground. The area of  the FSU is examined generally but  specific attention is 
given to how geopolitical interests have impacted upon Russia's relations with Ukraine and 
Belarus. 
Three key areas are examined: 
1.  How the presence of  the large Russian Diaspora affected Russia's policies towards 
the states of  the region; 
2.  How issues of  strategic importance (e.g.the proposed enlargement ofNA  TO, or the 
threat of either instability or the spread of  extremism on Russia's southern borders) 
shaped Russian attitudes and policies, and the consequences of  this for the states of 
the region; 
3.  How Russia's economic interests (from a geopolitical perspective) continued to affect 
its relations with a number of  key states. 
394 Goble p84 
395 Noreen and Watson 1992 p 114f[ 
139 The Russian Diaspora in the 'Near Abroad'. 
The collapse of  the USSR presented Russia with many dilemmas. Crucially it raised issues of 
Russian national identity, national interests, security  and Russia's role in the modem 
geopolitical order. Intrinsic to this was the question ofthe 25 million strong Russian Diaspora 
in the ex-republics. 
The Russian diaspora, the scale of  which was historically unprecedented, existed as a 
consequence of  the  expansionist policies of  the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. Under the Tsars,  . 
Russians expanded into the new lands of  the empire as soldiers in the garrisons of  the 
imperial army, as the civil servants of  the Tsarist state bureaucracy and later as the regional 
agents of  industrialization. The outward migration of  Russians continued under the Soviet 
regime, bringing modem industry to the union republics and centralizing power by controlling 
regional and republican governments. 
Historical models offered post-Soviet Russia little in help in addressing the problem of  its 
diaspora. Similar 'unmixing' of  ethnic peoples occurred with the collapse of  the Ottoman and 
Habsburg empires at the tum of  the century 396 and the post war decolonization of  the lands 
occupied by the Europe's imperial powers, brought similar problems associated with the 
withdrawal of  the bureaucratic and military agents of  imperialism. However the problem of 
the Russian Diaspora in the late 20th century was unprecedented in terms of  its scale and the 
fact that many of  these ethnic Russians had acted as regional purveyors of  the policies and 
economics of  Soviet socialism. By 1991> the Soviet empire had collapsed, the communist 
ideology was discredited and the whole ethos on which many of  these ethnic Russians had 
based their lives in the republics was removed. 
The diaspora in the 'Near Abroad' brought both  advantages and disadvantages for Russia. For 
a resurgent neo-imperialist Russia, the 25 million strong diaspora could  provide it with a 
legitimate mandate for intervention on behalf of  its citizens should their rights be violated and 
thus covertly assist the reestablishment of  Russian influence in the region. The model for this 
could have been America's readiness to intervene militarily in defence of  its citizens - in 
396 Brubaker, Rogers  'Aftermaths of  Empire and the Unmixing ofPeoples:Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives'  in Barkey, K., &  Von Hagen, M., eds., After Empire: Multi Ethnic 
Societies and Nation Building Boulder: Colorado: Westview Press  1997; Ethnic and  Racial 
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140 recent years exemplified in its invasion of  Haiti. Conversely, for a Russia  emerging  as a 
'normal' player on the world stage and endeavouring to follow a neo-liberal / realist line in its 
policy toward the 'Near Abroad', the Russian community in the 'Near Abroad' could  prove a 
liability on two counts. Firstly, the fate of  the Russians there was taken up by the 
nationalists and right wing parties and leaders seeking to challenge and reduce the influence of 
the liberals in the government in the latter part of 1991 and 1992 and thus forced the Russian 
leadership to become more outspoken in its defence of  these ethnic Russians. Secondly, the 
threat of  the return migration of  large numbers of  ethnic Russians was  potentially 
destabilizing for Russia. This was of  particular concern in the early years of  post-Soviet 
national consolidation and economic transition, when it was estimated that as many as 10 
million immigrants would return to the Russian homeland In a Russia where economic reform 
was only partially underway but which was nevertheless having grave social consequences 
for large sections of  the population, and where returning soldiers from Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic states could barely be accommodated and with no guarantees of employment, the 
prospect of  the large scale return of  ethnic Russians threatened to undermine the already 
weak cohesion of  Russian society. 
It was in this context that Russia began to formulate its policy toward the 'Near Abroad' in 
general and specifically toward the Russian population there. Policy formulation took place 
amidst the debate about Russia, its identity and its national interests, which characterized the 
first 18 months of  post-Soviet independence. Central to this was the urgent need to respond 
to the question of  the Russian minority in the ex-repUblics. 
With independence, the ex-republics set about national consolidation. Devising policies 
regarding the position and treatment of ethnic minorities (which in some republics formed a 
substantial number) was an integral part of  this.  In the Baltic republics, where the Russians 
were generally viewed as an occupying force, ethnic Russians  began to experience 
discrimination in many forms including in housing and employment, linguistic  discrimination 
and quite often were denied citizenship. 
Russia's  policy towards the 'Near Abroad' became more assertive and nationalistic as a 
result of  the pressure from the growing militancy of  the Russian diaspora there and growing 
nationalism and Russian patriotism at home.  This  reflected the assertion  of  the forces of  the 
so called 'Red-Brown' coalition on the domestic policy agenda, evident from mid 1992.  [n 
141 June 1992, Russian Foreign Minister, A. Kozyrev, pledged that Russia would protect its 
minority by  'all means available'. Embassies and consulates were charged with  protecting the 
interests  of  persecuted compatriots.  Where the human rights of the Russian minority were 
violated, all measures of  civil influence would be used in the first instance, though if  this 
failed,the use of  military force was not ruled ouP97  Such sentiments prevailed into 1995. 
Addressing the Russian Foreign Policy Council in April 1995, Kozyrev reiterated that force, 
not only economic and political force but also direct/military force would be used to protect 
the Russian speaking population in the 'Near Abroad')98 Growing support for a Russian 
version of  the US' 'Monroe Doctrine' would be a further mechanism  enabling Russia to 
protect its minority. 
The potential for the issue of  the Russian diaspora to become a destabilizing factor in regional 
security  was not always  fully appreciated in the West.  One possible problem was that the 
Russian minority  could be viewed as a potential fifth column by the politicians and populace 
of  the newly independent states of  the FSU and the potential  for the Russian minority to 
behave as such.  Another potential problem would be for 'national-conservative' forces in the 
Russian Federation itself to stir up and incite the Russian  minority to the point where they 
could secede and seek unification with the Russian homeland This was thought to be 
potentially the case in areas where Russians out numbered the local population significantly, 
e.g. the Crimea in Ukraine, where Russians make up 67% of  the population, the oblasts of 
Northern Kazakhstan, where Russians make up 62% of  the residents and Kazakhs only 19%, 
and the Estonian town ofNarva, which is overwhelmingly populated by Russians (90%).399 
Open support for the Russian minority in Transdniester from nationalists and conservatives 
in Russia was evident over Moldova and since 1993 Ukraine's leaders  complained repeatedly 
about the actions of Russia's politicians in encouraging opposition to Ukraine's government 
amongst the Russian populations of  the oblasts of Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk, 
Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Kharkov) and Crimea. 
The influence of  nationalist-conservative forces in Russia became a potentially destabilizing 
397  hvestia 26 June 1992 pI 
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142 force in the region, more so when they organized themselves into new political bodies in the 
summer of 1995 in anticipation of  the December elections to the Federal Assembly. The 
'Council of  Compatriots' was established as a means to promote the interests of  the Russian 
Diaspora. Its aims were to take part in the drafting and reviewing of  laws  in the Russian 
State Duma, to protect the interests of  the organizations of  the ethnic Russians and to help 
Russian communities organize outside Russia.4oo 
A weakness of  Western literature on the Russian diaspora is the tendency to view the 
Diaspora as homogeneous, and culturally, ethnically and politically aligned to Russia. It is not 
fully appreciated that affiliation to Russia among the diaspora Russians  varies between those 
Russians whose ancestors settled in the outposts of  the empire in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries  and whose Russianness is based more on culture and ethnicity, and those more 
recent Russian emigrants to the republics, who viewed the Russian Federation as their 
political and territorial homeland.  Another important point was the fact that the Russian 
population was not equally dispersed throughout the former union but generally concentrated 
in large communities in some key republics. Over half(12.5 million) of  the Russia population 
is concentrated in Ukraine and Belarus with another 6 million concentrated mainly in the 
Northern territories of  Kazakhstan. The greatest number of  ethnic Russians is concentrated in 
these three key republics (18.8 million) and significantly, these Russians reside mainly in the 
large and middle sized industrial towns. The distribution of  ethnic Russians by republics is 
illustrated  in tables 16 &17 below.401 
400 SWB SU/2350 B/3 July 1995 
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143 Table 16 
Percentage Share of  Ethnic Russians in 
overall population of Republic 1989 
Republic  % Etlmic Russians 
Azberaijan  5.S 
Belarus  I  13.4 
Estonia  I  30.4 
Georgia  6.3 
Kazakhstan  37.8 
Kyrgystan  21 
Latvia  I  34 
Lithuania  I 
I  9.3 
Moldova 
I  12.9 
Tajikistan  7.6 
Turkmenistan  9.S 
Ukraine  22.1 
Uzbekistan  8.3 
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Table 17 
Republics'Share of  Ethnic Russians 
RANKED 
Republic  I  % Ethnic Russians  I 
Kazakhstan  I  37.8 
I  Latvia  34 
Estonia  30.4 
Ukraine  22.1 
Kyrgystan  21 
I  Belarus  13.4 
Moldova  12.9 
Turkmenistan  9.5 
Lithuania  9.3 
I  Uzbekistan  8.3 
Tajikistan  7.6 
5.51 
Georgia  6.3 
Azberaijan Russia's dual concerns regarding its Diaspora communities: on the one hand to be seen to be 
acting to defend the interests of Russians in the former republics against growing pressure 
from nationalist conservative forces in Russia, and on the other to prevent a potentially 
destabilizing flood of  ethnic Russians back to Russia, partially helps to explain Russia's 
willingness to provide the ex-republics with facilitative credits, subsidized energy supplies 
and loans as discussed in chapter five. This supports Noreen and Watson's view that certain 
republics would be granted more generous terms and conditions.402 A similar point is made 
more explicit by O.Rybakov, who points out that 
A considerable percentage of  the Russians moved to the former republics in 
connection with the creation of all-union production facilities in them and are 
concentrated in large industrial centres that play an appreciable role in economic 
interrelations with Russia. The severance of  ties with former republics therefore 
primarily affects those enterprises and those regions where Russians form the 
majority of  the work force. 403 
One means for Russia to protect the interests (ie. material well being) of  its minority was to 
continue to supply energy resources at preferential rates, to reschedule debt repayments and 
to provide loans/credits on favourable terms. Table 18 following shows the level of  this type 
of  assistance in 1992 and 1993 from Russia to those ex-republics, where large numbers of 
ethnic Russians resided. 
402 Noreen & Watson 1992  p114ff 
403 Rybakov, 0  'Prospects for the Development of  Russia's Economic relations with the 
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145 Table 18 
Russian Aid to Republics most populated by Russians 
as Percentage of  Republic's GDP 
Republic  1992  1993 
Kazakhstan  25.1  48.8 
Ukraine  23.7  1.9 
Belarus  1l.9  8.8 
The table shows a significant increase in Russia's aid to Kazakhstan, where almost 40% of 
the population is made up of  ethnic Russians. Over half of  the diaspora reside in Ukraine and 
Belarus, making up 22.1 %  and 13.4% of  their populations respectively. In Belarus, Russian 
aid in 1993 decreased by 3.1 %, though in comparison to other republics, this was quite a 
small reduction. However Russia's aid to Ukraine decreased drastically  - from 23.7% to 
1.9%,  a decrease of21.8%. This decline was clearly related to Ukraine's decision to leave the 
rouble zone and introduce its own national currency. The only republic to share a similar 
dramatic decrease was Turkmenistan (from 67.1 % to 45.7%), which like Ukraine, resisted 
Russian attempts to impose a uniform monetary policy in the region.  In Ukraine and 
Belarus, Russian aid decreased in real terms but these republics continued to benefit from 
Russia's benevolence in granting cheaper energy resources, and willingness to reschedule 
loans. 
While Russia was prepared to provide the economic means to support its ethnic minority, it 
was  also prepared to withhold economic aid in protest at ill treatment. In the proposed 
Federal Programme for the Protection of  the Russian  Minority (1994), one plan was to 
impose rigorous restrictions on the export of  Russian raw materials and energy resources to 
countries where the rights of  ethnic Russians were being violated.404 Russia  pursued this 
form of  economic leverage most frequently with the Baltic states, which remained dependent 
404 l:vestia 17 February 1994 pI 
146 on it for energy supplies.  The Federal Programme also proposed that in allocating credits to 
the ex-republics, a stipulation should be made that part of  the credits be used for the 
development of  Russian educational, linguistic and other needs of  the Russian Diaspora.405 
A further complicating factor regarding Russians in the Slavic republics of  Ukraine and 
Belarus was the fact that a large part of  the Soviet Union's defence capacity was located here. 
Overall 60,000 enterprises in the FSU worked for the defence sector. Ofthese, the majority 
were located in Russia (70%), but 17% were located in Ukraine and 4% in Belarus. The 
remaining 9% of  defence enterprises were dispersed throughout the rest of  the union 
republics.406 The end of  the Cold War and the down grading of  the military threat resulted in 
the reduced production capacity of  these defence enterprises. Unless, and in many cases in 
spite of, successful conversion to civilian production, large scale unemployment from these 
enterprises was likely. In Ukraine and Belarus, ethnic Russians comprised the majority of  the 
work force in these enterprises and their potential wide scale unemployment was another 
destabilizing factor in these countries. 
In Ukraine and Belarus, the Russian minority to date has not experienced widespread 
discrimination, when compared to the experiences of  the Russian minority in the Baltic 
states. This has much to do with the cultural and linguistic affinity of  these Slavic nations and 
a higher degree of  assimilation with the native populations. In Ukraine it also reflected the 
strategy of  the post-Soviet leadership to consolidate statehood on the basis of  territorial 
rather than ethnic integrity. In heterogeneous Ukraine, pursuing the ethnic principle could 
have decoupled the state. In Belarus, where the native population is even more assimilated to 
Russia, the threat of  discrimination for the Russian minority was minimal. Thus in these 
states the threat to the Russian minority came not from state sponsored policies of 
exclusiveness and discrimination but from the wider economic consequences of  the 
breakdown of  inter republican ties and the economic hardships associated with the collapse of 
the Soviet economy and the transition to market type economies. These however were the 
very circumstances which could give rise to exclusiveness, discrimination and radical 
nationalism. 
405 ibid 
406 i::vestia 13 March 1995 pI 
147 Russia's policies towards its  diaspora fonned a key component of its polices towards the 
'Near Abroad'. The twenty five million strong Russian minority in the ex-republics of  the 
FSU is an explicitly defined 'national interest' ofthe Russian Federation.407 However that 
Russian policy toward the 'Near Abroad' was not governed solely by the issue of  the Russian 
Diaspora, nor used explicitly as a pretext for intervention is shown by the fact that where 
Russia intervened militarily in the FSU, Russians formed only a small percentage of  the 
republics' population. For example in the Transcausasian republic of Georgia,  Russians 
comprised only 6.3% of  the republic's population; in Tajikistan only 7.6% and in Moldova 
12.9% .408 Clearly Russian intervention in these states was motivated by concerns for 
regional security and inherent within this, Russian  security. 
'Regional Security' is another clearly defined Russian national interest and an issue of 
importance not only for Russia but also of  continental and global importance.The 
circumstances in which the newly independent states (NIS) of  the FSU emerged threatened to 
undermine regional security from the outset. For most of  the ex-republics (excluding the 
Baltic States) independence came suddenly and for some unexpectedly (Belarus), in the wake 
of  the failed coup attempt of  August 1991. Many of  the NIS were wholly unprepared for 
independent statehood. From the practical perspective there was a shortage of  trained and 
experienced personnel, bureaucrats and politicians. Many of the leaders of  the NIS held the 
view that independence would deliver economic well being after decades of  exploitation from 
407 see for example Gosudarstvennaia Programma Natsional 'nogo  Vozrozhdeniia i 
Mezhnatsional 'nogo Sotrudnichestva Narodov Rossii (Osnovnie Napravleniia) Moscow 
(1994);  publications by RAN including 'Rossiiskaia Federatsiia Bezopasnost' i Voennoe 
Sotrudnichestvo '; Natsional 'naia Doktrina Rossii- Problemy i Prioritety  Moscow  NoS-8 
1994 (1994); 
408 Dronov,Y.P 1994 pS4.  A similar point is made by Kolstoe, P., &  Edemsky, A.,  in 
Russians in the Former Soviet Republics London 1994. They argue that Russia's policy 
toward the 'Near Abroad' contains a number of facets, instruments and objectives. The 
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most important. Russia's economic and security interests are often pursued independent of 
the diaspora issue. For example, some of  Russia's most important military engagements have 
been in areas where the Russian demographic presence is minimal such as South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. See chapter 10 p259 tf 
148 the centre (Ukraine). In reality most of  the republics were economically weak, either in or on 
the brink of  economic collapse and with an inordinately high dependence on the other 
republics and Russia. Few of  the republics had the means to provide for their own security, 
though some had the potential to destabilize regional security by having tactical nuclear 
weapons stationed on their territory (Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, in addition to 
Russia). All of  the republics anticipated and feared Russian domination of  the region. 
The collapse of  the USSR left in its wake a 'zone of  instability', which unless controlled, 
risked degenerating into ethnic and territorial conflict and warfare, drawing in not only the 
other republics ofthe FSU but other powers keen to gain a foothold in the region. Clearly it 
was not in Russia's interest for this to happen and Russia's evolving strategy since 1992 was 
double sided seeking to control  instability and contain  external influences. 
One of  the earliest challenges to this dual policy of  control and containment carne from the 
proposed east ward expansion of  NATO, which forced Russia to reevaluate more closely its 
security concerns in the area of  the FSU. The implications of  NATO's enlargement for 
Russia, its consequences for Ukraine and Belarus and and its ramifications for the wider issue 
of  regional security are discussed at length below. 
New Strategic Issues: NATO Enlargement 
Since 1991, Russia was formulating its foreign policy in circumstances which are historically 
unique and unprecedented both for that nation and the world. As the successor state to the 
USSR, Russia immediately acquired two distinct roles - that of  a 'great power' in 
international relations (though significantly reduced from the USSR's superpower status) and 
a role as a regional power in the areas of influence of  the F SU - in the Eastern and Central 
parts of  Europe and the Asian continent. In the early years of  post-Soviet national 
consolidation much of  the debate about Russia's status in the world, its national interests and 
national security centred around reconciling these two roles.
409  The approach followed by 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev tended to favour the first role - pursued in the belief that while its 
role as a regional power was important for Russia, its power should not be reduced solely to 
this. Thus the strategy followed from August 1991  until late 1992 was designed to sustain 
and maintain Russia's power internationally and attain Western aid and finance. It was 
409 Kozyrev, A., 'Russian Interests in the CIS' International Affairs Moscow 1994 pll-30~ 
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149 further bolstered by Russia's nuclear status, providing it with additional bargaining powers. 
From 1993, Russia's difficulties in sustaining this role led to confusion over its place in the 
world. A key source of  the difficulties was the proposed eastward expansion of  NATO 
which gained momentum from this time and was the first major crisis in the foreign policy of 
post-Soviet Russia. It resulted in  disagreements between Russia and the West; contributed to 
the growing assertion of  conservative and nationalist forces on the Russian domestic agenda 
and caused a reexamination and reevaluation of  Russia's interests in the "Near Abroad' and 
Eastern Europe, forcing these interests to become more clearly defined and defended. 
The prospect of  NATO enlargement had always been problematic for Russia and especially 
for  the Russian military. With the end of  the Cold War, it was largely assumed (primarily in 
Russian circles) that the two military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
WTO), which had sustained the post war confrontation would disappear. The disappearance 
of  the WTO occurred almost immediately following the unification of  Germany in October 
1990. NATO on the other hand, not only failed to disappear, but actually recast itself in a 
new post cold war mould and was significantly strengthened. With the 'enemy' removed, 
NATO and the West were free to dominate. Even before the collapse of  the USSR in 1991, it 
was clear that the USA was the world's only superpower, that power in the post cold war 
world would be dominated by it and to a lesser extent, the nations of  the EU and that this 
power would be channelled through organizations  like the UN and NATO, which they 
controlled. 
Initially Russia had sought to match America's role internationally by positing itself in the 
position of  the international peace keeper (eg.in the Arab Israeli conflict and in the Balkan 
conflict) with little significant impact in both cases.410 In an attempt to temper the influence 
of  the revived NATO, Russia argued for the strengthening and expansion of  the CSCE as the 
key structure in the new architecture of  European security, of  which NATO would only be a 
component part. This was more acceptable for Russia since the USSR had played a key role 
in the strengthening of  the CSCE and its institutionalization  as an international organization 
in 1990. Whereas NATO would always be associated with confrontation of  the  Cold War 
Europe, the CSCE (soon to become, the OSCE) represented cooperation in the new era of 
international relations. Since the OSCE would be the  the new mechanism for European 
410 see Me Mahon 'From Union to Commonwealth: The Foreign Policy of Transition' 1992 
150 security,the American influence within it could be contained. 
The proposed expansion of  NATO was therefore inimical to Russia. Cold War hostilities 
revived at the prospect of  NATO troops positioned close to Russia's borders. A military 
bloc which had existed as Russia's enemy and whose raison d'etre for almost fifty years had 
been the destruction of  Russia and the USSR, was not to disappear but to expand rapidly. 
Consequently, if  NATO was expanding then Russia needed to quickly build a bulwark 
against this. 
Paradoxically, the origins of  NATO's proposed expansion are to be found in Russia itself. 
This can be traced back to the withdrawal of Soviet influence from the area of  Eastern Europe 
in the late 1980s. Free from Soviet influence, the states of  the region sought to reinforce their 
independence - politically and economically, through admission to key European structures 
and organizations such as the Council of  Europe, the EU and WED. Traditionally an area of 
instability, the new states of  the region sought to bolster national and regional security 
through 'Western' security organizations, notably, NATO and the CSCE. Growing pressure 
from the East European states for membership of 'Western' security organizations was met 
only partially with the creation of  the NACC (North Atlantic Consultative Council) in 
December 1991 and the Partnership for Peace Programme launched in 1994. 
While many of  the East European states viewed their incorporation into Western security 
organizations as a logical and natural development following the collapse of  communism in 
the region,411 the growing assertiveness of  the 'right' (conservatives, communists and 
nationalists) on the domestic policy agenda in Russia from mid 1992, generated uneasiness 
among the Eastern European governments. The  subsequent success  of  these forces in 
Russia's  first post-Soviet parliamentary elections (December 1993) caused further alarm and 
raised concerns that they would eventually seek to restore Russian hegemony over them. 
Russian military doctrine also indicated a fresh assertion of its interests in  Eastern Europe, 
with the region being viewed as a priority for Russia's interests after the CIS and the 'Near 
Abroad'. 
411 For example, at the CSCE summit in Budapest in December 1994, the Polish president 
justified NATO membership as a 'natural and sovereign choice'. See Piotr Switalski 'An Ally 
for the Central and East European States' in Transition  30 June 1995  p26 
151 The general swing to the 'right' in Russian politics, both at the parliamentary and presidential 
level, evident from mid 1992  acted as a major incentive for the strengthening of  NATO and 
the expansion of  the security umbrella to include the East European nations. As political 
developments in Russia became more unstable and unpredictable and as the West grew 
increasingly concerned at the growing trend away from liberal democracy and market reform, 
a defensive mechanism against a Russian threat was perceived as essential. The  success of 
the Communist Party of  the Russian Federation  (CP-RF) in the parliamentary elections 
(December 1995) and the exit of  the notable reformers from Yeltsin's government (A. 
Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister) underlined this. 
The realignment of  several of  the states of  the FSU towards Russia  also served as an 
impetus for NATO membership. Some of  the East European states had anticipated that 
Ukraine and Belarus, two new regional actors in East Central Europe, would act as a kind of  a 
belt which kept Russia at a distance. In the period of  optimism following the collapse of  the 
USSR in 1991, a strong Ukraine and a strong Belarus were seen particularly in Warsaw, but 
also in Budapest, Bratislava and to a lesser extent in Prague as a crucial element of  their 
external security.412  By 1992 it was clear that domestic problems within these states meant 
that they could not be relied on as strong allies against a potentially threatening Russia and 
indeed, in the Ukrainian case could actually destabilise European security.  Their hopes went 
unfulfilled with both Ukraine and Belarus returning pro Russian candidates in their first 
presidential elections in 1994, and Belarus' active pursuit of  closer union with Russia. 
Consequently, G. Wetting  argued that, 
The fact that Belarus seems again to be dominated by Russia and that Ukraine 
may conceivably share the same fate, reinforces the Central European countries' 
drive for NATO membership.413 
The proposed eastward expansion of  NATO had a number of security implications for 
Russia. Crucially, expansion to include the states of  Hungary, Slovakia and Poland would 
bring NATO uncomfortably close to Russia's borders. In September 1995, a thirty page 
alliance study suggested that any extension of  NATO membership to the former WTO 
countries must include the right to station tactical nuclear weapons and troops on their 
412 Wetting, G., 'post-Soviet Central Europe in International Security' European Security 
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152 terri  tory in times of  conflict.  414 
This meant that although accepting NATO troops and weapons was not a condition of 
membership the possibility of  this in the future was not precluded. Consequently, this made 
Russia's relations with the former Soviet republics bordering on these states critical, affecting 
primarily Ukraine and Belarus. Eastward expansion also raised the prospect of  the admission 
of  the Baltic states, with immediate implications of  the Russian enclave in the Baltic -
Kaliningrad. Finally it also generated a whole panoply of  psychological complexes about the 
'the advance of  a former enemy'. In February 1996, Russian first Deputy Defence Minister, 
A.Kokoshin, demonstrated the prevalence of  such attitudes amongst the military elite. 
Addressing a meeting of  defence experts in Munich he charged that NATO's expansion 
would be in violation of  the obvious obligations of  the West not to expand NATO after the 
dissolution ofthe Warsaw Pact and the USSR's consent to German unification.  Describing it 
as 'an historical injustice', Kokoshin said 'We have retreated to the east and NATO is 
advancing in the same direction, pushing us further and further east.'  415 
The eastward advance of  NATO was  viewed in by some Russia as the West's attempt to 
drive Russia from the European continent. An article in the more mainstream newspaper, 
Moscow News in October 1994 belied such views.  In the article, O.Pushkov claimed that if 
NATO expansion occurred, then it would have to be admitted that Russia's age old 
endeavour to establish itself as a European state had not succeeded. Pushkov viewed the 
decade between 1985 and 1995 as a period when Russia attempted to become part of  Europe 
by renouncing military instruments of  conducting policy and sharply curtailing its 
geostrategic presence on the continent by granting independence to the Baltic countries and 
the Western republics of  Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. He concluded that Russia's 
attempts to become part of  Europe through geopolitical self disarmament had failed.416 
Even without the expansion of  NATO, Russia's geopolitical position had been significantly 
weakened. Since 1991 it has lost much of  the territory for which it had fought for centuries.!t 
has lost its warm water ports in the West and relies on St Petersburg, which is not a natural 
harbour, Kaliningrad, and the ice bound ports of  Murmansk and Arkhangel. Its retreat from 
414 The Guardian  28 September 1995 
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153 the Baltic and Black Sea has effectively pushed Russia away from Europe and back into the 
Eurasian heartland. 4  17 
Russian opposition to the expansion of  NATO was  largely unanimous.418  Opposition was 
centred around the belief that expansion would result in a new division of  Europe. Kozyrev 
warned in November 1994 that it carried 'a serious danger of  destabilization in Europe' .419 In 
worst case scenarios, Western analysts warned that 
.. , the principle of  NATO expansion, once established will ultimately lead to 
alliance membership for the Baltic states and Ukraine, the isolation of  Russia, the 
cutting off  of  millions of  ethnic Russians on the far side of  the geopolitical 
frontier and the collapse of  Russian influence throughout the former Soviet 
Union'.42o 
Reiterating the military's position, General Lebed warned that an enlarged NATO would 
clearly be more powerful than Russia. Russian military thinking would have to reflect that 
and expansion would clearly necessitate greater investment in the military.421 
Commander in Chief  of  Russia's Armed Forces, Col. General V. Semenov,  also predicted 
that the East European countries and the Baltic states would eventually join NATO. This 
would bring the military structures of  the North Atlantic Alliance to Russian borders, for 
which Russia needed to be prepared. He added that the Russian military leadership was 
particularly wary that CIS countries would receive membership in NATO.422 
Russia reacted in three main ways to the proposed expansion of  NATO. Firstly, it actively 
sought to promote the CSCE (OSCE) as the pan-European security organization, within 
which Russia would have equitable influence with the other main powers. This tactic was 
417 Sakwa  1993 p293 
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422 OMRI Daily Digest 3 January 1996.  Along with the threat of  NATO expansion, 
Semenov identified the greatest threat to Russia as coming from the possible spread ofIslamic 
fundamentalism from the South and the South East. He also called for the strengthening of 
ties with Russia's' great southern neighbour - China'. 
154 largely unsuccessful. Secondly, it  sought to delay the admission of  the East European states 
by obstructing debate on the issue. This was only partially successful, since in spite of 
Russia's objections, a  key document addressing  the objectives of  NATO enlargement was 
presented in September 1995. Thirdly, it  sought to underline and strengthen relations within 
the CIS and with strategic allies, notably Belarus and Ukraine.423 This latter aspect of 
Russia's policy is considered below. 
Implications o/NATO Expansion/or Ukraine and Belarus 
The  eastward expansion of  NATO reinforced the strategic importance of  Ukraine and 
Belarus for Russia. The prospect of an enlarged NATO including Slovakia, Hungary and 
Poland, all of  which share borders with Ukraine and/or Belarus, and the possible inclusion of 
the Baltic states, strengthened the perception in Moscow of  the necessity for 'buffer states' 
between Russia and the enlarged NATO. A.  Arbatov, a deputy in the Russian Duma, 
outlined the basis of  Russia's NATO strategy and stressed that given the current security 
vacuum in East-Central Europe, the Western republics of  the fonner  USSR must be a 
fulcrum of  Moscow's new security strategy. This region was important for Russia since for 
'many centuries these countries served as a bridgehead for Western aggression against Russia 
or Russian aggression against the West, and their borders have been endlessly drawn and 
redrawn.  He concluded that, 
The greatest task of  the post-Cold War Europe is to reconcile the desire of  the 
states of  Central Europe to join NATO with the legitimate security interests of 
Russia and other post-Soviet states, to avoid the mightiest military alliance in the 
world coming to their borders without any prospects of  joining it in the near 
future. 424 
The proposed expansion ofNA  TO to the Western borders of  the CIS was an incentive for 
Moscow to pursue close relations with Ukraine and Belarus. In the latter's case, the state's 
leadership proved to be relatively compliant to Russia's vision and demands. Evidently this 
was due to the general pro-Russian orientation of  the leadership but was also related to 
Belarus's concept of  its own security which was seen as inherently and historically linked to 
423 In 1995, Pavel Fel'dengauer writing in Segodnya concluded 'NATO's expansion 
eastward is making Russia look around hurriedly for at least some kind of strategic allies'. 
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155 Russia's and which prevented it from conceiving of and presenting itself as a 'European 
state' .425 
In contrast, since independence, Ukraine's leaders worked actively to be seen  and gain 
acceptance as a 'European state'. In being closely aligned to Europe, Ukraine could then 
distance itself more (though clearly not completely) from Russia. The election of  the more 
pro-Russian, L. Kuchma as President in July 1994 did not lead to a reversal of  the previous 
strategy but resulted in a reevaluation of  relations with Russia and Ukraine's place in Europe.· 
If  Kravchuk had envisaged that NATO membership might one day be an option for Ukraine, 
by 1994 it was clear that Europe's leaders did not consider this likely. A supporter of 
NATO's east ward expansion, the German Defence Minister, Volker Ruehe, outlined 
possible future members - ' ... the Visegrad states to be the first and primary candidates for 
membership in the EU and NATO' and urged 'extensive co-operation with those partners 
who do not have a prospect of  joining NATO - primarily Russia and Ukraine'.  426  This view 
was reinforced by the German Foreign Minister, Kinkel not a supporter of  wide expansion, 
who warned that 'a network of  political and economic relationships of  graduated intensity 
must be constructed to reach out to states such as Russia and Ukraine that would never be 
considered members of  the EU'.  427 
Reluctant to place itself or be placed directly in the Russian 'sphere of  influence' but 
effectively  excluded from the West's protective umbrella, in 1994 and 1995 Ukraine became 
acutely aware of its strategic position between East and West and Russia's growing 
perception of it as a crucial buffer state.  In late 1994, Kuchma expressed concern that 
Ukraine might become a cordon sanitaire if  NATO were to expand too soon.428 V. Mukhin, 
Head of  Ukraine's Parliamentary Defence and State Security Committee, warned that if 
'Ukraine abandons its neutral status, it will inevitably lose its sovereignty.'429  Stemming 
from this, Ukraine's opposition to NATO's  eastward expansion  to an extent followed the 
425 Umbach, F., Back to the Future? Belarus and its Security Policy in the Shadow o/Russia 
Berichte des Bundesinstituts fur ostwissenschaftliche und internationale studien 1992; 
426 Mihalka, M., 'Eastern and Central Europe's Great divide over Membership in NATO' 
Transition Vol 1 NoI4 11  August 1995 p48 ff 
427 ibid. Note, membership of  NATO and the EU  was expected to occur simultaneously. 
428 ibid 
429 SWB SU/2425 D/2  4  October 1995 
156 Russian line - emphasizing the divisive nature of  enlargement and expressing preference for 'a 
new concept of European security'. This was made clear by Ukraine's First Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Boris Tarasyuk, who warned that 'if  NATO expands to include the countries on 
our Western borders, Ukraine would become a buffer state between NATO and the countries 
in the 1992 Tashkent agreement'.430 
A similar point was emphasised by Ukraine's Foreign Minister, H.Udovenko, to Russia's 
new Foreign Minister, Y. Primakov, when he visited Kiev at the end of  January 1996.431 
Ukraine's leaders also sought to remind the leaders of  East European states of  the 
implications of  NATO expansion for Ukraine. For example, in October 1995, O. Moroz, 
Chainnan of  Ukraine's Supreme Council, warned Poland over its bid to join NATO, urging it 
to take into account Ukraine's interests and called on Poland to consider Ukraine's objections 
to playing the role ofa buffer zone between NATO and other blocs.432 The leaders of  the 
Vise grad states (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia)  reacted cautiously to 
Ukraine's entreaties since Ukraine, and to a lesser extent Belarus provide them with the very 
cordon san  ita  ire in the East that they have traditionally found themselves in and a role that 
they no longer want to play for the countries further westward.433 
Ukraine's position on NATO expansion began to alter somewhat by summer 1995 and 
President Kuchma  indicated that evolutionary expansion of  NATO could be possible. 
Speaking in Riga in May 1995 he said that 'the process of NATO enlargement  is underway 
and it is impossible to stop it'. He also added that 'NATO's doors should not be closed to 
anybody' - an indication that Ukraine would  consider again the prospect of  one day being 
admitted to NATO.434 This would have obvious strategic and security implications for 
Russia. 
Ukraine's strategic position and consequently its importance for Russia is underlined by 
historical developments. In Tsarist and Soviet times, Ukraine, as the largest (demographically 
430 Jung, M  'A New Concept of  European Security  - Interview with B.Tarasyuk, first 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Ukraine'  Transition Vol 1 No 13  28 July 1995 p18 ff 
431 Kommersant Daily 2 February 1996 p5 
432 SWB SUI 242904 9 October 1995 
433 Wetting 1994 p463- 481 
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157 and territorially) Western  province of  the empire and republic of  the union, was Russia's 
bridgehead to Europe. Suzerainty  over Ukraine allowed Russia to claim its status as a 
'European State'. Stephen Blank considers that 
Historically it was acquiring Ukraine that integrated Russia into Europe both 
politically and culturally. But it was that acquisition that confirmed and 
necessitated an autocratic and imperial Russia under both Tsars and Soviets ..... 
Today again Ukraine is Russia's true window on Europe and can either separate 
Europe and Russia or  act as a medium of  East West exchange'.435 
From an historical perspective then, control over Ukraine defined Russia as an imperial 
power and from a contemporary perspective, it was in its relations with Ukraine that 
evidence could be found of  how far Russia had moved away from the imperialist path / 
mentality. Russia's security dilemmas, associated with the proposed eastward expansion of 
NATO, forced a reevaluation of  relations with Ukraine. Many Russian political and military 
elites failed to adjust psychologically to the loss of  Ukraine  and viewed its independence as 
only temporary. Hence it was predicted that if  NATO were to expand,  Russia would 
certainly become less tolerant of  Ukraine's independent stance within the CIS and would put 
pressure on it to at least reaffirm its neutrality or to integrate militarily and politically with 
the rest of  the CIS in order to more effectively balance NATO.436  'Pressurizing' Ukraine in 
its vulnerable areas: oil and gas supplies, the Black Sea Fleet  and the Crimean question were 
key ways in which Russia sought to 'influence' Ukraine  and were seen as indicative of  latent 
neo-imperialist tendencies in its relations with Ukraine.437 
Belarus's attitude towards NATO enlargement also essentially followed the Russian line. 
Commenting on the pursuit of  NATO membership by the nations of  East Central Europe, 
Belarusian President, A. Lukashenka, warned that it  was 'creating an imbalance of  forces in 
Europe likely to lead to military confrontation'. Lukashenka outlined what he viewed as 
Belarus' security choices. 
435 Blank, S  'Russia, Ukraine and European Security 1991-1993' European Security  Vol 3 
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158 Militarily  and politically, Belarus has two options: either we protect our 
national assets with Russia or we make the republic a corridor for the passage of 
giant military formations.438 
Deputy Foreign minister of  Belarus, A.  Samikov also stressed that Belarus did not believe 
that NATO expansion was necessary and would create a huge imbalance of  force between 
NATO and the CIS.439 
The degree to which Belarus had now placed itself within the Russian sphere of  influence was 
shown by the acceptance of  Russian border guards to patrol Belarus' borders. Significantly, 
three days after Poland's President had declared that no foreign state could influence Poland's 
wish to join NATO, Yeltsin signed an agreement with Belarus, permitting Russian troops to 
patrol Belarus' three external borders with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Following the 
agreement, the Head of  Russia's border guards proudly declared that with this agreement 
Russia had pushed its military border 384 miles to the West of its'  administrative border'.  440 
Another agreement, reached in February 1994 gave Russia use of  two radars that were part of 
the Soviet ballistic missile early warning systems, airfields and bases for 30,000 Russian 
troops.441 Moscow also acquired military bases in Belarus with an agreement to lease the 
Baranovichi and Vikeyka bases for twenty five years.442  The isolation ofKaliningrad from 
Russia proper also emphasized Belarus' strategic importance to Russia. To overcome 
Kaliningrad's separation from Russia and the unsatisfactory transit arrangements through 
Lithuania, Russia  proposed building a 'Kaliningrad highway' - a vitally important road link 
between Belarus and Kaliningrad.443 
Unlike Ukraine, Belarus did not pose a critical security dilemma for Russia.  Belarus' 
compliance with Russian needs was assumed as given, as statements on the deployment of 
nuclear weapons in the event of  NATO expansion show. In a updated, draft version of 
Russia's Defence Doctrine published in September 1995, defence analysts concluded that 
since Russia no longer had the money to maintain its army at its current levels, it would be 
necessary to eliminate the adversary's superiority wherever they could: in the Western 
438 Mihalka 1995 p48 ff 
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159 theatre of military operations (the Polish border and the Baltic Sea; in the North (the 
Norwegian border and the Barents sea); the South (the Black Sea and Russian military bases 
in Crimea, Abkhazia, Georgia and Armenia). The  report emphasized that tactical nuclear 
weapons would be deployed everywhere. The deployment of  tactical nuclear weapons in 
Belarus was seen as a key element of  military cooperation with that state. Weapons would be 
deployed in Kaliningrad and on Baltic Fleet ships as well. The draft defence doctrine also 
stated that if  NATO decided to admit the Baltic states as members, then Russia's armed 
forces would be immediately sent into the three Baltic states.444 A.Surikov of  the Russian 
Institute of  Defence Research, warned that Russia might deploy tactical nuclear weapons on 
its border with Poland and in the southern regions to counter balance NATO's expansion  to 
Poland,the Czech republic and Hungary.445 Belarus' president, A. Lukashenka, indicated the 
state's acceptance of  this by announcing in early 1996 that Belarus could be forced to 
redeploy nuclear weapons on its territory ifNA  TO expanded. 446 
Taking military cooperation between Belarus and Russia further, Russian media reported that 
in the event of  NATO expansion, the General Staff had proposed a military and political 
union with Belarus and the deployment of  Russian troops along its borders with Lithuania 
and Poland.447  Similar sentiments had been expressed in 1993  by Y. Primakov, then head of 
foreign intelligence, when he suggested that 
This expansion would bring the biggest military grouping in the world, with its 
colossal offensive potential, directly to the borders of  Russia. If this happens, the 
need would arise for a fundamental reappraisal of  all defence concepts on our 
side, a redeployment of  armed forces and changes in operational plans.448 
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160 The prospect of a new political-military union between Russia and Belarus would have 
serious implications for Belarusian statehood, resulting in the possible loss of sovereignty. 449 
In Ukraine, where a strong sense of  national identity  sustained national independence since 
1991, the loss of  partial sovereignty could not be ruled out, especially if  NATO's expansion 
continued. In the Ukrainian case, the leadership was less likely to submit (willingly) to 
Russian pressure for political and military union but could ultimately have been forced into it 
by its difficult geostrategic position and political and economic instability. 
NATO's proposed east ward expansion  forced a reevaluation of  national and regional 
security in Russia, the result of  which was increased efforts by Russia to strengthen the CIS, 
not only as an economic union but as a political-military union and to actively promote the 
concept of  collective security in the region. The formation of  a military-political union 
between Russia and compliant states such as Belarus was seen as one way of  organizing 
collective security to prevent and/or resist the east ward expansion of  NATO. In the early 
years of  its existence (1991-1993) the CIS members states were largely concerned with 
fmding and establishing suitable mechanisms for economic cooperation. As outlined in 
chapter five, inspite of  a willingness on the part of  most member states for economic 
cooperation, many of  the agreements arrived at failed to reach the implementation stage. 
Endeavours to reach agreement on security matters came to fruition in the Agreement on 
Collective Security signed in Tashkent in 1992. Like many economic agreements the level of 
cooperation envisaged in this agreement was slow to materialize. However the threat of 
NATO's east ward expansion resulted in renewed action on the part of  Russia to reinvigorate 
this organ of  Collective Security. 
449 Parrish, S 'Russia Contemplates the Risk of Expansion' Transition 15 December 1995 
pI1  argued that if  NATO expanded Russia would be all the more likely to take seriously 
Belarus' demands for integration. If  Poland joined NATO then Russia would certainly want 
to position additional forces in Belarus. Military integration with Belarus would also relieve 
the isolation of  Kalin  in  grad oblast. Ultimately, NATO's expansion could have grave 
implication for Belarus' sovereignty since it could mean Belarus would effectively surrender 
its political sovereignty to Russia, an outcome the West would prefer to avoid. 
161 Regional Security Policy 
Russia's active promotion of  the 1992 Agreement on Collective Security fonned a crucial 
component of  its overall regional security policy which emerged since late 1992 and which 
was given added impetus with NATO's proposed  enlargement. 
Essentially this security policy consisted of  three main aims: 
1.  to prevent the further destabilization of  the region and the spread of  possible conflicts 
to Russia's borders and beyond. In this context Russia carved out a role for itself as 
regional peace keeper or 'regional gendanne'. 
II.  to prevent other regional powers or neighbours from gaining a strong foothold in the 
region. Russia sought to control economic developments and security in the region. 
III.  to attain international recognition of  the area of  the 'Near Abroad' as a Russian 'sphere 
of  influence' and to administer the region as such, preferably through a multilateral 
organization like the CIS. 
Russia's policy toward the 'Near Abroad' was governed by the belief  that this area was vital 
to Russia's security and possible future developments there could threaten Russia's security. 
Therefore policy toward the 'Near Abroad' was therefore structured around two poles: 
control and containment  .. Russia sought to control political, economic and military 
developments in the region and to contain the influence of external forces and the expansionist 
policies of regional neighbours and international organizations such as NATO. 
Controlling  and Containing Regional Instability 
In the transitional period, and beyond into the phase of  economic recovery and regeneration, 
it was not advantageous for Russia to be surrounded by weak and unstable neighbours. 
Regional instability could have a number of  implications for Russia including: 
• unprecedented migration to Russia of  refugees from regional trouble spots; 
• diversion of  Russian resources, vital for economic recovery away from domestic 
requirements and towards extensive peacekeeping measures in the FSU; 
• the risk of  the spread of  ethnic conflict to Russia's own borders threatening Russia's 
own security; 
l62 • political and economic destabilization of  Russia itself; 
• the possibility of  the emergence of regimes hostile to Russia in the neighbouring 
republics, supported by other external influences; 
• arms and nuclear weapons proliferation; 
• regional anarchy  as weak states are no longer able to sustain independence. 
With the collapse of  the Soviet Union and the emergence of 15 independent states, a security 
vacuum emerged in the area of  the FSU. Initially it was perceived that this vacuum would be 
filled by international organizations such as the CSCE  and the UN. However by early 1992, 
it was clear that Western organizations had neither the will nor the resources for engagement 
in the FSU. The West's concern however about the security vacuum in the region permitted it 
to tolerate, as ifby proxy, Russia's emergence as the guarantor of security in the region. 
Russia quickly assumed the role of 'regional gendarme', engaging in so called peacekeeping 
missions  in the Caucasus (Georgia, and Russia's own breakaway republic ofChechnya), 
Moldova and Tajikistan. The very nature of  these peacekeeping missions, in addition to 
Russia's  Military Doctrine which was developed in 1993, suggested that Russia was engaged 
in a new military imperialism under the peacekeeping guise. The Russian response to these 
objections was to cite the example of  former Yugoslavia to show the importance of 
peacekeeping, particularly along the Tajik-Afghan border.45o 
The actions of  the Russian military in  Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan gave rise to 
accusations of  resurgent military imperialism. In Georgia, the Russian military acted (by 
covert support for the Abkhaz rebels) to destabilize the Georgian polity to the point where it 
would be forced to seek Russian assistance. In August 1993, growing military weakness and 
near economic collapse caused by the civil war forced a reluctant Eduard Shevardnadze, the 
republic's President, to hand over control of  Abkhazia to Russian peace keepers. By 
December 1993, Russian troops were guarding the railways in defence of  the Georgian 
government and in exchange received permission to run five  military bases including three 
Black sea portS.451  Thus Russia secured bases in the B  lack Sea from which it could control 
the Caucasus and secure a buffer zone against NATO in Turkey. Russia's neo imperialist 
ambitions were recognized by Shevardnadze, who warned after the fall of  the port of 
450 Jonson, L.,& Archer, c., Peacekeeping and the Role of  Russia in Eurasia Boulder, 
Colorado;Westview 1996; Financial Times  2 December 1993 
451  ibid 
163 Sukhumi in September 1993 that 'nobody should doubt that the mentality and reflexes of 
Russian imperialism are not dead'  .452 
Russia's strategy of  securing military bases in Georgia and in particular the B lack Sea ports 
coincided with its turbulent negotiations with Ukraine (still under the leadership ofL. 
Kravchuk) over the Black Sea Fleet. Its search for alternative Black sea ports reflected fears at 
that time that it could lose its Black Sea bases in Ukraine. 
In late 1992 Yeltsin first introduced the idea of setting up military bases on the territory of 
the FSU. The new Russian Military Doctrine, which had been approved by the Security 
Council gave the creation of  military bases a legal status and raised it to the level of  state 
policy.453 In April 1994 Yeltsin  signed a new directive ordering Russian foreign and defence 
ministries to continue to work on the establishment, through bilateral agreements, of  military 
bases or military facilities on the territory of  other CIS states. Unknown sources claimed that 
the directive was part of  a plan aimed at allowing Russia to form a zone of  stability on its 
borders and to protect more effectively Russia's interests in the 'Near Abroad'.454 Members 
of  the policy making elite presented the policy of  acquiring military bases in different ways. 
Russia's Foreign Minister, A. Kozyrev, viewed it as a requirement of  the security vacuum, 
which could be filled by other powers. Defence Minister, P. Grachev,rationalized it in 
functional terms saying 
The need for military installations outside Russia's territory is determined by 
their function (eg.early warning radar stations) and, in other cases, by their 
technical uniqueness and the impossibility  of  creating an equivalent  replacement 
on Russian territory in the near future. 
v. Yelagin, Deputy Head at the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, provided more explicit 
aims, including, the need to protect the Russian population in the CIS; the need to defend the 
external borders of  the CIS and the need to defend Russian economic interests in those 
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164 countries.455  Clearly then, Russian troops stationed in military bases in the CIS would serve 
the strategic interests of  the Russian state and could be mobilized quickly to expel threats to 
Russia and Russian interests arising from within or outwith these states. 
Acquiring or retaining military bases in the area of  the FSU was a key way in which Russia 
sought to increase its military influence in the region. These were either been ceded willingly 
as in Belarus, or as the result of  the virtual forced submission of  the state, as in Georgia. In 
May 1995 Russia and Armenia signed the first ever agreement establishing Russian bases on 
the territory of  another state, with a twenty five year agreement on Russian military bases 
with facilities in Gyumri and Yerevan, where Soviet military installations had previously been 
located. This was followed in September 1995 with the agreement between Russia and 
Georgia to  permit Russia to operate five  military bases for twenty five years. This meant 
that  six years after the dissolution of  the USSR, Russia had maintained or reestablished a 
significant military presence in almost every part of  the FSU except the Baltic states.456 
Strategic concerns also shaped Russia' policy towards Moldova and the break away pro 
Russian Dniester Republic (DNR) which first declared its secession from Moldova in 
September 1990.  Russia's policy here was shaped by the plight of  the 112 million ethnic 
Russians in the Transdniester region who  pledged their loyalty to Moscow. But more than 
than this, Moldova remained important to Moscow as a means to control regional security. 
The former Commander in Chief of  Russia's 14th Army, stationed in Moldova, underlined 
the importance of  the Dniester region as 'the key to the Balkans' and the consequences of 
Russian withdrawal from the region  would mean that Russia would 'lose that key together 
with its influence in the region'.457 The  instability of  the Balkans area, the risk ofa sudden 
reignition of  conflict and the region's historical tendency towards instability and conflict gave 
Russia a powerful incentive to retain its interests in Moldova and contain the possible spread 
of  conflict to Russia itself.  In addition the Russian presence in Moldova acted as another 
possible bulwark against the eastward expansion of  NATO. 
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l65 In Tajikistan Russian soldiers acted as peace keepers in the tribal warfare which raged there 
since 1991. In effect Russia helped to prop up the Tajik state and government, in the 
knowledge that civil breakdown in Tajikistan could lead to its penetration by extremists, with 
the risk of  spreading to Russia. 458 
Russia's growing concerns with regional security were accompanied by a more active policy 
of  seeking Western approval and sanction for peacekeeping missions by Russian troops in 
the CIS. Active pursuit of  this came first began in February 1993, when in an address to 
members of  the Civic Union coalition, Yeltsin announced that 'the time has come for 
authoritative international organizations, including the United Nations to grant Russia special 
powers as guarantor of  peace and stability in this region'.459 
Similar sentiments were expressed in a document presented to the UN and to CIS leaders in 
March 1993. Throughout 1993, both  Western and CIS leaders were reluctant to accede to 
Russia's request. It  was only in December 1994, at the CSCE summit that the decision was 
taken to enhance Moscow's mediation of  a settlement in Nagorno Karabakh, marking the first 
stage of  Russia's legitimation as regional peace keeper and signalling the West's desire to see 
stability in the region. 
Russia was also able to effect its control in the region by seeking to bringing all of  the ex-
republics (with the exception of  the Baltic states) under its influence once again. While this 
aim was not made explicit as a official policy objective, Russia's actions in the region 
indicated that this was indeed the case. In certain circumstances this appeared to be a strategy 
of  destabilization, effectively forcing reluctant states into compliance. One form this took was 
the application by official agencies of  economic pressure, such as withholding vital oil and gas 
supplies as in Ukraine. Another variant was inciting the local Russian popUlation as 
458 The Russian foreign Minister insisted that Russian troops were needed in Tajikistan to 
protect the 200,000 Russians in Tajikistan and prevent the rebels based in Afghanistan from 
spreading Islamic extremism into its southern flank.  Financial Times  2 December 1993 
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166 evidenced in Ukraine and Moldova.460  It also took the form of  covert support for 
opposition forces as in Georgia  and attempts to topple regimes displeasing to Russia, as in 
Azerbaijan. The strategy of  containment was effected through demands for a Russian role in 
the economic alliances of  other states such as the 'Deal of  the Century' reached over oil 
resources in the Caspian sea and the use of  Russian forces as in Tajikistan to enforce peace 
and to contain the spread of  conflict and Islamic extremism. 
Russia's actions in the Caucasus region have led many to believe that an active policy of 
'destabilization' has been pursued there. For example, T.  Gotz  concluded that 
... Russian policy appears to be based on the tacit threat of  dismemberment of 
those states that wish to leave Moscow's orbit. That is effected by promoting 
the concept of  self  determination of local minorities at the expense of  the 
territorial integrity of  existing states.461 
In the case of  Georgia, P. Kolstoe argues that Russia directly encouraged secessionist 
sentiments in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the clear cut aim of  taking control over 
these areas and incorporating them into the Russia republic. 462 
Generally Russia's destabilizing policies were most evident in those states which hesitated 
over acceding to the CIS (Azerbaijan and Georgia had not ratified the CIS treaty) or  sought to 
minimize the role of  the CIS and Russia's influence within it (Ukraine). Gotz observes that 
either the Russian military command had lost control of  its own forces or had been 
encouraging these same forces to destabilize countries like Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine-
states which had refused to participate in its publicly announced, reestablished zone of 
influence. Gotz also cites evidence for Russian support for the Abkhaz separatists in Georgia 
as part of  a Russia's geostrategic  plan. He relates a conversation with a Russian military 
commander who said that the Abkhazian coastline would make a fine replacement for 
460 As Ukraine sank further into economic crisis in 1993, Russia was increasingly accused of 
pursing 'destabilizing policies' . For example, M. K  ykhalchenko,  Kravchuk's chief political 
advisor said  'It is absolutely clear what Russia's tactics are. It wants to force Ukraine to 
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167 territory lost to Moscow when Ukraine became an independent state in 1991. Gotz surmised 
that the Russian military very clearly regarded the entire littoral as being part of  their 
legitimate strategic interests. 463 
Since 1991 then Russia has sought to protect its interests in the region via its dual strategy of 
control and containment. Ultimately the creation of  a military and political union in the area 
of  the FSU was envisaged. While the Tashkent agreement (1992) provided the basis for this, 
its effectuation was given added impetus by the proposed enlargement of  NATO. Russian 
political and military elites responded to NATO's proposed expansion with warnings about 
the creation of  a military -political alliance, which would herald the return of  security 'blocs' 
in Europe.464 An indication of  the fresh priority  given to security issues was seen in 
meetings of  the CIS leaders. For example, at the meeting of  CIS Foreign Ministers, held in 
Moscow on January 12 1996, security issues rather than economic issues dominated the 
discussion.465 At the Heads of  State meeting a week later, Yeltsin called for tighter 
coordination of  defence and foreign policies within the CIS, arguing that it was only 
collectively that they could solve their security problems.  466 
The security dilemmas associated with NATO proposed expansion, as well as growing 
instability on Russia's borders resulted in a refocussing of  Russia' s attention on the area and 
its designation as a 'zone of  vital interests' for Russia. In September 1995, the Russian 
President issued a decree identifying the CIS as a 'priority area'. The decree stated that 
Russia's goal was the 'creation of  an integrated political and economic community of  states 
which can aspire to a respected position in the world'. The decree identified the CIS as a 
'priority area' for Russia because of 'important vital interests' in the area of  security, 
economics, and the defence of  Russians living abroad'. It called for closer economic ties and 
underlined the importance of  forming a military alliance in order to create an effective 
463 Gotz 1996 p 108 
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168 'collective defence' system.467 Significantly, the decree stipulated that Russian economic, 
political and military support for other CIS states would be conditional on their willingness 
to accept the Russian vision of  CIS integration, suggesting that there would be preferential 
treatment for those republics willing to follow Moscow's lead and a harsher stance to those 
that objected.468 (In the context of  Russia's destabilizing policies in the region, this was a 
strategy which had been followed from 1993 anyway.) The decree also urged that former 
Soviet military infrastructure should be maintained in the non Russian states of  the CIS 
through bilateral agreements. It  called for more vigorous steps to unify the CIS states' border 
control regimes and emphasized that all states should honour their pledge to refrain from 
joining  any military alliances or blocs aimed at any other member of  the Commonwealth.469 
The decree marked a renewal of  Russia's commitment to regional cooperation in the FSU, 
especially in the sphere of  security.  One of  the first stages in the construction of  a collective 
security system was reached soon after, in  November 1995, when CIS Defence ministers 
concluded an agreement on a Joint Air Defence System. Through this agreement, Russia 
would finance the upgrading of  air defence facilities in Georgia, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, 
Armenia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 
refused to participate in the air defence system.470 
Economic imperatives of  Control and Containment (Geoeconomics) 
In applying Noreen and Watson's paradigm for Russia's relations with the former Soviet 
republics, we can see that Ukraine and Belarus were important to Russia for economic as well 
as for military and security reasons, as well as the significant numbers of  ethnic Russians on 
their territory (22.1 % and 13.4% respectively). Belarus' modern industries (mostly 
developed in the post war years) including transport and agriculture machinery, precision 
tools, television and radio assembly plants and oil and gas equipment, remained important for 
the Russian economy. In the short term the unreformed Belarusian economy was less 
attractive to Russia and helps explain the hesitancy among Russia's leaders for the economic 
union actively pursued by Belarus. However  in the long term, both the Ukrainian and 
Belarusian economies are important for Russia both because of  their proximity as regional 
467 OMRI Daily  Digest 18 September 1995 
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169 neighbours and the large number of  Russian speakers there. Reformed economies in these two 
states would be assets in  Russia's regional market., both as a destination for Russian 
products and a supplier of  goods for Russia. Important oil and gas pipelines transversing 
these states  also gave Russia legitimate economic interests there while providing Ukraine and 
Belarus' leaders with powerful bargaining tools.471 
More economically important for Russia are the energy rich states of  the FSU and it was here 
that Russia's economic concerns were at their most active. The strategy of  control and 
containment, evident in Russia's regional security policies, also underpinned its regional 
economic policy. This was a strategy of  controlling economic developments in region so that 
they did not exclude and were indeed advantageous to Russia and containing the influence of 
other external forces (e.g.other states or multinational corporations) which could benefit from 
economic relations to the exclusion of  Russia. 
This strategy was most clearly applied in Russia's relations with the oil rich state of 
Azerbaijan. In September 1994, Azerbaijan signed the so called 'Deal of  the Century' with  a 
consortium of  eight Western oil companies to develop three oil fields with an estimated 
reserve of  four million barrels.472 The deal brought immediate objections from Russia, with a 
Foreign Ministry spokesman saying that Russia did not recognize the legitimacy of  the deal, 
arguing that it contravened valid Soviet-Iranian agreements from 1920 and 1941 which barred 
any foreign firms from exploiting Caspian mineral resources. 
Russia's objections came from a desire to control Azerbaijan's exports and to prevent any 
other forces  from doing so. Russia's potential reaction to the latter was indicated in an 
unimplemented, secret Presidential directive 'On protecting the interests of  the Russian 
Federation in the Caspian Sea' which spoke of  imposing economic sanctions against Baku if 
implementation of  the oil project should begin. Foreign Minister, Kozyrev, also reportedly 
sent a letter to the Prime Minister, stressing the importance of  Russia retaining control of 
Azerbaijan's oil and proposing measures 'of  a commercial, economic and financial nature that 
471 Kommersant  No 48 24 December 1996  p12 
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170 could impel that country to respect Russia's interests and provisions of international law.' 4  73 
The Foreign Ministry's position was further underlined  statements by Foreign Intelligence 
chief, Primakov, to the effect that the oil contract posed a threat to Russia's national security 
interests. 474 
One of  Russia's main objections was the prospect of  a new pipeline being built which would 
bypass Russia and go from the Caspian Sea at Baku across Georgia to the Black sea port of 
Supsa - in effect breaking Moscow's stranglehold on the pipelines. Russia on the other hand 
wanted the oil to be piped through the Soviet Druzhba pipeline which ran through Chechnya 
and the Northern Caucasus to the Russian port of  Novorossiisk.475  Almost a year after the 
initial agreement, the consortium announced the initial  export routes for Azerbaijan's oil. 
Two pipelines were to be used: from late 1996,4-5 million tons per year of  oil extracted from 
the Caspian Chirag field (the first of  the oil fields to be  exploited) would be exported 
simultaneously through two Black Sea ports - Novorossiisk in Russia and  another in 
Georgia.476 The announcement of  the proposed routes brought immediate objections from 
Moscow. 
The Russian aim of  controlling the pipelines carrying the new oil resources led to accusations 
of  a 'hidden Russian hand' at work in the region. For example, it was thought that Russian 
fears of  a new pipeline transversing the politically unstable Georgia, resulted in Russian 
sponsored attempts on Shevardnadze's life in the autumn of 1995. Russia has  been 
implicated in several coup attempts on the Azeri leadership, supporting the coup in 1993, 
which saw the replacement of  the more nationalist, A. Echibey  with  former Soviet Politburo 
member, G. Alieyev.477 Some even attribute the wars in the Caucasus to Russia's desire to 
control the region's vast oil resources. A common perception among Azeris is that Azeri-
Armenian war over the enclave ofNagorno Karabakh was orchestrated by Russia to make 
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171 sure it had access to Azeri oi1.478 Bremmer and Richter point out that  Russian support for 
the Annenian war effort, long implicit, was strengthened considerably almost immediately 
after Azerbaijan signed its first major  international oil deal, with the Russian and Armenian 
governments negotiating an agreement  to open Russian military bases  on Armenian territory. 
They also show how Russia also applied ethnic levers, fanning autonomist and secessionist 
tendencies among the Lezgins in northern Azerbaijan and the Talysh in the south.479 
The most recent war in the Caucasus - Russia's attempt to suppress Chechen independence, 
was also viewed by some as driven by the need to control the important oil pipeline running 
via the Northern Caucasus to Novorossiisk.48o  Bremmer and Richter observe that it is not 
coincidental that Russia's first incursion into Chechnya directly followed the crisis in 
Azerbaijan (the agreement on the exploitation of  oil resources had been reached in September 
1994). For them, the 'politics of  oil' explain Russia's intransigence and brutality in the 
Caucasus, since a compliant Chechnya was essential for Russian control of  Azerbaijani oi1.481 
At issue over Azerbaijan was not only the question of  who controlled the oil resources but 
also wider issues of  geopolitical importance. Azerbaijan is important to Russia  due to its 
strategic position on Eurasia's oil map where it is described as being in the centre of 'a vast 
oil bearing belt stretching from Tyumen to the Persian gulf and simultaneously providing the 
only possible  geographical alternative of  an outlet to the West (bypassing Russia) both for 
Chechnya,  with its oil refining capacities and for Central Asia with its energy resources'.  482 
Russians interests in the Caspian region and its oil  continued into the late 1990s. A 
manifesto issued by Russian foreign policy specialists warned that Russia must not stand by 
as the energy resources of  the Caspian are carved up in the interests of  the US and Europe.  483 
Such geopolitical imperatives made it essential for Russia to maintain and strengthen its 
influence in the region. This also helped to explain the application of  similar policies in 
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172 Kazakhstan where the American company Chevron, intended to develop the vast Tengiz oil 
field. Kazakhstan, like Azerbaijan succumbed to Russian pressure for the oil to be routed 
through Astrakhan to Novorossiisk.484 Unlike Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan had less room to 
manoeuvre under Russia demands. The large ethnic Russian minority and a Kazakh army 
staffed almost entirely by Russian officers, gave Russia a powerful means for applying 
pressure to enforce compliance.485 
Conclusion 
Since 1993 Russia has pursued more assertive policies in the 'Near Abroad'. This reflected 
the growing shift to the right in the domestic policy agenda, the development of  a clearer 
concept of  what Russia's interests in the region were and the emergence of  new strategic 
issues which  necessitated a more closely defined and actively pursed policy of  national and 
regional security. 
These policies were shaped by Russia's geopolitical concerns and the nature ofthese 
concerns (political, economic, security) meant that Russia pursued a range of  differing 
policies towards the states of  the region. In effect this meant that there was a hierarchy of 
relations with some states considered more important to and vital for Russia's national 
interests. These included states with large numbers of  ethnic Russians, states which were 
important economically and those states which were crucial for Russia's regional security. 
The range of  Russia's interests meant that most of  the ex-republics of  the FSU remain 
important in some way. 
Within this hierarchy of  relations, Russia's relations with Ukraine and Belarus were a 
priority. This is only partially  explained by the traditional historical and economic relations 
which existed between these three Slavic nations in Tsarist and Soviet times. In the post-
Soviet period, Ukraine and Belarus' continued importance to Russia stemmed from the 
altered geopo litical framework which resulted from the collapse of  the USSR in 1991 and 
specifically from the implications for Russian security ofNA  TO's eastward expansion. The 
presence of  large numbers of  ethnic Russians in Ukraine and its potential  economic recovery, 
484 LeVine, S., 'Oil dealer's row with Chevron threatens Caspian  project' 
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l73 the desire of  the Belarusian leadership to achieve closer union with Russia and the importance 
of using Belarus for access to Kaliningrad explained Russia's interests in these states. This 
interest  intensified after 1993 and NA  TO's proposed enlargement underlined the strategic 
importance of  these states for Russia as a crucial buffer zone. 
Russia's strategy of  Control and Containment formed the basis of  its policy toward the 'Near 
Abroad' and was applied to Belarus and Ukraine. However the degree to which Russia 
applied these policies differed given their contrasting attitudes towards relations with Russia  .. 
The evolution ofthese relations in the context of  changing economic and geopolitical 
circumstances is examined in the following chapter. 
174 Chapter 6  lVlaturation of Relations between Russia, and Ukraine and 
Belarus (1996 & 1997) 
By 1996, five years after the collapse of the USSR, the first phase of  post-Soviet 
consolidation was completed. One measurement of  this was the peaceful hand over of power 
which took place in the three states under investigation but which was generally characteristic 
of  most of  the CIS states (Georgia and Taj ikistan are obvious exceptions). 
In Ukraine and Belarus, elections for the post of president were held in summer 1994 and led· 
to the replacement of  those leaders who had brought their states to independence in 1991 
(Stanislav Shushkevich by Alexandr Lukashenka in Belarus and Leonid Kravchuk by Leonid 
Kuchma in Ukraine). Parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine in  spring and summer 
1994 and in Belarus in May 1995. In both cases low voter turnout necessitated further 
rounds of  voting and by elections were held long after the original polling day. In December 
1995 the Russian  electorate voted elected on a new legislature for the second time and in June 
and July 1996 elections for the presidency saw Yeltsin reconfirmed as the nation's leader. 
While many flaws could be found in the conduct of  the various election campaigns in these 
states, a form of  democracy, however crude, existed there. 
In earlier chapters I demonstrated how new forms of  cooperation among these three states 
was preferable for them. This derived largely from their economic and particularly trade 
relations though it was also clearly advantageous  from the perspective of regional 
cooperation. By 1996 a new phase was reached in relations between the states of  the Slavic 
triangle culminating in the agreement on the creation of  a Commonwealth of  Sovereign States 
(SSR) between Russia and Belarus (March-April 1996). Rapproachment with Ukraine which 
also began at this time was to result in the signing of the much disputed Treaty of  Friendship 
and Cooperation in May 1997. Spring 1996 can thus be seen as marking a critical juncture in 
the evolution of  relations between Russia, and Ukraine and Belarus. 
In March 1996  the union between Russia and Belarus, which the latter's leaders had actively 
pursued since 1992, was formalized with the creation of  the SSR.  A new agreement on the 
creation of  what Russia's leaders preferred to describe as the Russo-Belarusian Community 
was signed on 2 April. A few days later, on 3-4 April, Yeltsin was scheduled to travel to 
Kiev on his first official visit there, during which the frequently postponed Treaty of 
175 Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine would finally be signed. This would 
herald a new era in relations between these states, marking the resolution of  the difficult 
problems which had been the legacy of  the collapse of  the USSR and symbolizing the 
beginning of  normal, state to state relations.  In the event, the visit was cancelled due to the 
last minute failure to resolve outstanding differences regarding the Black Sea Fleet. 
When placed alongside the new Russian Belarusian Community, the cancellation of  the Kiev 
visit was in itself significant.  Belarus'  leaders were happy to enter into closer union with 
Russia even if  that entailed ceding a degree of  state sovereignty.  In contrast, Ukraine's 
leaders cautiously  guarded the state's sovereignty and did not allow a  grave economic 
situation to pressure them into closer relations with Russia. While on one level Ukraine's 
position  can be viewed as intransigent, Belarus can be seen as compliant. Ultimately the 
issue rested on state sovereignty which for U1aaine was non negotiable, while amongst 
Belarus' leaders,  sovereignty was viewed as a commodity which could be used to secure 
vitally important economic concessions from Russia as well as propping up their internal 
political position.  The reasons for these two very different perceptions are rooted deep in 
the history of  these states. 
This chapter investigates the processes which resulted in the Russo-Belarusian agreement on 
union and the Russo-Ukrainian Treaty of  Friendship and Cooperation.  It outlines the state 
of  relations between the Slavic nations of  the CIS at this critical juncture, analysing the 
reasons for the forms in which these relations  developed and  charts the possible direction of 
relations between these states in the future. 
SSR - The Russian-Belarusian Commonwealth 
The agreement on a new type of  union between Russia and Belarus was reached  on 2 April 
1996.  That the agreement was reached less than three months before the first round of  the 
Russian presidential elections was not coincidental.  Hitherto, Russia's leaders had favoured a 
cautious  response to the initiatives of  Belarus' political leaders  for closer union between the 
two states.  By the spring of 1996, it had become politically expedient for Russia's leaders to 
take the question of  union more seriously. While the communist and nationalist political 
parties and leaders could only tempt voters with promises that if brought to  power they 
would restore the former union in some form,  Yeltsin was able to seize the initiative by 
reaching abYfeement with Belarus and signalling to Russia's electorate that the creation of  a 
176 new union was underway. 486 
Two points are important  regarding the founding of  the Russian Belarusian Community. 
Firstly, it marked the culmination of  a process actively pursued by Belarus' leaders since 
1992. Closer union  with Russia was not solely the initiative of  Belarus' russophilic 
President, Alexandr Lukashenka, elected in July 1994, but had been sought also by his 
predecessor, Chairman of  Belarus , unreformed Supreme Soviet, Stanislav Shushkevich. 
Secondly, Russia's leaders only responded to Belarus' initiatives when union with this state 
would be beneficial for Russia. As long as Belarus' economy remained largely unreformed, 
close economic links between Belarus and Russia would prove to be too great an economic 
liability for the latter. By  spring 1996, with the Communists taking the lead in the opinion 
polls, the political gains which union with Belarus would bring began to outweigh the 
economic losses of  union even in the short term. 
These circumstances in which the Russian Belarusian Community was founded  led some 
observers to predict that the community would be stillborn.487  However shortly after its 
founding an executive set up under the terms of  the agreement began to meet on a monthly 
basis, with a new interstate parliamentary assembly also functioning. The Western press, also 
content to accept the view that Russia's union with Belarus marked a new phase of  Russian 
neo imperialism, missed the point that union had been sought  by Belarus' leaders for several 
years previously.  Both sides gained from the agreement.  Crucially for Belarus it tied Russia 
into a formal commitment, essentially ensuring Russian support for the floundering 
Belarusian economy. Only Belarus' small nationalist opposition  came to view it as  the 
reduction of  Belarus to a Russian vassal state. For the vast majority of  the population, union 
486 Reaching agreement on further integration prior to elections in Russia was a pattern 
which was repeated recently.  A new 'union treaty' was designed between Russia and 
Belarus on 8 December 1999, in advance of Russia's parliamentary elections.  ONfRl Daily 
Digest 9 December 1999 
487 Markus, 0., 'Toothless Treaty with Russia Sparks Controversy'  Transition  3 May 
1996 
l77 or as some would argue reunion  with Russia was a logical, desirable and inevitable step.488 
It is also worth noting that as a nation, the Belarusian people had not actively sought 
independence as other peoples of  the former USSR had, such as those of  the Baltic states. 
Even Belarus' nationalist opposition did not consider that national independence was on the 
agenda in 1990 when state sovereignty was declared.  Popular consciousness in Belarus had 
not yet reached the stage where a significant portion of  the population supported 
independence, as occurred even in Ukraine. In the referendum on preserving the union held in 
March 1991, 76.4% of  the Belarusian electorate  voted in favouring of  preserving the union. 
This corresponded to the all union average (76.4%).489  Four years later, 83% of  the 
electorate voted for union with Russia. The results of  the referendum of  May 1995 
demonstrated that even after four years of  independence concepts of  statehood and national 
consciousness had yet to become ingrained among the people in similar manner to that 
achieved in Ukraine.  One reason for this is the fact that in the period following independence, 
Ukraine's leaders focussed on consolidating Ukrainian statehood and fostering a deep sense of 
national consciousness.49o  This was perhaps easier to achieve in Ukraine, which had a longer 
488  Popular support for Lukashenka's policies was confirmed in two referenda. In the first 
of  these (May 1995) 82.4% ofthe electorate voted for economic integration with Russia 
while 75%  favoured the restoration of Soviet era symbols. In the second and most recent 
referendum on the introduction of  the new presidential constitution in November 1996, 
70.5% of  those voting chose Lukashenka's version, which vastly increased his powers at the 
expense of  the parliament. Success for L ukashenka on both these occasions was assured, in 
part at least, by  his almost complete monopoly of  the media as well as questionable electoral 
procedures. In the referendum of  November 1996 many polling stations were opened well in 
advance of  polling day (7 November) and large numbers of  uncounted and unaccounted for 
ballot papers were in circulation. Nevertheless, while growing numbers ofBelarusians took to 
the streets to protest at Lukashenka's actions, a significantly greater proportion of the 
population favoured his policies as shown by the election results and the outcome of  the 
referenda. see McMahon 'Alexandr Lukashenka - a Profile' in Journal o/Communist Studies 
and Transition Politics Vol  13 Dec 1997 No 4  p 129ff 
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[78 history of  striving for independence than Belarus. In contrast however Belarus' leaders 
appeared to have only a vague understanding of national consolidation and how to attain it. 
Independence had come as a shock to Belarus' political leaders and people. This 
unpreparedness, both physically and psychologically  was problematic for them. One way to 
over come this was to align the independent state to its larger, resource rich Russian 
neighbour. Hence the  creation of the Russo-Belarusian Community  in 1996 was the 
culmination of  an integrative process which had begun in 1992. The phases of  this process are 
outlined below. 
<>  Phase One 
The integrative  process began very soon after the USSR had collapsed.  In January 1992 
Russia and Belarus  signed an agreement  removing restrictions on economic activity. Trade 
and economic relations between the Russian Federation (RF) and the Republic of  Belarus 
(RE) were to be conducted within the framework  of  a single economic space on the basis of 
mutual benefit and the use of  a common monetary unit (the rouble) as a means of financial 
settlement.  Under the terms of  the agreement the governments of  each state would ensure the 
unimpeded transfer of  all types of  monetary assets and the Central Banks of  each state would 
keep each other informed about the amounts of  credit they would issue and about the state of 
monetary circulation. In the area of  mutual trade a coordinated export - import policy was to 
be followed with respect to goods and services of  vital importance for trade.491 
In July  1992 a further 21  agreements  were signed between government delegations from the 
RF and RE. These included 15 agreements concerned solely with economic issues,S 
regarding  military questions and two dealing with the division of  property.  492  Izvestia 
reported that at the meeting, the governments of  Russia and Belarus pledged to work on 
perfecting integrative processes within the framework of  the two states' common economic 
space.  Russia's then acting prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, for whom opposition to closer 
economic ties was to become an issue in his resignation in January 1994,  said at the time that 
the agreements were undoubtedly effective, serving to restore the single economic space that 
used to exist between the two republics.493 
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[79 In the press at that time, Andranik Migranyan, a member of  the Presidential Council, 
articulated Russian impressions of the Belarusian state and how relations with it should 
advance.  For example in an article in A1egapolis Express in October 1992, Migranyan 
described the prevailing tendency of  the Belarusian people to preserve bonds with Russia 
with whom the Belarusians were linked by ethnic, linguistic and religious closeness. Belarus' 
economy was geared to Russia and used Russia's raw materials. According to Migranyan, 
since Belarus could not rely on support from the West, with which it had no traditional ties 
or borders, confederal relations with Russia could not be ruled out. 494 
o Phase Two 
The next phase in the integrative process was reached in  spring 1994 with a new draft 
agreement on monetary union between the two states.  In the autumn of 1993, Belarus' 
parliament had ratified the treaty 'On the creation of  an economic union' and agreements 'On 
practical measures to create a new type of  ruble zone and on uniting the monetary systems of 
the Republic of  Belarus and the Russian Federation'.  These agreements would establish 
common credit amounts, interest rates, taxation principles, methods for regulating prices and 
the incomes of  the population and a common set of  rules for regulating economic activity and 
trade procedures with third countries.495  If  implemented these agreements would have 
largely deprived Belarus of  the possibility of  conducting its own monetary and credit policy 
and so were viewed by  Belarus' nationalist opposition as a betrayal of national interests.496 
The new agreement on monetary illlion with Russia was reached in the wake of  a worsening 
crisis of  the Belarusian economy which had escalated throughout 1993.  By the summer of 
that year Belarus was experiencing a virtual 'fuel famine' in all branches of  the national 
economy.  On 24 August 1993 i::vestia described the result for Belarus of  the reduction by 
almost two thirds of  deliveries of  Russia's natural resources, which effectively paralyzed 
industry in the republic.497 
That monetary  union with Russia was driven by economic rather than political  imperatives 
was made explicit by Belarus' prime minister Vladimir Kebich.  Speaking about the rupture of 
economic ties with the republics which occurred with the collapse ofthe USSR and the fact 
494 Rossi/skaya Ga:::eta  4 August 1992 p 7 
495  Dlplomaticheskii Vestnik  (Moscow) 9- to May  1994 p53 
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180 that Belarus imported 85% of its raw materials from these republics, he conceded that the 
only chance of survival was through rapproachment with Russia, through close economic ties 
and integration. Consequently he said, the unification of  the monetary system was the first 
step on the path leading towards an effective union.498 
Even the more restrained Chairman of  the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, Stanislav Shushkevich 
considered that 'the agreements will make it possible to remove the technical barriers which 
restrict cooperation between what is essentially a single people'.  499 
One factor which explains the more active quest for union by  Belarus' leaders was Russia's 
adoption of a stricter financial regime in 1993. That summer Russia stopped providing 
facilitative credits, raised energy prices and nationalized the rouble as its own currency, a 
measure effectively marking the end of  the ruble zone.500  For Russian economist Andrei 
Illarionov, Belarus' quest for monetary union was an alternative to radical economic reform. 
As he saw it, 'by entering the ruble zone, it hopes to continue to shift its own economic 
difficulties onto the shoulders of  its 'new-old' partners'.  5 0 1 
The liberal press in Russia recognized the implications  of  the new phase reached in Russo -
Belarusian relations.502  Nezavisimaya Gazeta  considered it indicative of  the economic 
programme ofKebich's government, which until that time had kept going by selling off assets 
which had remained from the time of  the Soviet Union. With reserves now running low, 
Kebich, it was argued, was putting state sovereignty on the  bargaining table.  The paper 
predicted that Kebich would become the President of  the 90th member of  the RF since if  the 
agreement were to be  implemented, there would be no point talking about Belarus' existence 
as an independent state.503 Ne::avisimaya Gazeta  also considered the implications of the 
agreement for Russia. Its key benefit would be to act as a precedent for the return of  a former 
union republic to its older brother's embrace. It could also bring real economic benefits for the 
RF including free transit via Belarus and freedom of action for Russian capital on its territory. 
Monetary union however was potentially disadvantageous for Russia. As Nezavisimaya 
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I R  I Gazeta pointed out,  it could result in a surge of inflation in Russia, since it was estimated 
that Russia would have to make a one time allocation of 1.5 trillion rubles to Belarus to unify 
the monetary  system as well as facilitate the penetration  of  the  Russian market by 
Belarusian goods. The paper concluded that the Kebich cabinet saw unification of monetary 
systems as a life saver.504  The line taken by Nezavisimaya Gazeta  reflected the thinking 
among the liberal refonners in Russia's government, that Belarus would be an economic 
liability for Russia and that close relations with it would bring Russia few real benefits. 
In April 1994 a revised version of  the treaty on the unification of  the customs and monetary 
systems which had first  appeared in January was signed by Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin 
and Kebich. Unification would take place in two stages. The first stage would begin on  1 
May 1994, when trade customs dues and payment for Russian cargo transit through Belarus 
would be cancelled and Russia would begin to lease facilities for strategic troops free of 
charge.  At the second stage, there would be the direct exchange of  Belarusian cash at the one 
to one exchange rate. This would be preceded by a political expression of  the Belarusian's 
people's will on the unification of  the Belarusian monetary system with that of Russia,s05 
Although the proposed agreement would have serious implications for Belarusian statehood, 
its leaders were not unduly concerned by this and were even happy to consider altering the 
constitution to enable the merger to take place. The joining ofthe two monetary systems 
contravened articles 8 and 145 of  the Belarusian constitution (introduced on 15 March 1994) 
which stated that international treaties  at variance with the constitution could not be 
concluded (Art. 8)  and the exclusive right of  the Belarusian National Bank to issue money 
(Art.14S).506  The Chairman of  the National Bank of  Belarus (NBB), Stanislav Bogdankevich 
opposed the surrender of  the bank's rights to the Russian Central Bank (RCB). 
Bogdankevich made his position clear saying that the NBB had never been against preserving 
and improving of  economic integration with Russia.  It supported a union which would not 
destroy their state system. The NBB not want economic policy to be determined by a foreign 
country and was against giving the National Bank with its assets and liabilities to the 
ownership of  Russia. It also objected to the determination of  Belarus  state budget and its 
deficit  by the Russian parliament. 
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182 He went on to explain that 
The unification of  the monetary systems of  Russia and Belarus on terms which 
would violate our constitution is in contradiction with our economic and political 
interests. It must not come into being. Instead of monetary unification the 
bilateral payment agreement can be concluded in the near future. 507 
Bogdankevich's continued and outspoken opposition to monetary  union was to lead to his 
dismissal as chairman of  the NBB. 
o Phase Three 
A Presidential visit to Minsk by Yeltsin in February 1995 and the signing of  a Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation marked the third phase of  the integrative process. Key elements 
of  this treaty included coordination of  foreign policy activities (Art. 2); the opening of 
borders between RF and RB (Art. 4) and the creation of  conditions for the formation of  a 
single economic space (Art. 9)  as well as joint forces for defending the external borders of 
Belarus and a single administered customs service.50s  From 15 July customs controls and 
customs registration were to be removed between Russia and Belarus but by late May it was 
already reported that Russian customs officers were present at Belarus' border crossings with 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine.509 
This phase in the relationship was significant as the rationale for closer relations began to be 
couched in terms of  pressing security concerns. This reflected Russia's growing concerns 
about the proposed east ward expansion of  NATO and the ability of  Belarus' leaders to use 
these fears to their advantage.510  Following Yeltsin's visit, Lukashenka told a crowd on 
Minsk's Victory Square that economic and military union with Russia was a security issue. 
Belarus, he said, was facing the real prospect of  becoming a state bordering on NATO, given 
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183 Poland's and Lithuania's aspirations to join NATO) II  Lukashenka exploited Russian fears 
about NA TO, reminding them that Belarus protected Russia from NATO.512  Using the 
security threat to justify greater financial support from Russia, in April, Lukashenka 
declared 'It will be difficult for Belarus to maintain its western border without Russian 
aid'.513  Even Yeltsin articulated  a vision of  future union between the two states when he 
spoke of  developing relations with Belarus in a direction which could lead to unity 
(  obedineniye  ).5 14 
o Phase Four 
Yeltsin's vision of  union came to fruition in April 1996 with an agreement on the 'Creation of 
the Russian Belarusian Community'. The signing of  the agreement was preceded by two 
significant events. Firstly, on 27 February  Lukashenka had meetings with Russia's leaders at 
which  a 'zero sum' agreement was reached. All mutual debts  including Belarus' enormous 
unpaid energy bills and its claim to compensation for nuclear weapons transferred to Russia 
would be cancelled.  Belarus' debts to Russia included $800 million for energy and $470 
million in loans. 515  Two days later Yeltsin spoke about'  deeper Russian Belarusian 
integration aimed at eventually reaching the goal of  unity between the states'. Lukashenka 
predicted that a major agreement would be signed in March which would accelerate the 
integration of  the two states, creating a supra national organization with a jointly funded 
budget to over see military cooperation and to overcome the consequences of  the Chernobyl 
disaster.516 
The second event of  significance was the resolution of  the Russian Duma in March, 
denouncing the Belovezhsk accords of 1991  which had effectively ended the USSR with the 
withdrawal of  Russia, Ukraine and Belarus from it and and which had led to the creation of 
the CIS.  A second resolution affirmed the 'legal force' of  the all union referendum of 17 
March 1991 on the preservation of the USSR in which 76.4 % of those voting in the USSR 
had supported retaining the union. The Duma resolutions asserted that the USSR legally 
continued to exist and rejected the December 1991  Belovezhsk accords that formed the 
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184 CIS.517 
Yeltsin and Lukashenka met again on 22 March and agreed to move forward with closer 
integration culminating in the 2 April signing ceremony for the creation of  the Russian 
Belarusian Community.5 18 The agreement envisaged the formation of a closely binding union, 
with supranational political institutions and a joint Supreme Council to direct the activities of 
the union.5 19 
Clearly the sequence of  events are not unconnected. Under pressure from the gains for the 
communists' and nationalists' in  Duma elections of  December 1995  Russia's leaders acted 
quickly to steal their thunder in advance of  the Presidential elections in June. The need for a 
decisive, demonstrative act was given added impetus by the Duma resolutions of  mid March. 
In pulling the union with Belarus out of  the hat at the crucial moment Russia's leaders almost 
guaranteed the support of  those voters who, while not supporting the ideology of  the 
reformed Communist Party, might never the less have voted for its candidate because of the 
promise of  the creation of  a new union. Yeltsin'  s 'new but better' union appealed strongly to 
this constituency. Kommersant  speculated that on this occasion Yeltsin might be drawing on 
the example of  Germany's Chancellor Kohl, who before the reunification of Germany  in 
1990 had suffered badly in the polls but after reunification, his triumph at the polls was 
guaranteed. 520 
The 'zero sum' deal  which was a component part of  the union agreement was not without its 
critics in Russia. S Aleksashenko, First Deputy Chairman of  the RCB denounced the writing 
off  of  mutual debts, pointing out that although Russia waived $910 million owed for gas 
supplies, Gazprom was not compensated for its lost revenues which could limit its ability to 
pay taxes and which could have been contributed to the country's budget.521  The newspaper 
517 Pravda 16 March 1996 pt  Pravda 19 March 1996 pI 
518  Biulleten' Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovor No 7 July 1996;  'Dagavor ab Stvarenni 
Supol'nitstva Belarsusi  i Rasii' (in Belarusian) Belaruskaia Dumka No 6 1996 p3-6 see 
appendix 5 for fuller translation of  text of  the treaty. 
519 Diplomaticheskii Vestnik  No 5  May  1996  p39 
520 Kommersant Daily 26 March 1996 p  1; 
521  OMRI Daily Digest  29 February 1996 
185 Segodnya  questioned the wisdom of  integration with Belarus.522  I::.vestia  made a more 
explicit point, warning that only the blind could fail to see that the cause of  integration was 
being used as a bargaining chip in the Presidential campaign.523 
Russia, however, was not the only party to gain from the April agreement on union. Belarus 
gained, not only in finally attaining the much sought union but also in the zero sum 
agreement. This was of  vital importance for Belarus  since a poorly implemented programme 
of  economic reform had only exacerbated the crisis of  the economy and the country urgently 
needed to renegotiate its external debts. While Lukashenka may have actively pursued closer 
union with a more cautious Russia, it is not improbable that the zero sum agreement was the 
price Lukashenka was able to extract from Russia's leaders to agree to something which was 
of great importance to them at that particular time.  The writing off of  debts was one way  in 
which Belarus benefited from the plans for merger. Kommersant  pointed out that  six months 
before the Russian Presidential elections Russia wrote off  Belarus' debts to the sum of $1.3 
billion.  Lukashenka, it said,  always had always insisted that Moscow should pay for 
political and military integration, and the writing off  of  debts was one way of  doing this.524 
Russia it seemed was prepared to pay Minsk  in order to maintain its political and economic 
influence in the region.  525 
The mechanisms for making the new union operative were put in place soon after the signing 
ceremony.  The Russian-Belarusian Executive Committee had its first meeting on  11 April 
1996 at which Chernomyrdin spoke of  the need to synchronize economic policies.526  At the 
second session on 15 May, decisions were taken regarding the granting of  citizens of  each 
state equal rights to health care, employment and other social services in Russia and Belarus. 
A protocol was signed outlining cooperation in hard currency and export control.  The 
executive met for the third time on 18 June 1996, though for the first time Belarus' president 
did not attend.527  On 25 June the Russian-Belarusian Parliamentary Assembly met for the 
first time.  Under the union agreement, the  assembly was to provide a basis for the merger of 
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186 the two countries' economies and some other governmental functions.  Six commissions were 
established, three chaired by  Russian delegates  legal affairs, economics and social issues) and 
three by Belarusian delegates (foreign policy; crime and ecology).528  A visit to Moscow by 
L ukashenka in October was fo Howed by  an agreement on the regulation of relations of a 
fmancial character.529 
By spring 1996 then, Russian Belarusian relations had been fonnalized in a new configuration 
marking the culmination of  a process of  reintegration which had begun early in 1992 but 
which received added impetus with the approach of  Russia's presidential elections. 
Russian Ukrainian Relations 
By the spring of 1996, Russian Ukrainian relations appeared to have reached an impasse, yet 
within the year the symbolically important Treaty of  Friendship and Cooperation had been 
signed.  The main source of  dispute between the two countries - the question of  the Black Sea 
Fleet, and specifically the question of  basing, had blocked the signing of  a treaty, which had 
been in preparation for several years. Yeltsin and his advisors had made the signing of  the 
agreement conditional on resolution of  the Black Sea Fleet dispute. The apparent deadlock did 
not however preclude agreement and cooperation  occurred in other areas of  interstate 
relations. Though Russian Ukrainian relations may have occasionally been characterized by 
intransigence and even outright hostility, differences between the two did not on any occasion 
degenerate into openconfiict or the threat of  it. Even actions which could have been 
interpreted as aggressive such as cutting offvital energy supplies to Ukraine because of  non 
payment of  debts,  or the active intervention, openly and covertly,  of  Russian politicians and 
Russian political groups to incite Crimean separatism,53o  or Ukraine's unilateral decision to 
increase transit rates for Russian oil, did not develop into serious conflict. Problems and 
disputes between the two nations were addressed with a modicum of  moderation and 
compromIse. 
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un Unlike Russian Belarusian relations, in the Russian Ukrainian relationship symbolism was all 
important. Ukraine's independence in 1991 was indisputable, ratified as it was by 
overwhelming  support in a national referendum but it was problematic for Russia, since the 
former Ukrainian lands had always been  viewed as a part of Russia, whether in the Tsarist 
or Soviet empires.  Ukrainian independence  forced Russia to come to terms with a new 
political and geopolitical  reality. Between 1992 and 1994, before nationalist / conservative 
forces became fully dominant in the Russian political hierarchy,  Russia's relations with 
Ukraine were caught between the liberal course heralded by foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, 
and pressure for assertiveness from nationalist / conservative groups. For a brief period 
Kozyrev's liberal course meant treating Ukraine as an equal and working to achieve 'normal' 
relations with it.  This was soon replaced by a strategy  of  trying to subdue or suppress 
Ukrainian statehood. At the core of  the conflicting strategies was the issue of how to accept 
and deal with Ukraine as an independent state.53 !  By 1996, the latter strategy had clearly 
failed to achieve its objectives. Rather than being progressively weakened by separatism, 
political weakness and economic decay, Ukrainian statehood appeared to have been 
strengthened. A new constitution had been agreed, the potentially destabilising dispute with 
Crimea had been averted by granting Crimea a degree of  autonomy  (in marked contrast to 
Russia's handling of  the Chechen dispute), economic reform and privatization were 
underway, with the introduction of  the new currency, the Hryvna, further symbolizing the 
new confidence of  the state. 
International uncertainty and concern at political developments in Russia, in the wake of  the 
December 1995 parliamentary elections and prior to the June 1996 presidential elections 
meant greater attention was focussed on Ukraine as a bulwark against potential Russian 
expansionism, as a stable ally for the Western states and as an alternative regional power. 
This ensured for Ukraine assurances of moral and financial support from the US President 
and several of  Europe's political leaders and provided it with additional  confidence to 
withstand Russian economic and political pressure. 
531  Russia's emergence in 1991 as a new state forced a rethinking on the concept of 
statehood. Integral to this was a reconsideration of its imperial past, and intrinsically its 
relationship with Ukraine. Concepts of statehood among the three Slavic states are discussed 
in chapter 7. 
ISH That Russia would have to accept Ukrainian independence became clear very early, though of 
course this did not mean that Russia would willingly surrender its interests in Ukraine. These 
would have to be renegotiated, with the Russian side making this as protracted and difficult 
for Ukraine as possible. Ultimately though Russia would have to give way. It would have to 
acknowledge and accept the fact of  Ukrainian statehood and independence which was exactly 
what the proposed Treaty of  Friendship and Cooperation represented. It would symbolise 
for Russians and Ukrainians the existence of  Ukraine as a state independent and separate 
from Russia - a state with which Russia would have 'normal type' relations as opposed to a 
variant of  a 'special relationship' Russia  preferred with the former Soviet republics in the 
context of  the CIS. It  would confirm that Ukraine was once more lost. 
The penultimate act in this protracted process of  acceptance and acknowledgement would be 
to give up Russia's basing rights in Sevastopol. From the Russian perspective this was 
viewed  as a territorial issue.  Conceding to Ukraine's demands would signify the surrender of 
once vital Russian interests in Ukraine and being forced to find new bases for the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet would be seen as the further withdrawal of  Russia from the fonner lands of 
the Tsarist and Soviet empires. To agree to this on the eve of  the Presidential elections, with 
Y  eltsin' s victory still not assured, would be too risky. Hence the dispute was allowed to 
fester and the agreement remained unsigned. 
With Russia seemingly involved in a staged but inevitable withdrawal from Ukraine, union 
with Belarus took on even greater significance. Russia may have become more alienated from 
one of  the historic Slavic states, but the formation of the Russian Belarusian Community 
represented an important new stage in the emergence of  the post-Soviet Russian state.  The 
SSR could be seen as the beginning ofa new process where the former republics of  the USSR 
would begin to return to the Russian fold, with the implication that Ukraine would also 
eventually come this way as well. 
Ukraine's leaders preferred its relationship with Russia to be based on 'normal type' 
relations 532 while for Russia's leaders treating Ukraine as' normal' was an implicit way of 
punishing it for leaving the rouble zone since Ukraine could no longer avail of  the preferential 
rates which Russia granted to more compliant states like Belarus. However  the Russian 
532 'Normal' in this context is taken to mean the type of relations Ukraine shared with other 
non CIS states based  on mutual interests and  intemationallaw. 
l89 Ukrainian relationship was not and indeed could not be 'normal'. This was determined by a 
number of factors the most important of which were  i) a mutually interdependent trading 
relationship  ii) mutual importance for energy supplies and energy transit;  iii) a large Russian 
minority concentrated in Southern and Eastern Ukraine. In the Russian Belarusian 
relationship these factors were either absent or were based on a unilateral (Belarus on Russia) 
rather than mutual dependence. Why these factors constitute the basis of a special 
relationship between Russia and Ukraine is explained below. 
• AtJutually Interdependent Trading Relationship 
Historically, Russia and Ukraine have shared strong trading relations. With the disruption of 
trade relations which accompanied  the collapse of  the USSR the volume of  trade was reduced 
but Ukraine and Russia still remained important partners. By 1995, Ukraine was still 
Russia's  chief  trading partner  absorbing 8.7% of  Russia's exports.  How this compares to 
other states is shown in the tables and pie charts below)33 
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190 Table 19 
Top Ten Destinations for Russian Exports  (1995) 
(CIS & Non CIS) 
Country  %Share of Exports 
Ukraine  8.5 
Germany  7.6 
USA  5.4 
Switzerland  4.4 
China  4.2 
Italy  4.1 
Netherlands  4 
United Kingdom  3.9 
Japan  3.9 
Belarus  3.7 
I  Top 10 Destinations for Russian Exports I 
Switzerland 
•  China 
•  Italy 
D Netherlands 
•  United Kingdom 
•  Japan 
•  Belarus 
19l Table 20 
Top Ten Sources of Russian Imports (1995) 
(CIS and non CIS) 
Country  %Share of  Imports 
Ukraine  14.2 
Gennany  14 
Kazakhstan  5.9 
USA  5.7 
Finland  4.4 
Belarus  4 
Italy  4 
Netherlands  3.5 
Poland  2.8 
United Kingdom  2.4 
I  Top 10 Sources of  Russian Imports I 
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Ukraine 
•  Gennany 
o  Kazakhstan 
USA 
•  Finland 
•  Belarus 
o  Italy 
•  Netherlands 
•  Poland 
•  United Kingdom The figures above show that in  1995 Ukraine was an important destination market for 
Russian products and an important source of imports for Russia. [n comparison, Belarus' 
trading importance to Russia is significantly less, supplying only 4% of  Russia's imports and 
absorbing only 3.7% of its imports.  For Ukraine, Russia was also an important trading 
partner, with Russia accounting for 38% of its exports and nearly half of its imports in 
1995.534 
Table 21 
Ukraine's Foreign Trade with CIS states in  1995 
I CIS States  I  100 
I 
I  I 
i Russia 
i 
79.2 
I 
! 
\ Belarus  I  7.58 
Turkmenistan!  3.75 
I  Moldova  I  2.11 
I  1.77  Lithuania  I 
Uzbekistan  I  1.58 
Kazakhstan 
I 
1.31  I 
IL  .  i  0.88  atvla  I 
Azerbaijan 
I 
0.57 
Estonia  0.5 
Georgia  I  0.25 
I 
Tajikistan  I  0.15 
Kyrgyzstan  \  0.11 
I 
Armenia 
I  0.08  I 
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Moldova 
•  Lithuania 
•  Uzbekistan 
G Kazakhstan 
•  Latvia 
•  Azerbaijan 
•  Estonia 
o  Georgia 
o  Tajikistan 
•  Kyrgyzstan 
•  Annenia 
Most of  Ukraine's imports from Russia consisted of energy supplies with Russia supplying 
90% of  its oil and almost  60% of  its natural gas.535  While Ukraine continued to be supplied 
with these resources for much of  the period under review, its inability to pay resulted in 
periodic bottlenecks in supply. This of  course had a knock on effect on Ukrainian industry. 
How Ukraine responded to this dependence on Russian energy resources and its inability to 
pay for supplies is significant. Unlike Belarus, Ukraine leaders did not try to negotiate away 
their energy debt (for example, Belarus' infamous 'zero sum' deal) but rather sought to reach 
compromise solutions which would enable Ukraine to reschedule payments and prevent 
greater Russian leverage over the Ukrainian economy. 
The response to Ukraine's growing debt problems generated much debate in Russia.  Two 
responses were preponderant. .Many nationalists and conservatives held the view that 
Russia should use Ukraine's economic problems to tighten the screw further.  For example 
535 Markus, u., 'Energy Crisis Spurs Ukraine and Belarus to seek help abroad' Transition 3 
May 1996 p14 
194 Moskovskie Novosti  reported in  May 1992 on the predictions of  analysts who foresaw that 
a crisis could begin in summer and autumn of 1992 in branches like coal, metallurgical and 
chemical industries, which would give rise to social tension and the exacerbation of  nationality 
related and political problems. The report noted that some in the upper echelons of  Russia's 
leadership were convinced that this was precisely the time when Russia should demonstrate 
its strength to Kiev.536  It  was believed that that although there was little Russia could do 
about Ukraine's de jure independent status, it could make it more difficult for Ukraine to 
survive as an independent state.  This entailed targeting Ukraine's obvious weak points: its 
unconsolidated and fragile independence; the question of  the status of  Crimea and the issue of 
the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol; its energy reliance on Russia and its large Russian 
speaking population. 
Another perspective, marked by a degree of  rationalism, came to predominate, at least in the 
short term. This view foresaw that it would not be advantageous for Russia to have to a large, 
heavily militarized but weak and disintegrating state on its borders. If  this state was to 
descend into civil conflict and even anarchy, then while there may be gains for Russia this 
would only come at a huge financial cost. Furthermore by making it impossible for Ukraine to 
purchase Russian oil, gas and other products, the Russian economy would be deprived of 
important duties and markets, while the world market still remained relatively distant. 
According to Izvestia  this 'healthy rationalism' was evident in Russia's negotiations with 
Ukraine over the payments crisis which developed in spring 1993. The crisis arose from 
Russia's decision to charge world prices for Russian products to those states which had left 
the rouble zone. Since those states remaining in the rouble zone continued to receive Russian 
products at preferential rates, Russia was clearly seeking to punish those states which had 
opted to leave. In Ukraine's case this was made clear by Yeltsin after the surrogate Ukrainian 
currency, the Karbovanets, went into circulation in the autumn of 1992.  Yeltsin responded to 
this by saying 'if  Ukraine has switched to a national currency let it immediately  start paying 
for oil and gas in hard currency'.537 
This policy had an immediate and dramatic effect in Ukraine.  In March Izvestia  reported 
that a one month ban on gasoline and diesel fuel had been enforced, with the sale of gas to 
private automobile owners halted. Ukraine's Prime Minister, Leonid Kuchma underlined the 
significance of reaching agreement on energy supplies saying 'if  I don't succeed in reaching an 
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195 agreement with Russia on oil and gas prices that will essentially mean acknowledgement of  an 
economic blockade of  Ukraine by Russia'.S38 
Originally Russia had offered to sell Ukraine gas at world prices - 45,000 roubles for 1,000 
cU.m.  Ukraine however wanted to pay the same price charged to customers within  the RF 
and remaining members ofthe rouble zone (15,000 roubles per 1,000 cu.m). By mid March 
both sides had managed to reach agreement. Ukraine was to receive Russian gas at the lowest 
prices (the same price paid by Belarus)~ Ukraine agreed to sign an agreement on changing over 
to a free trade regime, making it possible to drop the question of  export and import duties and 
Russia was granted concessions in the transit rates for exported Russian gas travelling through 
Ukraine. The motivation for this, Izvestia argued was a 'healthy rationalism'  since to 
maintain excessively high prices for gas would have led to an increase in export revenues but 
to a reduction in purchases, which combined with the equally excessive transit rate for Russia 
that Ukraine would have imposed in response, would have resulted in very great losses for 
the Russian economy.  5 3  9 
This rationalism was evident in successive years when the energy and debt problems 
recurred. Agreement between the two countries was facilitated by a degree of  compromise on 
both sides. For example in spring 1994 Ukraine's outstanding gas debts to Russia stood at 1.5 
trillion roubles. Instead of  seeking to avoid repaying any part of  the debt (the route Belarus 
was opting for) Ukraine agreed to pay back half of  the total debt in monetary form. As a 
credit toward the rest of  it, the Russian gas conglomerate, Gazprom would receive a 
percentage share of  the authorized capital of  enterprises in the gas transportation 
infrastructure (51 %) and a number of  other plants of interest to it (50%). These included 
specific facilities  such as gas pipelines for exports to Europe, underground storage facilities 
on Ukrainian territory and the Odessa port plant.540 Thus Ukraine was able to reach a deal 
on its debts to Russia  and Russia attained greater control of important installations located in 
Ukraine for its gas industry. 
By 1995 Ukraine's debts had grown once more but Russia was again to prove rather 
tractable. Ukraine's total indebtedness to Russia stood at $2.5 billion. The restructuring of 
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196 the debt meant that Ukraine would repay the debt over a period extending to 2008.  From 
1995 to 1998 Ukraine would only pay interest on the unpaid debt at a rate of 8% or 8.5%. 
The only repayment Ukraine was required to make before 20 March 1997 was the $68 
million remaining for Russian facilitative credits received in 1993.  Regarding its specific debt 
to Gazprom, ofthe $1. 5 billion owed by Ukraine, $1.4 billion was converted into state debt 
and would be repaid over a period of thirteen years with easy payments for the first two 
years.541 The reason for this tractability on the Russian side, Izvestia  suggested, was not 
simply good will but the result of  growing pressure on Russia from international financial 
organizations such as the Paris Club which wished to prevent Russia from crushing the 
Ukrainian economy. 542 
Another incident highlighting the mutual interdependence of  Russia and Ukraine was the 
dispute over transit rates which broke out early  in 1996. The dispute arose when Ukraine 
unilaterally increased the rate paid by Russia for transit  of  oil across Ukrainian territory. 
Originally this rate had been set at $4.53 per ton which Ukraine now proposed to increase to 
$5.20. The sudden increase resulted in the suspension of  oil shipments to Eastern Europe via 
the Druzhba pipeline, which traversed Ukrainian territory. While Russian officials blamed 
Ukraine for the break down in supplies, a Ukrainian spokesperson attributed the suspension 
to Russia's insistence that oil be shipped at the old tariff until new transit rates would be 
negotiated.543  Although supplies to Eastern Europe resumed, resolution of  the dispute did 
not come until late March 1996, when Russia reportedly agreed to the rate originally set by 
Ukraine in January of$5.2 per ton. In the intervening period Russia attempted to apply 
pressure tactics to Ukraine. For example, it stopped supplying Ukraine's Drohobych oil 
refinery with oil and  issued a Presidential decree, effective from 18 February  levying excise 
taxes on goods manufactured in Ukraine.544  While this was a response to the Ukrainian 
government's decision to lift excise taxes from all goods exported to Russia, making them 
cheaper than Russian commodities, the decree had added impetus against the background of 
the transit tariff dispute.  Russia's Minister for Fuel and Energy, P.  Nidzelsky, warned 
Ukraine that if  it refused to yield to Russia then Russia would be forced to look into 
alternative means of  transporting its oil to the West, including building a new pipeline 
541  Ne:::avisimaya Ga:::eta  23  March 1995  pI 
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197 bypassing Ukraine.545  In the event the latter option would prove too costly and Russia was 
ultimately forced to give way to Ukraine. This was an important  concession  since it 
demonstrated that Russia was also capable of  compromise, though in this case refusal to 
concede would have been even  more detrimental to the Russian economy. 
The transit dispute was notable since it demonstrated that Ukraine was capable of  resisting 
Russian pressure. This reflected a new found confidence that derived partly from  growing 
financial and moral support from the international community.  The transit dispute also 
showed that Russia had only limited power over political and economic developments in 
Ukraine. This was especially evident regarding the Crimean question, which Ukraine had 
successfully and peacefully resolved by 1995. 
Unlike any other source of  conflict between Russian and Ukraine, the Crimean question had 
the potential to escalate into serious, militarised conflict.546 The question of  Crimea, and 
linked to this, the dispute regarding the division and basing of  the Black Sea Fleet  generated 
fundamental questions concerning the nature of  the modem Russian state and its relations 
with the new state of  Ukraine. In acknowledging Ukraine's independence and the status of 
Crimea within it, Russia was conceding, however reluctantly, that the new Russian state was 
very different from the Russia of  old.  There was much resistance to this among Russia's 
political elite. Crimea was viewed as an inalienable part of  Russia, illegally transferred to 
Ukraine in 1954, and which should now be returned to Russia. 547  It was also seen as a 
pressure point  with which to undermine the young Ukrainian state. For example, in 1992, 
Russian presidential advisor, Andranik Migranyan, proposed that 
545 OMRI Daily Digest 10 March 1996 
546 For a discussion of  this see Kuzio,T., Ukrainian Security Policy, Washington:Praeger 
1995 p70&71 
547  On 20 January 1992, Russia's working parliament, the Supreme  Soviet voted 166 for, 
13 against, with 8 abstentions,  for a resolution stating that the transferal of  the Crimean 
province from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR  in 1954 had not been confirmed 
in advance by the RSFSR. Consequently the acts of 1954 had no legal force and Crimea was 
part of  the RF.  Kommersant Daily  20 January 1992 p20 
198 In view of  its internal fragility and its unconsolidated condition, both regionally 
and demographically, at this stage the necessary levers of  influence on it should 
be ensured in order to safeguard Russia's national state interests. On this account, 
Russia should under no circumstances leave the Crimea. The foreign policy 
objective with regard to Ukraine is to ensure at least special status for  Crimea 
within Ukraine and to establish direct treaty relations with it, bypassing Kiev.548 
The Crimean crisis escalated in the spring of 1992 when the parliament of  Crimea, the 
Supreme Soviet,  (with the status of  autonomous republic within Ukraine, Crimea  had been 
entitled to its own parliament in Soviet times) proclaimed 'the state independence of  the 
republic of  Crimea as an independent, sovereign state on whose territory only its laws have 
force, to be enacted following its approval in a referendum'. 549 
While the Crimean question offered Russia great opportunities to apply further pressure on 
Ukraine when the latter  finally acted against the self  proclaimed republic, Russia's response 
was tempered.  In March 1994 when Ukraine moved against Crimea with its decision to 
abrogate the Crimean constitution and eliminate the post of  President of  Crimea, Russian 
officials openly criticised Ukraine's actions but accepted that the conflict was an internal 
affair. Russia's leaders signalled their unwillingness to get involved in the Crimean dispute. 
Yeltsin noted that 'Crimea is a sovereign republic within Ukraine and has the right to make its 
own decisions. The most important thing is that neither Russia nor Ukraine should interfere 
in its affairs. '550  Russia's deputy Minister of  Foreign Affairs, S. Krylov declared that 'the 
peninsula is an integral part of  Ukraine. We are prepared to develop economic relations with 
the republic of  Crimea without putting them on a political level. '551 
548  Rossiiskaya Gazeta 4 August  1992 p7 
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199 Several factors help explain the reaction of  Russia's political leaders: 
• the Chechen conflict -Russia's leaders were embroiled in and distracted by the war 
with the Chechen republic which had begun in December 1994. It may not  be 
coincidental that Ukraine's leaders chose to move against Crimea at a time when 
Russia was in less of  a position to react; 
•  Realism - as we have seen previously, Russia was capable of  applying a degree of 
rationalism  to its relations with Ukraine. This was extended to the issue of  Crimea. 
Viewed realistically it was apparent that if  Russia encouraged separatism in Crimea 
with the end result being its reabsorption into the RF, the economic costs ofthis for 
Russia would far out weigh any symbolic gains at that critical time.  Crimea was fully 
integrated into the Ukrainian economy. It received  from Ukraine its drinking water, 
most of its food, all of its coal and sugar, 90% of  its electric power and 55% of  its 
petroleum products.552  If  Russia continued to encourage Crimean separatism and 
independence, Ukraine would inevitably respond with a form of  economic blockade of 
the peninsula and Russia would be forced to divert vital resources to support the 
Crimean economy. Kommersant  also noted that in addition to an economically 
inviable island Russia would also receive the vigorous Crimean Tatar national 
movement, whose leaders preferred to deal with Ukraine.  553 
•  International Pressure - Western leaders had been greatly alarmed and concerned at 
Russia's bloody  and violent moves  against the Chechen Republic. For Russia to 
react in a similar manner to Ukraine's decisions regarding Crimea would surely alienate 
the international community further. 
Given this range of  influences, the Russian response was one of  moderate caution, 
emphasising  that Crimea was an internal affair and one in which Russia was prohibited by 
international law from getting involved in. 
In examining these areas of  contention between Russia and Ukraine, we see that Russia's 
leaders were capable of  exercising restraint, moderation, cooperation and compromise in its 
relations with Ukraine. Yet the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet remained the one major 
552 Kommersant  Daily  20 January  1992 p20 
553  ibid 
200 stumbling block in Russo-Ukrainian relations. This ensued  since 1992 and despite the 
endeavours of  both sides remained unresolved until 1996. Like other aspects of  the 
relationship, symbolism  greatly inhibited agreement on this issue and as the dispute 
continued  it acquired even greater importance. As noted earlier, for Russia to concede 
Sevastopol to Ukraine as the base for the Ukrainian navy and to withdraw the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet to bases within the RF, would effectively signal Russia's final withdrawal from 
Ukraine.  Removal  of  the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the surrender of  Sevastopol could be 
viewed as an act of  humiliation within the RF, particularly among those of  the Red-Brown 
coalition who were still bitter from the loss of  empire in Eastern Europe. Whether or not 
Russia's interests  in the Crimean peninsula were driven by  long term neo imperialist 
ambitions, maintaining its fleet in Sevastopol provided Russia with the means to mobilize 
Russian forces quickly should developments in the region require it. This enabled Russia to 
retain a degree of  influence in the region. The historic significance of  the Russian Black Sea 
Fleet and its Sevastopol base should not be under estimated either. The fleet had been based 
in this Crimean port since its formation under Catherine the Great. Withdrawal from 
Sevastopol would have signalled that the era of 'Great Russia' was finally over and that the 
new Russia was a significantly smaller, less powerful nation than its imperial predecessor. 
The original dispute over Black Sea Fleet broke out in early 1992 when Ukraine declared that 
as of  3 January 1992 Ukraine would take under its jurisdiction all the troops stationed on its 
territory, except for strategic forces and the Black Sea Fleet. The three military districts of 
Kiev, Transcarpathia and Odessa were to come under the direct authority of  Ukraine's leader. 
The implications of  this were open to interpretation.  Russia considered that the Black Sea 
Fleet was part of  the strategic force and thus should come solely under its jurisdiction while 
Ukraine claimed jurisdiction since the ships of  the fleet were not carrying strategic 
weapons.554 
Both sides sought to reach agreement in a series of  conferences and  summits held through the 
period under review. These included: 
554 Izvestia  3 January 1992 p2 
201 •  Dagomys - June 1992. Yeltsin and Kravchuk agreed that Black Sea Fleet would be 
used as the basis for the creation of  separate Russian and Ukrainian navies. How and 
when the division would take place was left unclear. In the interim the Black Sea Fleet 
would be placed under joint command and  financedjointly.555 
• Yalta - August 1992.  Both sides agreed to establish a transitional period until the end 
of 1995. In the interim a Ukrainian navy and a Russian Federation Navy was to be 
formed in the Black Sea (Art 2). During the transitional period the Black Sea Fleet 
would be with drawn from the CIS Joint  Command (Art 3) and for the duration of 
the transitional period the fleet would be manned with draftees from Ukraine and 
Russia on a 50-50 basis (Art 5) .556 
• Moscow - June 1993. Rather than wait until 1995 to divide the fleet, as agreed at 
Yalta, both sides agreed to proceed with  the accelerated  formation of  the Russian 
and Ukrainian navy bases. It was agreed that the Russian navy would be based in 
Sevastopol and other locations in Ukraine. The sides also agreed that the two navies 
would perform  coordinated tasks to protect the common interests of  security and 
stability.557 
• Massandra - September 1993. It was agreed at this summit that the Black Sea Fleet 
would be transferred entirely to Russia and Russia would pay Ukraine  half of  the 
fleet's value. On the issue of  basing it was agreed that Russia would pay for the 
disposition of  the fleet on the basis of  treaties with the appropriate cities and 
settlements. Russia's attempt to link a resolution  on outstanding differences to 
Ukraine's growing energy debt  and Kravchuk's seeming compliance to this aroused 
great  opposition in Ukraine and the agreements reached were not implemented. 
• April 1994  At this meeting Yeltsin and Kravchuk agreed that in deciding the fate of 
the Black Sea Fleet, both sides would take as a basis all previous agreements including 
the Massandra agreements of September 1993. Accordingly, Ukraine was to retain 15-
20% of  the Black sea Ships and the Ukrainian Navy and the Russian Black Sea Fleet 
would be based in separate places. 
555 J\;foskovskie Novosti  No 22 7 June 1992 p6-7; Markus 1995 
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202 • Sochi -June 1995.  Following talks with Yeltsin, Ukraine's  president  Kuchrna 
declared that the problem had been 'generally solved'. The Sochi agreement reiterated 
that the fleet would be divided equally but Russia would buyout the majority of 
Ukraine's share, leaving Kiev with less than 20% of  the fleet's vessels. They also 
agreed that Russia would be able to base it share of  the fleet in Sevastopo1.558 
The deal reached at Sochi was heralded as the defmitive agreement on the Black Sea Fleet. Yet 
this agreement, as those which had preceded it were open to different interpretations by both· 
sides. By 1994 it had become apparent that the key area of  disagreement regarding the Black 
Sea Fleet lay not in its numerical division, which had been reached fairly amicably, but in the 
question of  basing. Russia wanted to continue to base its share of  the fleet in Ukraine's naval 
ports. In April 1994 Russia had proposed that its Black Sea ships  should be based in a 
number of  locations: 70% in Sevastopol, 10% in Danuzlau and the remainder split between 
Balaklava, Feodosia and Kerch. This was unacceptable  to Ukraine (indeed as it would be to 
most sovereign states) since it would give Russia an unprecedented degree of  military and 
naval influence throughout the Crimean peninsula. Initially Ukraine insisted that Russia 
accept the smaller Crimean port ofDonuzlau as its single base in Ukraine. By August 1994 it 
had modified its position somewhat, proposing to allow Russia to keep its share of  the fleet 
in other Crimean bases alongside the Ukrainian navy.  When Russia's leaders insisted on 
having sole basing rights in Sevastopol  Ukraine's leaders  continued to object and  insisted 
that there should be a stipulation that Russia's military presence in the region would be 
temporary. Sevastopol, Ukraine's leaders insisted, would serve as a naval base for both the 
Ukrainian and Russian navies.559  Such sharing of  facilities was unacceptable to Russia since 
it was considered impossible to share the base head quarters of  Russian Black Sea Fleet. 
558 Segodnya 10 June 1995 pI; Moskovskie Novosti  4-11 June 1995 p5.  The agreement 
was determined as follows: Article 1: the navies of  the RF and Ukraine would be formed on 
the basis of  the Black Sea Fleet, with separate bases; Article 2:  Sevastopol was be the base 
for Russia's navy and its head quarters; Article 3:  Separate agreement would be reached on 
the division of  the property of  the Black Sea Fleet; Article 4:  RF would receive 8l.7% of 
ships and vessels, Ukraine would receive 18.3%. Article 5: the division of  weapons and 
military hardware would be based on the decisions of  August 1992. 
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203 Clearly Ukraine's leaders realized that that it would be impossible to oust Russia from 
Sevastopol and Crimea immediately. Their strategy was to tightly control and limit those 
areas where the Russian fleet would eventually be based. Hence Ukraine's insistence that the 
fleet should be based solely in Sevastopol, where it would share facilities with the Ukrainian 
navy. 
This strategy evolved alongside the formulation of  Ukraine's national security concept which 
was adopted by Ukraine's parliament on its first reading in May 1995. The National security 
concept specified Ukraine's priorities as ensuring state sovereignty, preserving its territorial 
integrity  and upholding the inviolability of  borders.  It identified threats to Ukraine as 
including interference in the country's internal affairs, territorial claims, instability and 
conflict in neighbouring states, separatism and violations of  the constitutional system.560 
In December 1995, Vice Admiral B. Kozhyn, a deputy in Ukraine's parliament and a former 
commander of  Ukraine's navy, said that it was now time for Ukraine to decide on the status 
of  the foreign troops on its territory and encode this in law. This law, he suggested, should 
confirm how long foreign troops could serve on Ukrainian soil and proposed a restriction of  4 
years.  Furthermore, he added foreign troops should abide by Ukrainian law and the country 
deploying them should pay Ukraine a fee of  around 300 ECU per year for each soldier. Rent 
for land being used by the troops should be paid for at world prices and any ecological or 
other damage  caused by the troops should be fully covered by their own country.561 While 
Kozhyn's comments were directed at any military forces on Ukrainian territory, they were 
aimed in the first instance towards Russia. The first move in this direction came in June 1996, 
when Ukrainian parliamentarians  voted to ban foreign bases on Ukrainian territory. The 
deputies took into account Russia's basing rights in the Black Sea and so allowed for a 
transitional period of  an unspecified length during which the Russian fleet would be allowed 
to remain in Ukraine.562 
Throughout  1995 and 1996 it became clear that while Ukraine pursued a strategy of limiting, 
controlling and eventually removing formal  (i.e. the Black Sea Fleet) Russian influence from 
Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia was endeavouring to retain its foothold there. Clearly the 
560 OMRI Daily Digest No 101  25  May 1995 
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204 issue of  basing masked a deeper question of  territoriality and elucidated the difficulties 
associated with the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. 
As already noted, in signing the proposed treaty, Russia would have to acknowledge and 
accept the fact of  Ukrainian statehood and independence. It would symbolise for Russians 
and Ukrainians the existence of  Ukraine as a state independent and separate from Russia. 
However in spite of  what the treaty represented there was an apparent will on both sides to 
sign it so that Russo-Ukrainian relations could be shifted forward to a new level. 
The proposed treaty would cover all aspects of  bilateral relations and update the earlier 
agreement  signed in November 1990, when the USSR still existed and Russia and Ukraine 
had only recently made declarations of  state sovereignty.  The new treaty was to be signed in 
a grand ceremony in Kiev  in October 1994.563  This original date was postponed, as were 
successive signing dates from 1994 through to 1996 and instead of  Kiev, the great signing 
ceremony, marking the formation of  the Russian Belarusian Community took place in Minsk. 
In spite of  the great claims by both sides, it was hard to avoid seeing union with Belarus as 
anything more than a consolation prize for Russia. Few could dispute that the grand signing 
ceremony in the Kremlin, with the Russia Patriarch in attendance and on the eve of  Russia's 
presidential elections had great symbolic value. But the tangible merits of  entering into a 
union with Belarus were questionable. For sure Russian national security gained by having 
greater control over the western border, particularly with the prospect of  the east ward 
expansion of  NATO, and Russia was able to maintain its military garrisons in Belarus rent 
free.  But Belarus was increasingly coming to look like a liability, and not just economically. 
Lukashenka's actions  in the weeks following the agreement caused concern not just among 
Western nations but in Russia as well. His orders to disperse the crowds at the Chernobyl 
anniversary rally, the arrest of  many of its participants and opposition figures, the banning of 
other rallies and growing political censorship conflicted greatly with the Russia's efforts to 
present it self  (if  not act as) as a liberal type democracy.564 
563 Wilson, A, Ukraine under Kuchma  Russia and Successor States Briefing 1995 pll 
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205 Economic disparity between Russia and Belarus also impeded the real benefits of union.  A 
range of  indicators showed Belarus lagging far behind Russia in GDP, budget deficit, inflation 
and wages.565  Such differences between two members of  an economic union was certain to 
impede any genuine attempt at union. How, it was argued, could union be achieved when two 
very different economic systems were in place. Analogies were made with the experience  of 
German unification after 1990, when the incorporation of  the less advanced economy of  the 
east seriously affected the more successful  economy of West Germany.566 
Russia, having embarked on radical economic reform, had largely dismantled the command 
economy of  Soviet times by 1995. In contrast, Belarus had demonstrated an aversion to 
reform with almost 90% of  property remaining in state hands. A state managed economy 
continued to exist in form though elements of  a free market were tolerated.567  Attempts at 
small scale privatization, similar to Russia's voucher scheme had largely failed. Under the 
terms of  the April agreement, both states guaranteed to introduce measures for forming a 
common transport system and a common tariff for the transport of  passengers and cargo as 
well as the unification  of  energy (power grids), common scientific / technological and 
informational space. By the end of 1997 a unified monetary credit and budget system was to 
be introduced and the conditions were to  be created for the introduction of  a common 
currency.  Both sides would synchronise the stages, rate and conduct of  economic reform, 
creating a single standardized legal basis by the end of  that year.568  Given the practicalities 
associated with trying to unite two different economies it appeared to some that the 
agreement signalled no more than an intent to merge economies rather than practical measures 
to achieve this. 
Though generally welcomed in Belarus, the agreement on union was not with out its critics 
there. Responding to Lukashenka's  claims that the SSR was taking as its model the EU, an 
article in Belorusskii  Rynok made an implicit comparison between the gradual progression 
toward unity followed by the member countries of  the EU, and the hasty approach taken by 
Russia and Belarus. The process which had begun in Europe in 1951 only  neared completion 
in 1992. What it took the EU over three decades to achieve Russia and Belarus were 
565 Kommersant  Daily 30 March 1996 p2 
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206 attempting to do in less than five. 569 
Ultimately though, however great the symbolic merits of  union with Belarus, in Russia's long 
term interests, rapproachment with Ukraine was preferable. This preference derived from a 
number of  factors, some of  which have been already addressed such as a mutually 
interdependent trading relationship and mutual importance for energy supplies and energy 
transit. Additional factors included Ukraine's geopolitical position in the centre of  Europe 
and the large Russian minority concentrated in Southern and Eastern Ukraine. 
It is not advantageous for Russia to have 'cold war type' relations with Ukraine.  Such a 
relationship could inhibit deeper forms of  mutually advantageous cooperation while  carrying 
the risk that cold war hostilities would escalate into hot war with economic, monetary and 
human costs. Furthermore, as long as such cold war relations endured, Ukraine could become 
even more alienated from Russia, building new and often more profitable relations with other 
states. 
Clearly the Russo-Ukrainian relationship can be meaningful for both sides.  Leaving aside 
their traditional elements of  commonality (common history, language, etc), Ukraine 
represents a more equitable partner for Russia than Belarus.  A key factor in this lies in 
Ukraine's long term economic potential. An over concentration on national consolidation 
under L. Kravchuk  meant that very little economic reform occurred in Ukraine until his 
replacement by L. Kuchma. Reforms introduced by Kuchma  (then Prime Minister) during 
Kravchuk's presidency had limited impact. By 1994 the Ukrainian economy was in a state of 
collapse. Production had declined by 28% (compared with 8%  in 1993) and agricultural 
production fell 17%. The budget deficit stood at 49% of  the GDP; inflation for the year was 
461%. 
In October 1994  Kuchma (having been elected President  in July) launched 'a new course of 
economic and social policy on price liberalization, quicker privatization, promotion of private 
entrepreneurship and banking reform'. Small scale privatization was to be completed by 
1995; privatization of  medium sized enterprises would occur over three years. Other new 
reforms included land reform, cancellation of  subsidies for state companies and the 
introduction of  a new currency (Hryvna) during August and September 1996. Western aid 
569 Belorusskii Rynok (Minsk) No 15  16 April 1996 'EC v SSP:Pochybstvuete pazhitzu?' 
207 was also actively sought. 
Greater commitment to economic reform from most of  Ukraine's political leaders meant that 
many of  the new reforms were implemented. Even by the end of 1994 inflation had been 
reduced significantly: from 72% in November to 28% in December and the budget deficit was 
cut from  22.4% ofGDP in August to 9.7% in December. 
In 1994 and 1995 Ukraine experienced many of  the worst excesses of  economic reform that 
Russia had experienced in 1992 and 1993. In 1995 the country suffered a severe slump of 
industrial production. GDP fell 22% in 1995 - one of  the worst rates in the CIS. A report 
from the International Labour organization (ILO, Geneva) in December 1995 concluded that 
the economy was sinking further into recession, industrial production had halved since 1991 
with  hidden employment affecting one out of  three factory workers. But by the summer of 
1996 Ukraine appeared to be emerging from the worst of  the crisis. The programme of  small 
scale privatization was announced completed  in September 1996 (with the exception of 
Crimea), with  80% of  small enterprises taken over through employee buyout schemes. The 
process of  large scale privatization was on going with over 40 million members of  the 
population having picked up their privatization vouchers.570 In the proposed draft budget for 
1997, the government foresaw  economic growth of  about 1.7%  - a small figure perhaps, but 
representing the first  real growth in the economy since independence.571  The introduction of 
the national currency - the Hryvna, was another indicator of  the importance of  economic 
security and a sign that the economy was slowly beginning to recover. The optimism and 
confidence of  external financial  institutions regarding the success of  Ukraine's  reform 
programme was confirmed by credits from the IMF, W orId Bank and ED. 5  72 
In Ukraine, the switch to a programme of radical economic reform was linked to the need to 
guarantee national security and independence - economic reform would ensure economic 
security. Radical economic reform occurred as a consequence of  Ukraine's post independence 
leaders, (notably Kravchuk) effectively having avoided any significant or meaningful 
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208 economic reform from 1991. This avoidance had taken  economy to the brink of  collapse. 
Kravchuk's main support lay in the Western regions of  Ukraine. He tried to gain support in 
the more russified eastern regions by  playing into the hands of  the post-Soviet conservatives 
through a slow programme reform. Kuchma realised that political and economic change 
depended upon a careful balancing of  the pro Russian sentiments of  the eastern territories 
and strong nationalist pressure from the west.  This balance was crucial in conditions of 
economic crisis to maintain internal stability. He also appreciated, in a way that Kravchuk 
had not, that continued economic weakness rendered the young state even more vulnerable to 
the influences of  its larger neighbour. While Kuchma was more 'russophile' than Kravchuk, 
he  recognized the need to minimize Russia's opportunities for intervention in Ukraine. 
Bolstering national security through economic security was the rationale behind the launch of 
the programme of  radical economic reform  in Autumn 1994.  This was imperative for the 
survival of  the state  since, as it was observed, 'if  Ukraine fails, its only alternative could be a 
return to domination by Moscow its main creditor'  .573 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined the processes underway since 1992 to formalize in treaty 
form relations between Russia and the other two Slavic states. The signing of  a Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation is an important benchmark in interstate relations among the ex-
republics of  the USSR, symbolizing their emergence and existence as independent states and 
recognition of  them as such. I have demonstrated that in the case of  Russia and Belarus, not 
only was the relationship formalized in treaty form but went significantly beyond this to the 
point where a process of  uniting the two countries was begun. In contrast, though troubled 
and beset with difficulties from time to time, the Russo-Ukrainian relationship did not break 
down and fmally managed to reach agreement on a treaty in 1997. 
I have shown how the Russian Ukrainian and Russian Belarusian relationships evolved in 
different directions. While the Russian Ukrainian relationship was more problematic and 
prone to dispute and conflict, the main sources of  disagreement between the two states were 
largely resolved and not at the expense of  the ceding of  any aspect of  Ukrainian sovereignty. 
By firmly bolstering its statehood (politically and economically) Ukraine emerged as a strong 
but moderate equal to Russia whose existence as an independent state is ultimately accepted 
573 Liesman, S., 'Can Ukraine Slip Russia's Grip?' Central European Economic Review 
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209 and respected by its larger neighbour. In contrast Russian Belarusian relations developed in a 
more pragmatic manner.  Unrefonned and excessively resource dependent, Belarus had little 
to offer Russia economically. Its importance to Russia in 1995 and 1996 lay in its strategic 
position (with the threat of  NATO'  s eastward expansion) and the symbolic importance of  its 
voluntary return to the Russian realm on the eve of  the Russian presidential elections. For the 
political leaders and elites of  both states Belarusian statehood and sovereignty was  malleable 
- a commodity  which could be used to the mutual benefit of  both. Unlike Ukraine, for 
Belarus' leaders statehood was not something to be strengthened and protected but rather a 
bargaining tool to extract short tenn economic gains and political assurances. 
Ukraine's reaction to the circumstances it found itself in contrasts considerably with the 
response of  Belarus' leaders. Ukraine responded to the crisis of statehood it found itself in in 
1991 and 1992 by building up a network of  new allies and partners, creating a new image as a 
moderate, stable state in Central Europe, launching a programme of  radical economic refonn 
and buttressing all of  this through constitutional democracy. The consequence of  this was to 
strengthen the state, both economically and politically so that Russian influence, interference 
or intervention  could be contained. In Belarus, its leaders sought deliverance from the crisis 
affecting the nation, not from the array of  resources available to the state (material, 
intellectual and so on) but from the Russian saviour. From the Russian perspective, the 
fonnation of  the Russian Belarusian Community could also be seen as a reaction to Ukraine's 
continued drift to the West, including joining the  Partnership for Peace in 1994 and 
concluding an agreement with NATO in 1997.
574 
To understand why the leaders of  Ukraine and Belarus' responded to Russia in different 
ways, the perception of  statehood held by their political elites and populace requires 
examination. It has long been acknowledged that in contrast to the Ukrainians, national 
consciousness among Belarusians is weakly developed. This may help explain the willingness 
of  the people to cede part of  their sovereignty in the hope of salvation from Russia and why 
union with Russia is chosen in preference to market refonn and democratic principles. 
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210 Chapter 7  Statehood and Status:Perceptions of Statehood and Relations 
between Russia, and Ukraine and Belarus. 
Russia's relations with Ukraine and Belarus had reached a significant stage by summer 1997 
with the agreement to form a union with Belarus (2 April 1997) and the long awaited Russian 
Ukrainian Treaty of  Friendship and Cooperation signed during Yeltsin's first official visit to 
Ukraine (30 May 1997). For Belarus the momentum for closer union with Russia had been 
building for several years, but in both cases the shift to a clearer resolution and definition of 
their relationship with Russia at this time was given added impetus by  NATO's eastward 
expansion and the admission of  the former WTO states of  the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland in July 1997. 
F  or these three Slavic states, NATO's expansion forced both a reevaluation and a 
reorientation of  their foreign policies, strategic interests and their place in the new geopolitical 
order that had emerged in the post-Soviet years. Since independence in 1991, intellectual and 
political elites in Russia and Ukraine, and to lesser extent Belarus had been seeking to identify 
and define national interests and a concept of  statehood which would reinforce national 
sovereignty. NATO's advance east gave this added urgency, necessitating a clearer definition 
and articulation of  these ideas. 
In the last years of  the USSR  a growing sense of  national identity developed  within its 
constituent republics.-This was stronger in some than in others and was often used by the 
communist or new political elites to channel opposition to the central authorities. Russia 
(then the RSFSR) is good an example of  how nationalism was used to challenge the power of 
the centre though it was also much in evidence in the Baltic republics, Ukraine and Georgia. 
This strong sense of  national identity and nationalism was an important element in the 
fostering of  a concept of  statehood within the new national states. By this is meant a vision 
or concept  of  what the state will be like and how it should function and exist in its 
contemporary form. 
Usually, though not necessarily this can be laid out in a formal statement - a type of  a 
mission statement,  and this concept of statehood would have an important input in the 
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security policies. 
Of  the three Slavic states it can be argued that Ukraine experienced the least difficulty in 
working out its concept of statehood. post-Soviet Ukraine was driven by a strong and 
unchallengeable belief in the historical legitimacy of  its statehood. Debates about its right to 
exist as a nation state were few and external challenges to the legitimacy of  its statehood 
(usually emanating from Russia) were firmly put down. In the Belarusian case, the 
comparative absence of  a strong sense of  nationhood and subsequently statehood, meant that 
initially the state floundered directionless. For Russia, the difficulty in working out its 
concept of statehood lay in reconciling its imperial past (both Tsarist and Soviet)  with its 
modem form. For each of  these Slavic states their perceptions of  statehood and the 
difficulties encountered in the working out of  these affected, and were affected by internal and 
external developments as well as impacting upon relations with each other. 
Russia 
Among Russia's political and intellectual elite, as well as for many ordinary people, the 
prospect of  NATO's advance east was an anathema. Russia had always objected to the 
continued existence and strengthening of  this 'Cold War' organization, especially since its 
Soviet controlled counterpart, the WTO organization, had been dissolved. It had actively 
sought to promote the OSCE as the post Cold war security mechanism, within which Russia 
would have a greater role. In 1991 Russian nationalists and communists had been angered by 
the Western triumphalism at having 'won' the Cold War. To them, NATO's expansion 
seemed very much like acquisition of  the spoils of  that war,  reviving the sense of  a defeated 
nation, dictated to by the West, that Russia had managed to overcome in the years following 
World War Two. This perception was perpetuated by the Western news media. In  May 
1997 The Economist  described Russia's acceptance of  NATO's expansion 'Russia's second 
surrender' .576 
Russia was also angered by its lack of  control over NATO's expansion. Once on the 
international agenda, there was  in reality very little Russia could  do to halt it, despite its 
best attempts at threats and obstructionism. In this context, Russia's position was very 
similar to that of the USSR in 1990, when after the collapse of  the Berlin Wall, German 
576 The Economist 17 May 1997 p43 
212 unification soon followed. In both cases, despite Soviet and Russian objections and 
opposition, German unification and latterly NA  TO expansion were ultimately  fait accompli 
which they had very little control over and could do very little about. The symbolic 
importance of  these events lay in their exposure of  the extent to which Soviet and 
subsequently Russian influence in international and European relations had declined. David 
Hearst, writing in the Guardian observed that Russia was facing for the first time since the 
1814 Vienna Congress which decided the political shape of  post Napoleonic Europe, its 
relegation as a European power.577 
NATO's expansion also led to the prolongation of  the debate about  whether  Russia's 
orientation lay in Europe, or in Asia. Discussions on Russia's role as a  'Eurasian' state had 
been ongoing since 1991  with the factions falling into Westernisers and Slavophiles, or 
Atlanticists and Eurasianists.578 This debate about Russia's post-Soviet status was neither 
conclusive nor resolved and contributed to the drift in Russia's external relations from 1991-
1993. This in turn had a serious impact on Russia's relations with its new neighbouring 
states. 
During this period Russian Foreign Policy continued to follow the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze 
line  based on 'New Political Thinking', noted for its heavily Atlanticist approach.579 By the 
middle of 1992 this approach came under criticism from nationalist and communist forces for 
being excessively conciliatory and concessionary to the West, at the expense of  Russia's 
national and strategic interests.  Alexei Arbatov argued that the apparent absence of  tangible 
political and security gains achieved at negotiations produced a common perception of  foreign 
policy as merely an adjunct of  tactics for getting credits and economic aid from the West.58G 
A sceptical Arbatov added that 'it was not inconceivable that former acting Prime Minister, 
Gaidar, and his team looked at it precisely in this way. '581  This point was implied again in 
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213 an article in Kommersant which noted that soon after Russia signed the Founding Act with 
NATO (27 May 1997) it was admitted to the G8.582  Arbatov also criticised Russia's foreign 
policy makers at this time for the complete lack of  interest in comprehensive, consistent 
analysis of  major political issues, involving experts from the academy of  sciences and the 
newly independent think tanks and foundations.583 
The impact of  the latter  should not be underestimated. Russia's foreign policy institutions 
were wholly unprepared for the practicalities of  implementing the foreign policy of  the new 
state.584 Continuity in approach and personnel from the Soviet era was unavoidable and 
because  independence had come so unexpectedly, a clear framework, for Russia's external 
relations, based on a concept of  statehood was lacking.585 I n the immediate post 
independence period, Russian foreign policy was largely reactive. Certainly, from 1991-1993, 
and indeed well into 1994 and 1995, Russia's foreign policy lacked clarity and defmition in its 
rationale and objectives and was confused and inconsistent in its application. Olga 
Alexandrova described the spread of  a 'lack of  orientation and a growing sense of  inferiority' 
and observed that Russia was in 'a stage of  a neurotic search for self identity' .586 
The formulation of  a  foreign policy concept was not wholly neglected at this time. On the 
contrary, on going attempts were made to work out a new orientation. In March 1992 the 
Russian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs (RMF  A) issued a statement  'On the Concept of 
Russian  Foreign Policy' identifying  as priorities the maintenance of  ties with Russian 
communities, the CIS states, the retention of  links with the Baltic states and participation in 
CIS structures. This was followed by a 'Strategy for Russia' from the Council on Foreign and 
Defence Policy (August 1992);  a statement 'Concerning the Basic Points ofthe Concept of 
Foreign Policy of  the RF' from the RMFA  (1993) and  an  inter departmental  institutional 
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21-+ initiative 'Basic Principles of  a Foreign Policy Concept of  the RF'.  A discussion paper from 
the Russian Academy of  Sciences in 1994 on a National Security Doctrine advised that 
Russia should seek to normalize and stablize relations with the CIS states.587 
The involvement of  a range of  institutional bodies led to difficulties in reaching a consensus 
on what Russia's external aims should be. This was compounded by the escalating  struggle 
between Russia's legislature (Congress of  People's Deputies) and executive (Presidency) 
during which both sides used foreign policy to further their aims and widen their support. 
The resolution of  the crisis by the dissolution of  the Congress in autumn 1993 was 
accompanied by a rightward shift in foreign policy, evident from early 1994 and formalized 
with appointment of Evgenii Primakov as Foreign Minister. While the pro Western 
orientation was maintained, the vocal and assertive coalition of  Red-Brown forces had 
ensured that Russia's relations with its neighbouring states would be given greater and more 
serious consideration. Within the government the move to the right was signalled by Yeltsin's 
jettisoning of  his chief  reformer, Egor Gaidar, while the other noted liberal, Foreign Minister, 
Andrei Kozyrev found his position becoming increasingly untenable throughout 1994 and 
1995 as criticism of  his conduct of  foreign policy mounted. The more youthful Kozyrev was 
replaced by Primakov (68), who had a reputation of  being a conservative and statist. 588 
A key criticism of  Kozyrev's foreign policy was the neglect of  relations with the countries of 
the near abroad in the months and years following independence.  By 1993 the Russian 
government was seeking to rectifY this problem but even by then much damage had been 
done. Russia's preoccupation with the West in the early years of  independence allowed the 
new states to move further out of  its sphere of  influence while allowing other states to 
acquire greater influence in the region. When Russia began to act to halt the process, it  was 
interpreted by the states of  the region and their new found allies as  evidence of  the 
restoration of  Russia's imperialist tendencies. 
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2[5 Working out its relations with the other former Soviet republics proved to be one of  the most 
complicated vectors of  Russia's foreign policy since this would act as an indicator of  just 
how far the new Russian state had evolved. Russia has never existed before in its 
contemporary form  and adjusting to this reality  entailed considering the nature and form of 
the modem Russian state. The evolution of its policy towards the ex-republics revealed 
much about the nature and form of  the new Russia. 
Two key factors  helped shape Russia's policy towards the ex-republics. Firstly, the 
inescapable fact that it was the dominant power in the region - economically, militarily, and 
geopolitically. Secondly, while this gave Russia an important power base, it also entailed 
responsibilities, especially for maintaining regional security. The mechanisms for 
implementing these responsibilities were more problematic and varied from neo-imperialist 
destabilization  and economic and ethnic leverage to a more rationale and reasoned cooperative 
strategy, depending on the internal political pressures of  the government. 
Realism in policy toward the ex-republics prevailed during those times when liberal reformers 
were most influential in the Russian government. Economists and politicians like Egor Gaidar, 
Boris Nemstov and Antoly Chubais were keen to minimise the costs to Russia of  sustaining 
her sphere of influence. This stemmed from the belief that, Russia, as it existed in its modem 
form was no longer capable of  subsiding its neighbouring states and needed to cap the huge 
drain on resources required for its own transition. When resigning as acting prime minister in 
January 1994, Egor Gaidar cited as one of  his reasons the proposed customs union with 
Belarus, which he believed Russia could ill afford. The restoration of liberal reformers to the 
government in the wake of  Y  eltsin'  s second election as President  (1996) saw the revival of 
this realism. Under the influence ofNemstov and Chubais the draft agreement on union with 
Belarus in Spring 1997 was significantly watered down so as to minimise or at least reduce 
financial losses to Russia. Nemtsov's attitude to union with Belarus was further underlined in 
September 1997 in a newspaper interview when he compared Belarus to North Korea and 
Cuba saying 'just as you cannot unite the economic systems of  north and south Korea, just 
as you cannot unite the economy of  Florida with near by Cuba, you cannot, quite clearly 
216 integrate the economies of  Belarus and Russia, whose economic fundamentals differ'.589 
At other times however the influence of  the liberal reformers was curtailed by the need to 
accommodate the vocal and assertive nationalist and communist lobbies. The impact of  this 
on policy implementation  ranged from neo imperialist rhetoric to overt and covert 
intervention, often of  a military type, and economic pressuring. Politicians from these lobbies 
have also undertaken their own initiatives,using contentious issues to gain further support.590 
Liberal Democratic Party  leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky; former Vice President, Alexandr 
Rutskoi; Alexandr Lebed, Yeltsin's running mate in the second round of  the 1996 Presidential 
elections; Communist Party leader, Gennadi Zuganov and more recently, Yuri Luzhkov, 
Mayor of  Moscow and Presidential hopeful, have all used this tactic.591 
Consequently not only has the formulation of foreign policy been impeded by the lack of 
resolution on basis of  Russian statehood and the Westernizer - Slavophile debate, it has also 
been constrained by the lack of  clarity and decisiveness in its relations with the CIS states. 
This has shifted from benign neglect (1991-1992)592, to costly economic and military 
intervention (1992-1996), to strategic realism (1996-1997). Underpinning this strategic 
realism is the awareness that even without imperialist ambitions, Russia must be concerned 
about regional security in the area ofthe FSU. The difficulty in adapting to this role was 
described by Sergei Karaganov (Foreign Policy advisor to Yeltsin), as a period when Russia 
knew it could no longer be donor and boss but it did not know whether to increase separation 
or try a new form of integration. Karaganov predicted that Russia would play the role of  first 
among equals in interstate relations in the CIS, rather like the US in NATO, or Germany in 
the EU, but not big brother  protecting and feeding his younger kin (though elements of  these 
589 cited from interview in Belorusskaya Delovaya Ga=eta in Russia Today  (Electronic 
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217 roles would remain).593 
As strategic realism evolved it became clear that in the hierarchy of  interests, some republics 
were more important to Russia than others. For example, the Central Asian republics, with 
the exception of  Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had little economic value, though strategically 
they acted as a buffer zone on Russia's southern border. There was general recognition among 
all political groups in Russia that the Baltic states of  Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania had 
effectively moved out of  Russia's sphere of  influence though the Russian minority and 
economic links meant that some form of  relationship had to be maintained. Instability in the 
Transcaucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia) made Russian involvement unavoidable, both 
to protect Russia's strategic interests and to contain the impact of  the instability on Russia. 
Of  the former republics contiguous to Russia's borders, Ukraine and Belarus were crucial to 
Russia for economic, military and geopolitical reasons, as well as the sizable Russian 
minorities in each state. 
In formulating a concept of  statehood and foreign policy orientation for the new Russian state 
the historical ties between the Slavic tribes of Kievan Rus' represented a contemporary bond 
between Russia, and Ukraine and Belarus. To what extent these historic ties should be 
revived into a new type of  Slavic union formed part of  the debate about Russia's position in 
the new geopolitical order and its relationship with the former Soviet republics. 594  The 
willingness of  Belarus' leaders to tie the state to Russia in a such a union vindicated the 
supporters of  this view. However Belarus' merger with Russia placed further emphasis on 
the dissonance in Russian Ukrainian relations. 
The existence of  Ukraine as an independent state was especially problematic for Russia and 
presented many difficulties. For the previous three centuries Russia had never existed in 
anything other than its imperial form and Ukraine had never existed outside of this. For 
Stephen Blank, it was Ukraine which had brought Russia to Europe, but which had also made 
it an empire, 
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218 Historically it was acquiring Ukraine that integrated Russia into Europe both 
politically and culturally. But it was that acquisition that confirmed and 
necessitated an autocratic and imperial Russia under both Tsars and Soviets.595 
Ukraine had played an important part in Russia's imperial configuration and with the 
independence of  both states, continued to playa role in the construction of  Russia's national 
identity. How Russia  related to independent Ukraine would serve as a measure of  the extent 
to which Russia had shed its imperial past. 596  Belarus proved less of  a dilemma for Russia 
since a concept of  national identity and statehood was so weak and as Russian commentators 
and academics pointed out, even the Belarusian intelligentsia found the idea of  a national state 
absurd. 597 
For several years following independence, many in Russia found the prospect of  Ukraine's 
independent existence intolerable, and viewed it as only a temporary phenomenon. Stephen 
Blank noted that for many, even liberals, Ukraine's independence was worse than treachery, 
striking at the very concept, let alone existence of a Russian state' . 
He also noted the 'visceral and deep seated belief that without Ukraine Russia's very identity 
was imperilled and that Ukraine was nothing more than 'Little Russia' or Malorossiia. '598 
This belief is held not only by  Russia's political elites but by a wide section of  the 
population. Roman Laba observed that a peculiarity of  the Russian Ukrainian relationship 
was that some Ukrainians and apparently most Russians saw no reason for the separate 
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219 states, state borders or a separate ethno nationality identity  .599 
In 1994 a nationwide survey found that most Russians would like Russia to form a large state 
which would incorporate the other territories of  the FSU. More than 75% of  respondents felt 
that Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan should be reunited with Russia. When asked whether 
Ukraine should be reunited with Russia, 49% of  the sample agreed.  When asked to prioritize 
the former Soviet republics with which Russia should have relations, 70.2% identified 
Ukraine, 42.8% Belarus and 42.3% Kazakhstan.600 Another survey, three years later  in 1997 
reconfirmed this.The poll of  Russians conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation found 
that 75% of  the respondents viewed the Russian - Belarusian union as the first step towards 
the restoration  of  the old  union. When asked to name which other republics they would like 
to accede to the union, 64% of  the respondents named Ukraine and 40% chose 
Kazakhstan.  60 1 
Ukraine  played an important psychological role in the construction of  Russia's national 
identity but while difficulties in reconciling itself to Ukraine's new status complicated 
relations, their development was not prevented. From 1994 it was evident that Russia was 
becoming accustomed to and adapting to the reality of  Ukraine's independence, seeking less 
to undermine it and instead use it to its advantage. This was given added impetus by the 
NATO's eastward advance, though strategic realism and the influence of  the liberal reformers 
were also important factors. Belarus' independence presented much less of  a  dilemma for 
Russia. Indeed, the problem for Russia's leaders was how to keep the state at a sufficient 
distance so that Russia would not end up propping up Belarus' economy. 
In 1996 and 1997 NATO's imminent expansion forced Russia to structure its response and 
reformulate its relationship with NATO and in particular the new member states while 
cushioning the impact of  this within the country itself. Russia's decision to enter initially, a 
'community' with Belarus and subsequently a 'union',  and its signing of  the Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation with Ukraine must be viewed as part of  Russia's strategy for 
responding to and dealing with NATO's expansion. It also reveals the degree to 'realpolitik' 
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220 has become a major influence on Russian Foreign Policy. 
Union with Belarus offered Russia a number of  tangible benefits in the face of  NATO's 
advance. Poland's inclusion brought NATO's area of  influence and its troops closer to 
Russia's western border than  had previously been anticipated. The political, military and 
economic union agreed to in April 1997 provided Russia military bases in Belarus as well as 
coordination of  foreign policy and military construction. By November 1997 this was 
fonnalized in a bilateral Treaty on Military cooperation.  602  From the strategic perspective, 
Belarus was secured as a buffer between Russia and NATO. Economically, union with 
Belarus offered Russia few benefits but such was the strategic importance of  its western 
neighbour that Russia was effectively willing to subsidize the Belarusian economy in return 
for this. Union with Belarus was also a  response to critics of  the government within Russia 
who accused the leadership of  acquiescence. The union signalled to these critics, as well as 
NATO's leaders that while Russia may have accepted the inevitable it was actively 
responding to it by creating its own military political union. 603 
Ukraine 
Agreement with Ukraine was also part of  Russia's response to NATO expansion. This  was 
finally reached in May 1997, after having eluded both states for so long. While both sides 
claimed that agreement was impossible as long as differences over the Black Sea Fleet 
remained unresolved, in reality they had found ways to work around this obstacle. But the 
actual symbolic value of  the Treaty inhibited Russia from signing it.  Crucially, signing the 
Treaty would acknowledge Russia's acceptance of Ukraine's existence as an independent 
state and territorial entity, separate from Russia. Hitherto the strong and vocal nationalist 
opposition within  Russia had refused to accept the loss of  Sevastopol and for some even the 
loss of  Ukraine itself. But by May 1997 such was the unease generated by NATO's 
expansion, even these groups were prepared to be more conciliatory.  The agreement with 
Ukraine was viewed a means to get Ukraine on side. In doing so it recognized Ukraine's 
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221 importance as a large and influential Central European state which Russia would prefer to 
have as its ally  rather than see its incorporation into the Western Alliance.The agreement was 
also tacit recognition that Ukraine's new found international status had been acquired 
without any Russian input, evolving instead from its determination to distance itself from its 
dominant Russian neighbour.  Once more realpolitik prevailed in Russian policy, stemming 
from the realization that Ukraine was now a vitally  important political and economic 
neighbour. 
Ukraine's success in achieving this formal recognition from Russia is linked to its clear and 
coherent concept of  statehood driven by a strong belief in the historical legitimacy of  its 
existence. Confident that Ukraine's true geopolitical orientation lay in the direction of  East 
Central Europe and beyond to Western Europe, the post independence leadership  sought to 
consolidate  sovereignty by building on the network of  relations formed in months before the 
USSR's collapse, as well as forming new alliances. In Ukraine's new military doctrine 
(enacted into law on 19 Oct 1993) Russia was clearly seen as a threat, though this was not 
explicitly stated. In the light of  this, it was vital to bolster Ukraine's security with other 
regional and  European security organizations.604  Recognition and support from external 
allies - both moral and financial,  gave Ukraine further confidence to minimise, reduce  or 
prevent any opportunities for  Russian  interference. 
Ukraine's leadership sought to optimise its position as the second largest actor in the region, 
exploiting Western fears of  Russian instability particularly in the crisis months from July to 
December 1993. Where Russia could only achieve a handover of  political power through the 
forcible closing of  the Congress of  Deputies, Ukraine accomplished a smooth changeover to 
new legislative and executive bodies with parliamentary and presidential elections in the 
summer of 1994 furnishing Ukraine with a new image as a moderate, stable state of  East-
Central Europe, ready to  launch a programme of  radical economic reform and buttressing all 
of  this through constitutional democracy. The overall objective was to strengthen the state, 
both economically and politically  so that  future Russian influence, interference or 
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222 intervention could be contained.605  The outcome was to provide Ukraine with the confidence 
to negotiate with Russia on an equitable basis without any diminution of  national 
sovereignty.  This was in stark contrast to the remaining member of  the Slavic triangle, 
Belarus. 
Belarus 
Although sharing a similar starting point 606 Ukraine and Belarus have followed radically 
divergent policies in their relationships with Russia. While Ukraine's leaders have sought to 
shape Ukraine into a modem stable state with a network of  Western allies, Belarus' leaders 
have taken their state in the opposite direction, towards Russia in its external relations and 
towards authoritarianism in its internal politics. In both cases, their post independence 
development can be linked to their historical  experience. In Ukraine's case, it was able to 
draw upon a long legacy of  nationalism, both overt and suppressed. In contrast,  Belarus 
lacked the strong historical basis to statehood that Ukraine's leaders could so easily exploit. 
The impact of  this deficit in Belarus has been evident in the actions of  its political leaders and 
populace which  indicate that statehood and its attributes are neither cherished nor valued, 
nor perceived as something to be protected and defended at all costs. What is evident in 
Belarus is the failure to reconcile nation with statehood. 
In Belarus, by  1991, neither of  these crucial facets (nation and state) had reached the point 
where the geographical lands and its  relatively homogeneous  indigenous people could  come 
together in a nation state. Belarus had not yet matured to the point of  its historical 
development where the next stage would be its emergence as an independent state. A nominal 
degree of  autonomy in Soviet times meant that when independence was thrust upon the state 
in 1991, the main  republican organs - the parliament (Supreme Soviet) and its leader, the 
Chairman, took on the day to day running of  the state. Some basic features of a  state were in 
place, others such as a constitution and a presidency were later added.  What was  notably 
605 'Vzryv Nezavismosti' Kommersant  No 28-29  6 August 1996  p34 ff 
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223 lacking however was a national ethos - a concept of statehood. Many citizens of  Belarus 
describe feelings of shock and betrayal upon hearing of  the dissolution of  the USSR and 
Belarus' new status as an independent state. One woman described her utter disbelief, 
particularly after the positive results of  the March referendum when a majority of 
Belarusians had voted to remain in a union. The blatant disregard of  this compounded her 
disbelief  607 
In the autumn and winter of 1991 Belarus was adrift  in the precarious  position of having an 
independent status it had not sought. It had been forced into a position neither its leaders and 
people had actively pursued and rather than  consolidating statehood and fostering  national 
consciousness, the strategy  seemed more like national  destruction rather than construction 
particularly since 1994 and the election of  Belarus' first President, Alexandr Lukashenka. 
Though L ukashenka did not  initiate the process of  reuniting Belarus with Russia, he made its 
accomplishment his personal mission since his election.608  To many observers the rationale 
for this was more than simply a logical path of development for two fraternal Slavic states. 
Certainly  Russia  and  Belarus  share  a  common  history  of close  and  often  mutually 
interconnected relations but impetus for close  relations  with Russia was  seen as  part of a 
presidential  policy  of 'reform  avoidance'  by  which  Belarus  would  reap  vital  economic 
benefits,  notably  the guaranteeing of energy supplies while  at the same time avoiding the 
painful  economic reforms and their potentially destabilising consequences. 
L ukashenka claimed as his raison d'  etre  for this mission the fact that he was the only deputy 
in the Belorussian Supreme Soviet to vote against the dissolution of  the USSR in 1991.  Since 
election however, Lukashenka achieved few real successes. The economic slump continued to 
deepen;  popular  opposition  to  him  grew  steadily  and  Belarus  became  more  isolated 
diplomatically. By casting himself as the unifier of  the two fraternal Slavic states, Lukashenka 
could at  least attain some degree of success for himself, even if the actual union of the two 
states  was  more  symbolic  than real.  His  'political stunts'  were even seen by  some  as  an 
attempt to distract the attention of  the population from the real problems of  the economy. 609 
607 Interviews conducted in Minsk, Belarus 1996 &  1997 
608  Lukashenko, A, 'Integratsionnaia Politika Belarusi i Rossii Zakhvatila Umy Millionov i 
Uzhe  Ne Imeet Obratnogo Khoda'  Belaruskaia Dumka  No 5 1996 p3 ff 
609  'Novy Kurs Aleksandr Lukashenko' Belorusskaya Ga::eta  8 April  1996  p9 
22-+ Even  if such  an  unlikely  policy  were  possible,  it  could  only  have  limited  application. 
Ultimately, the'  goods' needed to be delivered and while Belarus was still guaranteed Russian 
energy  supplies,  these  were  not  free.  The  1996  Agreement  on  formation  of a  Russian  -
Belarusian Community was  accompanied by  a so  called 'Zero Sum' agreement on Belarus' 
energy debts, eliminating Belarus energy debts to Russia, particularly its gas industry though 
Belarus' energy debts have continued to accumulate again since then. 
Russia was also more hesitant about implementing the terms of  the agreements on formation 
of a community and  responded to L  ukashenka' s overtures only when it was advantageous 
for them to  do  so.  This has now occurred on three notable occasions:  firstly  in April  1996 
with an agreement on the  formation of the Russian - Belarusian Community, signed in an 
elaborate ceremony in the Kremlin; secondly in April 1997 with an agreement to further this 
community;61o  thirdly, a so called new 'union treaty' signed  in December 1999. The first 
agreement preceded the Russian presidential elections of 1996 when Yeltsin needed to appeal 
to the nationalist and communist vote.  The second agreement was signed in spring 1997 as 
NATO's eastward expansion advanced despite Russian opposition and obstructionism.  In 
this context formalising a union with Belarus served several ends:  signalling to the USA and 
NATO powers that Russia would seek to construct a future political-military union of client 
states if  NATO advanced to Russia's borders, and securing Belarus as a buffer state between 
Russia and NATO  as  the  latter's advance  in Poland became  imminent.  The new  'union 
treaty'  was  signed  just  before  Russia's  parliamentary  elections  in December  1999  and 
appeared to be an attempt to play to the nationalist / conservative constituency.  611 
Conclusion 
In reaching  deals with both Belarus and Ukraine (Spring  1996 &  1997 and early summer of 
1997),  Russia was  able to  plug the security vacuum on  its  western flank,  made critical by 
NATO's east ward expansion. The agreements also served as measure of  the state of  relations 
between Russia and the two other Slavic states. 
Clearly  Ukraine  had gained  much.  Having  surmounted many  of its  initial  weaknesses  (the 
economy  continues  to  prove  problematic)  Ukraine  strengthened  and  consolidated  its 
610  Sovetskaysa Belorussia  3 April 1997 pI; 4 April 1997 pI;  22 April 1997 p2 
611  RFE/RL Newsline  9 December 1999 statehood, giving it a stronger bargaining position vis a vis Russia and enabling it  to negotiate 
on a more  equitable basis.  This was  achieved in spite of adverse  difficulties, not least the 
presence of a large and influential Russian minority. In contrast Belarus avoided confronting 
its weaknesses. It  continued to look to Russia as  its  saviour, tying itself into a union with 
Russia where it is very much the weaker partner. 
In relations  among the states of the  Slavic triangle, the  crucial developments  in the  recent 
years  have  been the  Russian-Belarusian  Union  and  the  Russo-Ukrainian  rapprochement. 
While the former has been the most publicised, it is the latter that which can be viewed as the 
more significant. In 1996 and 1997 Ukraine began to emerge as a serious partner and ally for 
Russia  in  regional  and  European  politics. 612  The  converse  of this  is  Ukraine's  future 
potential as a serious rival to Russian influence.613 
As allies Russian and Ukraine have the opportunity to exert strong influence in regional and 
European  affairs  but as  rivals  carry  the  risk of generating serious  instability  and conflict. 
Within the configuration  Belarus'  position is  greatly  diminished.  Weakened by  economic 
crises, led by an authoritarian type leader and isolated internationally, Belarus is susceptible 
to the influence and possible intervention of either state.  More likely could be a combined 
effort to pressure for change in Belarus should the country's continued right ward shift begin 
to threaten regional security. 
Clearly, the balance of power within the Slavic triangle has shifted. Russia no longer has the 
monopoly  of  power and influence within this sub-region and and the area as a whole. Russia 
and Ukraine now share' the position of  dominant regional actor with Belarus existing largely as 
an appendage to Russia and influential only to the extent of  its possible negative influence on 
regional politics. 
612 In 1996 Sherman W. Garnett was optimistic about Ukraine's new position, suggesting 
that it could become for Russia a serious partner and an anchor of  stability on its Western 
border.  Garnett, S.W.,  Ukraine: Europe's New Frontier  Conflict Studies Research Centre 
July 1996 
613 Ukraine's enthusiasm and involvement in non Russian regional bTfOupings can be taken as 
one indicator of  this. Recently this includes its involvement in the GUAM group, made up of 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. RFEIRL Newsline 1 Dec 1997 & 29 Dec 1997. 
226 Chapter 8  Conclusion 
In chapter 1 (Introduction)  I framed a number of key research issues which this thesis aimed 
to address. These were: 
• What were the outcomes of  imperial collapse for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus? 
• What specific issues and problems arose from the emergence of these states as a result 
of  the above process? 
• How did Russia organize its relations with Ukraine and Belarus and what factors 
determined and shaped these? 
• Was some form of  reintegration or reunion inevitable amongst these states? 
I will now demonstrate how my thesis has addressed these questions beginning with the 
consequences of  imperial collapse. 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were important parts of  the Tsarist and Soviet empires. The 
relationship between Russia and the other Slav regions was mutually interdependent, relying 
on each other for the exchange of  goods and personnel as well providing  security guarantees. 
The bonds between them were strengthened in the Soviet era with the development of  the 
ePE and the regional market. A new phase in the relationship occurred  in the late 1980s as 
the republics cooperated to renegotiate their relationship with the centre.  The collapse of  the 
Soviet empire revealed the inordinately high degree of  integration between the states of  the 
FSU.  As the republics emerged to become self governing states these bonds were tested, 
sometimes breaking down though rarely severing all together. The challenge following 
independence was to find mechanisms to restore, renew or replace these bonds. 
Imperial collapse left the former republics of  the USSR, and Ukraine and Belarus  in 
particular, with a number of specific problems.  These included  a trade dependency on 
Russia - a direct result of  the regional specialisation policies of  the Soviet regime. The 
presence of large numbers of  Russians in  Belarus, and particularly in Ukraine, was a serious 
and urgent issue which needed to be addressed. The treatment of Ukraine's  substantial 
Russian minority would act as an indicator of the political maturity of  this new state.  The 
227 potential existed there for a fonn of  reactive nationalism, finding  expression in acts of 
discrimination and aggression against the Russian minority.  The absence of this reflects the 
degree of  assimilation that had taken place and the positive impact of  the nation building 
policies of  the post-Soviet leadership in Ukraine. The perception prevailed  however, 
amongst many in Ukraine, and nationalists in Belarus, that they had been widely exploited by 
the Tsarist and Soviet regimes and that self government! independence was the best option 
for them.  The links between these states,  built up over many decades, could not be 
completely discarded, particularly as membership of European and international 
organizations remained inaccessible, at least in the early years following independence. 
Consequently the CIS offered  one way to manage post independence relations with the other 
states. 
The disintegration of  the Soviet empire had extensive geopolitical consequences.  The collapse 
of  the USSR left a security vacuum in the region. Russia became the dominant regional power 
and acted quickly to secure its interests. The instability and potential problems caused by the 
collapse of  Soviet power and the emergence of  many new, weak and unstable states 
represented a serious cause for concern in the West.  A dual strategy of assisting the arrival 
of  these states to the world stage (initially through financial support), while recognising that 
the region was a sphere of  Russian influence, allowed the West to influence developments 
without direct involvement.  This gave Russia an opportunity to control developments in the 
region.  A number of  tools were used to achieve this.  Using its dominance within the CIS was 
one mechanism; exploiting trade dependency and exerting economic pressure;  fanning 
potential regional conflicts;  covert support for military operations in other CIS  states, were 
others.  Russia was however unable to prevent a realignment that was taking place among 
some of  the fonner states. The drift of  the Central Asian states towards their regional 
neighbours to the south was a natural vector in their geopolitical alignment. Ukraine's 
westward leaning  was part of a strategy  to distance itself from Russia by presenting itself as 
European state. Following the countries of  Eastern Europe by gaining admission to European 
organization  was a detennined goal. 
With NATO's proposed eastwards expansion, Russia was confronted with its first real 
geopolitical dilemma.  NATO's expansion to include the East European states of 
Czechoslovakia and Poland was bearable. Russia could even tolerate the inclusion of  the 
Baltic states. But the prospect of Ukraine's inclusion suggested that NATO's eastward 
228 advance to Russia's western borders was beyond Russia's control.  Russia acted swiftly to 
reclaim the initiative. 
NATO expansion underlined the need to retain a western buffer zone and Russia sought to 
secure this quickly.  The creation of  the SSR with Belarus in 1996 and the Russian Ukrainian 
Treaty of  Friendship and Cooperation in 1997 were the results of  the drive to ensure that the 
states to west of  Russia's borders were firmly within its sphere of  influence.  The signing of 
state to state treaties in 1996 and 1997, which formalized relations with Ukraine and Belarus,· 
was an important stage in the process of  reconstituting relations between these states. 
Between  1991 and the signing of  the treaties, these regional neighbours were seeking ways to 
coexist and manage their relationship.  In signing the agreements all three states recognized 
that they could not live without each other. 
The process of  renegotiating the relationship was influenced by a number of  factors but 
significantly their common historic bonds played a minimal role. Reference could and was 
made to their historical development and shared past, when it was politically expedient to do 
so, but this alone was not sufficient to justifY renewed cooperation. Rather more pressing 
issues  such as national security and economic  recovery shaped the post independent 
relations of  these countries. 
The need for cooperation was imperative. The structural legacies of  the CPE  left the western 
republics of the FSU trade dependent and reliant on Russia for energy supplies.  A priority 
for all was to find a way to manage this dependency in the short term while reducing it in the 
long term and at the same time securing the necessary supplies.  In the immediate post-Soviet 
years, Russia was prepared to exploit this dependence for its own ends  and it became a 
measure of  a nation's statehood if  it was able to withstand this (Ukraine managed it, but 
Belarus failed).  Ukraine's ability to withstand  pressure signalled to Russia that it would 
have to be  dealt with on a more equitable basis so that the relationship which evolved after 
1994 was more conciliatory.  It is a relationship which is evolving and the signing of  the 
Treaty of  Friendship and Cooperation  marks an important stage in the 'normalising of 
relations' . 
229 Relations among the post-Soviet Slavic states are shaped now by new issues rather than old 
ones. The most pressing issue confronted by all was the issue of  NATO expansion. The 
implications of  the proposed expansion caused a reevaluation by all states of  their position in 
the regional geopolitical order and forced upon them the realisation their security would be 
better guaranteed by more cooperative relations with regional neighbours rather than 
potentially hostile relations. 
Even once the NATO threat receded  (or more accurately, compliance was forced upon them) 
the states of  the region continued to  see the benefits of greater cooperation. How this was to 
be achieved  reflected the degree of  maturity at which these new states had arrived. 
A common starting point was their effective exclusion from European and global economic 
organisations at a time when these states were increasingly dependent upon trade and 
exchange.  Renewing old relationships on new terms was one way of  overcoming these 
difficulties though clearly these new relations would have to be on a mutually advantageous 
basis.  The nature of  the relationship was clearly linked to the perception of  statehood, the 
roots of  which can be found in the historical development of these states in Tsarist and Soviet 
times.  But crucially in the post-Soviet era, realism and pragmatism rather than a romantic 
attachment to a common Slav heritage  proved the more successful model for forging a new 
relationship with Russia. 
Ukraine accepted the reality (though this was not the case in the Kravchuk years 1991- 94) 
that Russia is its largest neighbour in the region and for that reason a constructive rather than 
a destructive relationship should be pursued. This should not mean however that Ukraine 
would have to sacrifice any  degree of  statehood or sovereignty in the pursuit and 
maintenance of  this relationship.  In contrast, Belarus' retarded post-Soviet development 
resulted in a unequal relationship with its Russian neighbour where effectively Russia could 
dictate the terms of  the relationship to a ever dependent Belarus. 
The  Slavic Union in which these historically linked states would act together as an 
influential regional  bloc,  and which was envisaged by many in the early years of  the post-
Soviet era, has not emerged.  The political and economic reintegration amongst all the states of 
the region and not just the Slavic states,  which was predicted to be inevitable has similarly 
not happened.  Most states, and Ukraine and Belarus in particular have found their own 
ways of maintaining their relationship with Russia, with whatever implications this has for 
230 their state.  Within the Slavic subregion it is Ukraine which has made the most significant 
advances in its relationship with Russia, negotiating, bargaining and compromising to achieve 
a workable, equitable relationship. In the period 1991-1997, Russian-Belarusian relations 
made many symbolic advances (such as the formation of  the SSR)  but the relationship has 
yet to reach the stage where both partners view each other as equals.  In contrast, Russian-
Ukrainian relations have normalized with both states acting as partners in a developing and 
mutually advantageous relationship. In the next phase of  the post-Soviet transition the 
evolution of  the Russian Ukrainian relationship will be of  crucial importance given Ukraine's  . 
potential to become a partner and ally for Russia but also the possibility of  becoming a 
serious rival in regional and world politics. 
This thesis has presented an interpretation and analysis of  the changing relationship between 
Russia and its Slavic neighbours.  Relations between these states can not be understood 
without reference to their relations in the past as this has affected their perception of  each 
other in the modern era.  I have tracked the development of  that relationship from Tsarist to 
Soviet times but focussed more on the evolution of  relations during the period of  reform  in 
the late 1980s, the collapse of  the Soviet empire in 1991 and the subsequent emergence of  the 
former republics as new states the 1990s. 
Relations with Ukraine and Belarus is only one element of  Russia's external relations. 
However most analyses of  Russia's foreign policy continue to focus on its relations with the 
West while providing only a general interpretation of  its relations with the 'Near Abroad'. 
This looks set to continue as the changing leadership in Moscow redefines security policy 
with the West. Consequently  Russia's relations with its regional neighbours remains a 
neglected area.  I have sought to provide an analysis of one aspect of this.  My thesis 
demonstrates how the relationship has evolved within the Slavic sub-region. My research has 
shown that Russia's relations with these states has been determined not only by regional 
concerns but also by international issues, namely NATO expansion. The collapse of the 
USSR and the redefining of  relations between its successor states is vast topic for enquiry 
and research.  It was necessary for me to focus and specifically define my  area of study so 
that my investigation would be manageable and genuinely comparative.  Other aspects of 
relations with the post-Soviet states are important. For example how has the presence of 
large numbers of  ethnic Russians (37.8%)  in Northern Kazakhstan affected Russia's relations 
with the state?  How have relations between Russia and Moldova,  another former republic 
231 on  its western border developed?  Have there been any significant advances in the 
relationship between Ukraine and Belarus?  To have included these issues in my research 
would have significantly widened the area of study.  I hope to pursue these issues in my post 
doctoral research. 
Finally, Russia's relationship with Ukraine and Belarus continues to evolve. I have 
investigated the first phase of  this. The new leadership in Russia and the new emphasis in 
economic and security policy will have an effect on Russia's relations with regional 
neighbours.  Russia's relationship with its Slavic neighbours is an exciting and dynamic area 
of study and will continue to be an important subject of  investigation and analysis in the 
future. 
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Research Trips 
1992  Preliminary Research trip to Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Kiev prior 
to submitting proposal for doctoral thesis. During this trip I was able to 
identify key research issues and questions and establish contacts. 
I discussed the main themes with researchers at IMEMO. 
1995  Six week study trip to Moscow. The main focus was identifying and 
selecting primary research materials and library based research in the 
Russian State Library and the library at IMEMO. I  liaised with 
researchers at IMEMO and they provided me with advice and 
information. 
I interviewed Dr Vladimir Gelman of  the Institute for Humanities and 
Social Research (Moscow) and was given unlimited access to their 
archive of contemporary Russian newspaper articles. 
I interviewed Dr Alexei Kuzmin, Special Advisor to Gregori Yavlinsky 
(Yabloko) 
1996  Six week study trip to Minsk (Belarus). The main focus was gathering 
primary research materials and library based research in the Belarusian 
State Library. I liaised with researchers at Institute for Socio-Economic 
and Political Research. Professor Oleg Manaev  provided me with 
advice and information and gave me unlimited access to the Institute's 
archive of contemporary Belarusian newspapers. 1997  Four week study trip to Minsk (Belarus). The main focus was 
gathering primary research materials and library based research in the 
Belarusian State Library. 
I interviewed members of  Minsk Municipal Council. 
1998  One week study trip to Minsk (Belarus) to supplement research 
materials. 
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Population of CIS and Member States 1992 (in thousands, in descending order) 
Population 
CIS 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Uzkekistan 
Kazakhstan 
Belarus 
Azerbaijdan 
Tadiistikan 
Georgia 
Kirgizia 
Moldova 
Turkmenistan 
Annenia 
Size 
283844 
148704 
52057 
21207 
16964 
10281 
7297 
5570 
5463 
4484 
4359 
3809 
3649 
1  Population of  CIS and Member States 19921 
Kazakhstan 
•  Belarus 
•  Azerbaijdan 
D  Tadjistikan 
•  Georgia 
. Kirgizia 
•  Moldova 
D  Turkmenistan 
DAnnenia 
Source: Didenko, N.I., OSIWVY Vnesheekonomicheskoi Deiatel'nosti v Rossiikoi 
Federatsii Saint Petersburg: Politekhnika 1997 p428 
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Iallk~: Barter Trade (EXPORTS) by Russia to individual Republics of the US~ 
(as percentage of overall volume) 1987-90 
CIS State  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Overall  100  100  100  100 
.. 8-zerQ~j~.  3.56  3.6  3.48  3.74 
2.94  Armenia  2.59  2.59  2.56 
Belarus  14.07  14.1  14.27  15.65 
i_QeOIg(a _c_ 42:;._._  4)  L  ~  __ .4  .;!2 __ .  __ HL  ._ 
I  .. K~~~.WL.  14.13  14.1  13.99'  1_5_._1  .. _  ... _  .... __ 
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I.... KyIggia._._... .. ):J  J.  ...-. -.. - .~.Q2.._  ... _...  .  ..  ~  ~.1  ..  ~  ~~-~....-.. . 
Moldova  3.8  3.79  3.79  4.09 
2.2  2.2  2.16  2.5 
Turkmenia'  1.86  l.9  l.82  2.12 
I  !Jkraine  .... 
Uzkekistan •  _.- ... _- -_ ......  "_.  -._.-'-" 
42.03  42  42.28  43.32 
9.32  9.29  9.28  9.85 
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USSR  (as percentage of overall volume)  1987-90 
CIS State  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Overall 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
•• __ • ___  ._.  ___ ._",-~  ______  ._ ~_._  .. ________  •• __ ~_._  •••• ___  ••• ___ ". __  "U.  __  •• _._  • __  ._, 
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6.2  6.19  5.96 
100 
6.11 
16.99  17  17  16.36  I'· ...... _.-... -........ -... -..... -.. - ........... --.... - ......... ~  ................... -.......  -. -........ -. ---. --.. - "  ....  -..  '.". - ......... -... _  ........ -...  -." .. ' 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgizia 
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Tajikistan 
~"-- _...  ------_  .... -
I.T~~e~ia_  .. . 
Uzbekistan 
Ukraine 
5.17  5.2 
8.02  7.99 
1.4  1.4 
5.29  5.3 
--..  --_._  ...  _.  +- --_. 
1.53  1.49 
.  -- -_  ..  " ..  _.----_._  .. _---_  ...... -._----- ._ ..  ....... _. 
1.93  1.89  .. - _ ..  - --...  - ... 
7.7  7.69 
41.98  42 
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4.99 
8.61 
1.42 
5.11 
1.63  -_  .. __ ......  _. - ._--_  .... "._-_  .. _"-- ... 
1.94 
..  -- _  .. 
7.89 
41.63 
5.96 
7.22 
1.49 
5.84 
1.94 
2.12 
8.04 
41.8 Table 3: Russia's Trade (EXPORTS) to individual Republics of the USSR  (as 
percentage of overall volume) 1991-93 
I·_<:;I§.§~~J~.. .  ......  J2~!_  ...... - ... - .... J~~1.._  ....... J.?2.3 .....  1 
!Qverall  .  JQO  ....... __  .1QQ_.  .100. _ I 
I 
\ 
Azerbaijan . 
Armenia 
Belarus 
3.97  2.38 
- .. _--------_ .. 
3.39  1.4  ..  __ ._  .... __  ...  --_._  .. _  .... -._-
14  14.44 
0.5 
0.5 
15.89 
Kazakhstan  13.87  24.94  17.19 
Moldova  3.47 
Turkmenia·  1.77 
- -".--".  "-.. --"-
Ukraine  41.99  .. 
Uzkekistan  9.21 
. --_ ....  -' .. -- -
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2.91  2.89 
l.24 
2.18  _  ..  -
40.02 
7.69 
0.7 
1.4 
53.1 
5.2 Table 4: Russia's Trade (IMPORTS) from individual Republics of the USSR 
(as percentage of overall volume) 1991-93 
CIS State ·  1991 
Overall 
100 
- -_._-- -_._._- -- --
Azerbaijan;  6.63 
Armenia 
1  ____________________ "' __________ ::2.56 
Belarus 
1992 
100  --_.  .  ~  _  ...  --~  ... -_  ....  - -
3.6 
0.91 
1993 
100 
2.09 
0.19 
12.9  12.39  22.8 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgizia 
Moldova 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenia 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
- --.. -.---... ----~--~--.--.. -.... --.----'"-.--.- --_ ... _- - - ---'- ---_  ... __  .... _--_._ .....  -
3.64  0.57  0.3 
11.84 
2.52 
5.23 
1.94 
3.94 
35.81 
12.94 
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22.63 
1.71 
2.93 
0.8 
2.41 
47.99 
4.01 
16.39 
1.3 
1.3 
0.4 
0.99 
42.3 
11.9 Table 5:  Russia's  Trade (EXPORTS) to CIS States, excluding Baltic States, 
(as percentage of overall volume) 1994-97 
CIS State·  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Overall  100  100  100  100 
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NO Table 6: Russia's Trade (IMPORTS) from CIS States, excluding Baltic States, 
(as percentage of overall volume) 1994-97 
CIS State  1994  1995  1996 
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..  - -...... ---..... ~-.-.- ... -
Armenia  0.51  0.55  0.58 
1997 
100 
1.82 
0.42 
Belarus  20.2  15.36  20.87  33.1 
. --_.- '-._--'--- - .. _--_._-_  .. _-- --- .-.. - ---------._------ .. ,--_._----------->---------.  -- ..  -_"-.. --_.- . - "----- ....... ---_._. - "--'. 
~Q~()rgi(l~__  Q·~__QA~~_  __  0.46  1.04 
Kazakhstan  19.34  19.68  20.87  19.58 
______  . ___  ..• _____  •. __  . __ . __  •. u----*_  .. __  ...  _. _ _ •. __  ~  ..  _~  __ . ____  ~_.  ________  ..• ___  . ______  • __  .•  ___  ..  _. __  .• _. __  •.  _.  _.  ______  . __  ••  __  ._  ... __  .. __  . ____  ... _"  .. _ •.• 
__ ~J~y!ggj~  ..  _~~ .  ____  ~_~.Q.J~_~_~_  ~  __ ~ QJ~_~__  __  ~  .... ___ .  _  ...... 1 
I 
1· __ M21Q()'{~  __ :~. .- .~- .  ~_4_:2.1~  __ ~_~~  .... ~ __ A.:~I.~_~  __ .  ~~ ___  ~ --~: §  ~~- .... 
1.04 
5.9 
0.68 
1.11 
~_I.mj19sJ~_.  __  ~_~  ............ __ Q  .. ~l  __  ~ ......... _____  l.)~~~._  ....  ___ ..  _~Q  :Q.~ 
Turkmenia  0.58  1.31  1.15 
".  - .... _----- . __  ..... ---_  ... - ... _--- -. -...... -..  _-.- ... --- -. --.-_  ... _.--._-------------------------------.----- - ....  -- .....  --_._  .... --- _  .......  - ... -.-- ._.  -_ .. _.- - ._ .. __ .- -_ ... --- -.. . 
Uzbekistan  0.79 
Ukraine  42.68 
6.54 
48.68 
2-+1 
4.49 
43.1 
7.15 
28.07 I 
Table  7: Russia's Exports to Ukraine and Belarus 1987-93, 
as percentage of  overall imports from Soviet Republics 
(excluding  Baltic Republics) 
Exports 1987-1990 
Year  1987  1988  1989 
.. 
CIS States  43.9  43.9  43.45 
.-~----. 
Ukraine  42.03  42  42.28 
1990 
41.03 
43.32 
--~'--'~--- --' 
Belarus  14.07  14.1  14.27  15.65 
r-----. 
I  Total  56.1  56.1  56.55  58.97 
Exports 1991-1993 
.. 
Year  1991  1992  1993  _. 
CIS States  100  100  109~  - --------
--I---' 
--~.~--.-
Ukraine 
41.99  40.02  53.1 
'---'-'--'--_  .. _- _  .. __ ._---------_.  -.. ~-.. 
Belarus 
14  14.44  15.89  ---_._------1-----------.  -'--
Total  55.99  54.46  68.99 
~--.-----
Table 8:  Russia's imports from Ukraine and Belarus 1987-93, 
as percentage of  overall imports from Soviet Republics 
(excluding  Baltic Republics) 
Imports 1987-90 
Year  1987  1988  1989  1-;990 
CIS States  41.03  41  41.37  ,  41.84  --
-~~I 
,I 
Ji 
-----_.  f------.-- ... -. -Ji 
I 
-li 
Ukraine  41.98  42  4l.63  41.8  -
Belarus  16.99  17  17  16.36  ._-- .. -~- -
Total  58.97  59  58.63  58.16 
- -.. 
Imports 1991-1993 
Year  1991  1992  1993 
~----~-.  --~--
CIS States  100  100  100 
.~-.-~-- ~-------- .-
----- --~-.~~----- _.----
Ukraine 
35.8132.2_2  ___  ~2.]  __ +-_  .. _.  -' 
Belarus 
~::1  __  .~-~~::~ -~~~~-j •  = 
~--~ 
Total 
11 
~J 
242 Table 9:Russia's Exports to Ukraine and Belarus 1994-97 
percentage of  overall trade with CIS States  (excluding  Baltic Republics) 
Exports 1994-97 
Year  1994  1995  1996  1997 
~~~---f-----~---
CIS States  100  100  100  100 
.~---"---.~- '----~-- f----------
--~--- ----~  -------
Ukraine 
49.67  48.9  _~.4~~  43.69  -----
Belarus 
2l.62  20.61  32.09  28.11 
--~---------~-
Total  7l.29  69.51  79.56  71.8 --
Table lO:Russia's imports from Ukraine and Belarus 1994-97 as 
percentage of  overall trade with CIS States (excluding  Baltic 
Republics) 
Imports 1994-97 
Year  1994  1995  1996  1997 
CIS States 
-----
------- ------- -------f--------
Ukraine 
42.68  48.68  43.1  28.07  ----- -- ~-~---- ------~  --------
Belarus 
20.2  15.36  20.87  33.1 
Total  62.88  64.04  63.97  61.17 
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Table 11:  Russian Foreign Trade with republics 
of  US SRI  CIS IMPORTS  1987-97 
Table 12: Russian Foreign Trade with republics 
of  US SRI  CIS EXPORTS  1987-97 
244 CIS State  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  :  1995  1996  1997 
Azerbaijan·  6.2  6.19  5.96  6.11  6.63  3.6  2.09  1.36  0.78  1.05  1.82 
Armenia  i  3.73  3.7  3.75  3.05  2.56  0.91  0.19  0.51
r  0.55  0.58  0.42 
Belarus  16.99  17  17  16.36  12.9  12.39  22.8  20.2  i  15.36  20.87  33.1 
Georgia  5.17  5.2  4.99  5.96  3.64  0.57  0.3  0.5  0.42  0.46  1.04 
Kazakhstan i  8.02  7.99  8.61  7.22  11.84  22.63  16.39  19.34  i  19.68  20.87  19.58 
Kirgizia  1.4  1.4  1.42  1.49  2.52  1. 71  1.3  0.94  0.74  1  1.04 
Moldova  5.29  5.3  5.11 
I 
5.84  5.23  2.93  1.3  _ 1  4.61  4.67  5.68  5.9 
Tajikistan  1.53  1.49  1.63  1.94  1.94 
I  0.8  0.4  0.87  !  1.22  0.6  0.68 
Turkmenia  1.93  1.89  1.94  2.12  3.94  2.41  0.99  0.58  1.31  1.15  1.11 
Ukraine  41.98  42  41.63  41.8  35.81  47.99  42.3  42.68  48.68  43.1  28.07 
Uzkebistan  7.7  7.69  7.89  8.04  12.94  4.01  11.9  0.79  6.54  4.49  7.15 
245 L12zkebistan  9.32  9.29  9.28  9.85:  9.21  7.69:  5.2  5.4  5.7_5 _,  ____ ~~~  ______  5.27 ____  .1 
246 Table 13::  Share of  Trade (EXPORTS) with Ukraine and Belarus as percentage of  overall  exports to CIS States 1987-97 
---~-- ---~-~- ---~---
i 
CIS State'  1987  !  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  i  1993  1994  .  1995  1996  1997 
Ukraine  42.03 -1- 42  42.28  43.32  41.99  40.02  i  53.1  . 49.67  48.9  47.47  43.69 
Belarus  14.07  14.1  14.27  15.65  14  14.44  15.89  21.62  20.61  32.09  28.11 
Total  56.1  56.1  56.55  58.97  55.99  54.46  '  68.99  I 71.29  69.51  79.56  71.8 
TabJeJ4:  Share of  Trade  (IMPORTS) with Ukraine and Belarus as percentage of overall imports from CIS States 1987-97 
CIS State  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Ukraine  41.98  42  41.63  41.8  35.81  47.99  42.3  42.68  48.68  43.1  28.07 
Belarus  16.99  17  17  I  16.36  !  12.9  12.39  22.8  20.2  15.36  20.87  33.1 
Total  58.97  59  58.63  58.16  l  48.71  60.38  65.1  ; 62.88 .  64.04  63.97  61.17 
~------ ---'-~--~-'---------
247 Table 15:  Direct Ukrainian Investment  in Russian Federation as percentage of  overall  Ukrainian investment 
[ 
Investor  1995  1996  1997  19 
Ukraine  20.69  6l.93 
'----- 48.8  33 
-- d 
Table 16: Direct Russian  Investment  in Ukraine as percentage of  overall  foreign investment in Ukraine 
I  Investor-i·  1995--~  1996  1997 
RF  3.95  5.57  7.38 
·-1998  ~1 
7.32 
S_UU1.C_e:  Derzhavnii Komitet Statistiki Ukraini  Ukraina u Tsifrakh 1997  K  yiv 19?8 
*Main Sources for Appendix 3 
(1) Mezhgosudarstvennyi Statisticheskii Komitet Sodruzhestva Nezavismyx Gosudarstv Sodruzhestva Nezavismyx Gosudarstv  v 
1996 Gody (Moscow 1997) 
(2) Gosudarstvennyi  Komitet Rossiiskoi Federatsii Po Statistike  Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 1996, 1997,  1998 
248 Appendix 4 
Table 1: Trade Dependence  of  Soviet Republics C%) alphabetically 
Rel!ublic  %  of Internal Trade  %  of Non USSR I CMEA Trade  I 
I  1 
\ 
Armenia  90.1  9.91 
Azerbaijan  87.7  12.3 ) 
Belarus  86.8  132
1 
Estonia  91.6  8.4 
Georgia  85.9  14.11 
Kazakhstan  88.7  11.31 
1 
Kyrgizia  85.7  14.31 
Latvia  88.6  11.4 i 
Lithuania  j  89.71  10.31 
Moldova  87.71  12.3. 
Russia  60.6  39.41 
Tajikistan  86.5\  13.5 j 
Turkmenia  I  92.5/  7.5 
Ukraine  82.11 
1 UzbekIstan 
\ 
17.9( 
Table 11: Trade Dependence of Soviet Republics C%)  in order of  dependence 
Republic  %  of Internal Trade  %  of Non USSR I CMEA Trade 
Turkmenia  92.5  7.5 
Estonia  91.6  8.4 
Armenia  90.1  9.9 
Lithuania  89.7  10.3 
Uzbekistan  89.4  10.6 
Kazakhstan  88.7  1l.3 
Moldova  87.71  12.31 
I_T....::..a"'-.ii_k_is....::..t_an  __  ~  ______  8.::...6....::...5~1 ________  13.51 
I 
Georgia  85.91  14.11 
Kyrgizia  85.7  14.3
1 
IJJk~a_in_e  __  --c-_______  82_._1+--________  17_._9 i 
~IR_u_s_si_a  _____  ~  ____________  6_0  __  .6~  ____________  39.41 
Source:  Evstigneev, v.P., & Shishkov, Iu.  V.  Reintegratsiya Postsovetskovo Ekonomicheskovo 
Prostranstva i Opyt Zapadnoi Evropy Moscow 1994: Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i 
Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii  RAN  p39 
249 Appendix 5 
Agreement on Russian Belarusian Community 
2 April 1996 
On 2 April in a so lemn setting, the Presidents of Russia and Belarus endorsed a 
Treaty on the Formation of a Community [Soobschestvo] between Russia and 
Belarus. 
Text of the Agreement (in summary form) 
The Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, based on the historic 
closeness, similarities and destiny of  their peoples, confirmed by their desire to 
closeness, as shown in the results of  May referendum (1995) in Belarus and in the 
October decision of  the upper house, the Federal Council of  the Russian Federation 
(1995),  based on the Treaty of  Friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation 
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of  Belarus from 21  February 1995, 
confirmed by their membership in the CIS, the agreement between the Republics of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and the Russian Federation about the deepening of 
integration in the economic and humanitarian spheres from 29 March 1996, 
agreed the following: 
Art 1:  To achieve deeper integration, both sides agreed to form a political and 
economic community of  Russia and Belarus with the aim of  joining material and 
intellectual potential of both states for the benefit of  the economy, to create equal 
standards of  living and individual spiritual development. 
Art 2: It is based on the principles of sovereignty and equality of the participants, 
democracy and respect for human rights and the principles and norms of 
international law. 
Art 3: There will be coordination of foreign policy, a common position on basic 
international questions, mutual cooperation in guaranteeing security, border defence 
250 and the fight against crime. 
With the aim of  guaranteeing security, the sides will formulate common principles for 
military construction, using aspects of  the military infrastructure in accordance with 
national legislation; 
Art 4: For the creation of a single economic space, the effective functioning of  a 
common market, and the free movement of  goods, services, capital and labour, the 
sides agreed that at the end of 1997 to synchronise the stages, timing and depth of 
their economic reforms creating a single normal-legal basis for removal  of any 
interstate barriers, and restrictions and creating equal possibilities for free economic 
activities. 
In this period the sides will form a single, unifying system of  anti monopoly 
legislation, taxes, state support for production, investment regime, norms and laws 
for labour protection, and also the formation of a single customs space and a joint 
serve administration. 
Art 5: At the end of 1996 both sides agreed to take measures to introduce a common 
transport system, with a single tariff for the transport of goods and passengers, and 
also a joint energy system, a common scientific-technological and information space. 
Article 6:  Both sides agreed that at the beginning of 1997, the structural policies for 
the further development of  their economies, having in mind the future creation of  an 
industrial-agrarian complex, based on the mutual interaction of  their economies, 
maximum usage of  the rational division of  labour, specialised and cooperative 
production. 
Art 7: At the end of 1997, the introduction of  a unified monetary-credit and 
budgetary system, creating the conditions for the introduction of  a common 
currency. 
]51 Art 8:  Equal rights of citizens of both states to education, employment, payment of 
wages, and other social guarantees and a common standard of  social security~ 
Art 9-11: Outline the key administrative organs of  the community and their 
functions, including a Supreme Council (the highest body), a Parliamentary Council 
and an Executive Committee~ 
Art:  12: The functions of  the bodies of  the Community will be to introduce common 
economic and social policies and the working out and realization of a joint 
programme~ formation of a single legal basis and measures aimed at a unified 
monetary-credit, tax and budget system. Details other areas for joint cooperation 
including customs, security and meteorological service. 
Art 13: Decisions are not to be taken to the detriment of  the individual 
constitutions~ 
Art 14: Specific budgetary and financial arrangements; 
Art 15: In participating in the Community, each side maintains their sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity, its own constitution, state flag, coat of arms, 
hymns, and other atfributes of state power. 
Members of the Community consider themselves to be subjects of international law 
and conduct relations with other states through diplomatic relations and consuls, as 
concluded in an international treaty. The sides continue to be members of  the UN 
and other international organization. 
Art 17: The further development of  the Comm unity and its structure will be 
detennined by referendum, which will take palace on the territory of  the participant in 
accordance with their national legislation. 
251 Art 18: Membership of  the Community is open to other states; 
Art 19: The agreement is operative from the day of signing. 
Source: Diplomatcheskii Vestnik No 5 May  1996 p39-42 
253 Appendix 6 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine 
31 May 1997 
Summary of  Key Points 
• The lO-year treaty will automatically be extended for 1  O-year periods if 
neither side cancels it. 
• Russia accepts Ukraine's territorial integrity and its sovereignty over the 
Crimean peninsula. 
• It also confirms that Russia will assume all foreign debts accrued by 
Soviet-era Ukraine in exchange for all foreign assets accumulated by 
Kyiv under communism. 
Security Aspects of  the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty 
Russia and Ukraine pledged not to enter into agreements with third countries 
aimed against each-other and not to allow their territories to be used to the 
detriment of  each other's security. 
Black Sea Fleet 
A declaration was also signed on the division of  the Black Sea fleet,  formalizing 
a deal reached earlier by the two Prime Ministers. The key element of  the 
agreement were: 
15.1 • Russia is to rent the bases, ports and infrastructure of  the Black Sea 
Fleet of  the former USSR for a period of20 years. 
• The main bases of  the Russian Black Sea Fleet will be Sevastopol. 
• Russia is entitled to use aerodromes in Gvareiskom and military 
sanatorium in Yalta. 
• Russia is only entitled to have no more than 132 armoured cars in 
Ukraine as well as 24 artillery systems, 22 aeroplanes, and no more that 
25,000 military personnel. 
• Ships must be withdrawn from Ukraine on the basis of 50-50 but Russia 
must transfer to Russia $536.5 million over the course of  2 years. 
• Russia is obliged not to keep any nuclear weapons on its portion of  the 
Black Sea Fleet located in Ukraine. 
Source: Kommersant Daily 29 May 1997 p1&2 
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